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Introduction

Introduction
Internationally, environmental protection has increased through time. Despite this
phenomenon, environmental problems have expanded as developments in technology
have occurred. This is true both in peace time and in war time. Warfare, historically, is
considered the major enemy of the environment. Pollution and environmental devastation
are common consequences of almost every military battle.
The international community’s awareness of this sad fact has led that community
to try to address this dilemma and to set legal frameworks determining liability for
environmental damage caused by military activities. In international law, the
responsibility for environmental devastation occurring during armed conflict can be
attributed to both states and individuals. While the state’s responsibility is civil, the
individual’s responsibility encompasses both civil and criminal.
By and large, the individual’s criminal responsibility for environmental
destruction during armed conflict can be enforced on either the international or the
national level. This study aims to appraise the legal remedy the international community
should take in order to meet its needs on this issue, the protection of the environment
during the time of armed conflict.
In addition, the paper aims to provide a comparative study of the existing
international criminal law framework and its relation to environmental protection during
armed conflict. To approach this objective, the study will review the environmental crisis
that occurred during the armed conflict in the Arabian Gulf in 1990-1991 as a case study
for determining whether the international community adequately responds to these
events.
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Thus, this study is divided into five main parts. Part I assesses the justifications
for a remedy, the criminal remedy, that is more adequate than the United Nations remedy
taken toward Saddam Hussein’s actions against the environment, a civil remedy. Part II
grapples with when the criminal remedy is warranted. Part III deals with the substantive
aspects of international criminal prosecution. Part IV reviews procedural issues
pertaining to international criminal prosecution. Part V examines the criminal remedy
before interested national judicial bodies, the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems.
In Part I, this study discusses the question whether the U.N. remedy taken, a civil
remedy, was adequate, through six steps: the origin of the problem, the environmental
damage that occurred, the remedy taken, the nature of the remedy, the weaknesses of the
remedy, the adequacy of the remedy and alternative remedies. In conclusion, this part of
the study proposes that a criminal remedy (holding war crimes trials for environmental
offenses) should have been used in Saddam Hussein’s case as a suitable remedy to
accomplish the international community’s policy goals.
In Part II, the study encounters several questions: when the criminal remedy is
warranted and whether there are clear guidelines controlling international policy
regarding the prosecution of environmental offenses, more specifically guidelines
determining the gravity of the offense. After concluding that there are no definite
guidelines at the international level concerning the gravity of the offense, the study
examines the source to which international prosecutors should resort and the international
legal basis of this resort.
In Part III, the study appraises the substantive aspects of international criminal
prosecution. This part is divided into two questions. The first question grapples with the
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international criminal basis for prosecuting superiors. Since Saddam Hussein did not
commit actus reus of the environmental offenses, the questions that might have been
raised are: what are the bases for a superior’s criminal responsibility and were they
applicable to the case of Saddam Hussein.
Then, the study reviews those international instruments upon which the
indictments can be based without prejudice to the defendant’s rights, specifically the right
not to be tried under retroactive principles. Subsequently, in Part IV, the study examines
the procedural aspects of international criminal prosecution by addressing those issues
relating to principles of legality, jurisdiction, immunity, the statute of limitations, the
right to be tried without undue delay and the surrender of the defendant to international
criminal tribunals.
After reaching the conclusion that commencing international criminal prosecution
in the case of Saddam Hussein was unlikely to have occured, Part V of this study directs
the process of assessment to the national level. The study’s goal in this part is to explore
whether national legal systems can be substituted for the international legal system; in
other words, whether facing environmental crimes committed during armed conflict is
better done at the national level. Therefore, the study will look at both the positive and
the negative sides of the question at the national level.
Since both are interested states, the study will include both Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal
systems. Kuwait would have been interested in holding this trial since it was the main
party harmed, economically and environmentally, by the environmental offenses. On the
other side, Iraq would have been interested in having this trial within its judicial legal
system because Saddam Hussein was an Iraqi citizen. Referring particularly to the Iraqi
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legal system, the study mainly aims to assess the existing system before adopting an ad
hoc solution, issuing ad hoc national war crimes legislation. However, reviewing the ad
hoc legislation is important to avoid its deficiencies in future Iraqi legislative
amendments.
In this part, the research examines common issues between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi
legal systems. These issues are: the status of international law within the two systems, the
availability of national legislation, the defendant’s immunity before national courts, the
possibility of inflicting the death penalty and some issues relating to evidence and the
defendant’s rights.
Reviewing the Kuwaiti legal system, the study will consider Kuwait’s
international basis to exercise its judicial jurisdiction regarding environmental offenses
committed within its territory. Later on, the review will face the first problem within the
system, obtaining custody of the defendant and the possibility of extradition of the
defendant. Afterward, concluding that the possibility of extradition of the defendant
would have been slight, the study will examine the possibility of having held the trial in
absentia and executing the Kuwaiti sentence within Iraqi territory.
The review of the Iraq legal system begins with a discussion of Iraq’s
jurisdictional basis concerning environmental offenses committed in Kuwaiti territories.
Then, comments will be made concerning environmental offenses regarding the Iraqi
statute issued by the new Iraqi regime after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
After an overall assessment of the research, this study concluded that both
international and national prosecutions for environmental offenses committed during
warfare have their own positive and negative sides.

4
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At the international level, substantively, the positive side of the story is
represented by the existence of international bases for individual responsibility,
criminality and the priority of the international trend to pursue senior offenders.
Moreover, the positive side is not exclusive to the substantive aspect, but extends to
include the procedural aspect as well. Procedurally, the flexibility of the application of
principles of legality, the existence of defendants’ rights which are unfamiliar to some
national legal systems, and the establishment of an international legal precedent might
have been deemed the positive side of this judicial proceeding.
Nevertheless, while certain factors in the international legal system encourage
prosecuting war crimes; including environmental offenses, there are shortcomings in
addressing this prosecution. These shortcomings include the lack of political will,
jurisdictional bases, definitive criminal punishments, and clear guidelines ensuring the
fairness of international prosecution.
On the other hand, at the national level, the negative side of prosecution prevails
over the positive side. National prosecutions might have some advantages which are not
available to international prosecutions. These are the ability to gather evidence, having
local judges and prosecutors who apprehend the origin of the problem and the seriousness
of the offense, and the prevailing culture and tradition in the region of the offense.
However, other obstacles addressing national prosecutions can be expected. These
include the lack of statutes criminalizing the harmful conduct, extradition, the statute of
limitations, inability to execute penal sentences issued in absentia and the non-availability
of the defendant (being in power.) In addition, both limited national sentences as legal
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precedents and the high risk of infringing the defendant’s rights can be considered
negative factors at the national level.
In the end, the view toward pursuing war crimes, including environmental crimes,
differs depending upon the corner from which the view is seen and a battle between
different values should be expected. If the desire to accomplish environmental justice is
the prevailing goal of the prosecution policy, there is no question, at least to some extent,
that achieving the goal will be at the cost of a human rights value, specifically the
defendant’s rights.
If the human rights value becomes unbeatable, then environmental justice will
face some obstacles either nationally or internationally. Therefore, reaching harmony
between international and national legal frameworks is a necessity for the near future.
This does not suggest that the compromise between the two values, environmental justice
and human rights, is impossible, but it is a difficult task to achieve in light of current
developments reached by both some national legal systems and the international legal
system.
Until a compromise between the two values is reached, and the fact that legal
development is not free of suffering is accepted, private interests (defendants’ rights)
should cede priority to common interests (environmental justice) for at least some period
of time.
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Chapter I
Devising an Adequate Remedy for
Using Environmental Damage as a Strategy in
the 1990-1991 Gulf War
Introduction
On August 2, 1990 Iraqi troops, executing Saddam Hussein’s orders, invaded
Kuwaiti territory. He based his orders on several justifications. Before the invasion, Iraq
claimed that Kuwait had exploited Iraq’s diversion by a war with Iran by constructing
military and petroleum facilities on Iraqi territory. 1 This claim of sovereignty
infringement was not Iraq’s only justification; it claimed other theories as well. 2
However, the international community rejected all of these justifications after the Iraqi’s
announcement that it annexed Kuwait on August 6, 1990. 3
One of the remarkable steps the United Nations took to preserve and maintain its
goals was its response to the crisis caused by the then Iraqi president. Before 1945, use of
force was legal and often represented a tool to achieve governmental policy. In 1945,
however, the international community established the United Nations to maintain
international peace and security. 4 Article (2) of the United Nations Charter requires all

1

Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda [Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts
and Iraqi allegations] 17 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic).
2
Iraq claimed that its annexation of Kuwait represented the justice doctrine requiring Arab states to share
wealth “oil” among themselves. Iraq argued that its annexation of Kuwait supported Islamic maxims
obligating every Muslim to fight against corrupted rulers. Lastly, Iraq contended that both the state of
Kuwait and United Arab Emirates were in a conspiracy against Iraq to increase their production of oil to
decrease the price to harm the Iraqi economy. Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda
[Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts and Iraqi allegations] 32 (Center for Research and Studies
on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic).
3
Security Council Resolution (662) provides that “… annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and
whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void.” See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2934st mtg, P.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).
4
Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter provides “ The Purposes of United Nations are: 1. To maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
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members to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

5

The Charter lists

several mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution in lieu of force of arms. 6
As a general rule, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 7
However, the use of force in self-defense has always been recognized as legitimate in
international law. 8
Within the United Nations framework, the Security Council has primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. 9 From 1945 to 1990, the
Security Council rarely invoked its power under chapter VII because conflicts during this
period usually involved one of the two “superpowers,” the United States or the Soviet
Union, or their clients, and both superpowers were permanent Members 10 of the Security
Council with veto power. During this period, the only Security Council authorization to

and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.” U.N. Charter art.1, para. 1.
5
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
6
U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. Although at time states continue to resort to the use of military force against
other states to resolve disputes, however, implicating further Charter provisions. U.N. Charter arts. 39-45.
7
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. See J. G. Merrills, The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in The
United Nations and the Principles of International Law 49-65 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds.,
Routledge 1994).
8
The United Nations Charter states “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council..” U.N. Charter art. 51. See Adams Roberst, The Use of Force in The UN Security
Council 133 (David M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004).
9
U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. See Max Hilaire, United Nations Law and the Security Council 5-24
(Ashgate Publishing Company 2005).
10
U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. See Susan C. Hulton, Council Working Methods and Procedure in The UN
Security Council 237 (David M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004); see Pual Kennedy, The
Parliament of Men 51-76 (Penguin Books Ltd 2007).
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use force against a “breach of peace” was in response to North Korea’s attack on South
Korea in 1950 (at a time when the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council and
therefore was unable to cast a veto.) 11 After the Soviet Union returned to the Security
Council, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that if the Security Council
failed to exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security, the General Assembly “shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.” 12
Beginning in 1990, with the end of the Cold War and the decline of West-East
tension, the Security Council became much more active in authorizing the deployment of
military forces. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Security Council
adopted a resolution that it “1) condemns Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; and 2) demands that
Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which
they were located on 1 August 1990.” 13
After Iraq ignored the international community’s resolution, the Security Council
resorted to stronger mechanisms by imposing trade sanctions 14 and authorizing forcible
maritime interception operations by states acting in defense of Kuwait. 15 Ultimately, the
Security Council authorized states “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement”

11

The Security Council recommended that states furnish “such assistance” to South Korea as necessary to
repel that attack and restore international peace and security in the area. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th
Sess., 474st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (1950).
12
G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302 mtg, U.N. Doc. (1950).
13
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
14
S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933st mtg, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
15
S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
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Security Council decisions that demanded Iraq’s immediate and unconditional
withdrawal. 16
Under that authority, the United States, leading a multinational coalition in
January 1991, commenced an air campaign that concluded 42 days later after coalition
ground forces swept through Kuwait and into southern Iraq, setting up a buffer zone
between the two states. During that armed conflict, Saddam Hussein used all available
tools attempting to prevent the coalition forces from liberating Kuwait. One of these tools
was environmental destruction accomplished primarily by releasing and burning oil
which caused massive pollution to all environmental elements (hydrosphere, lithosphere,
and atmosphere.) 17 This destruction of the environment represented a unique event in the
history of warfare. 18
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a perfect example of the breach of peace and
international security cited by the United Nations Charter and reflects clear violations of
both international and regional treaties. 19 It is, as described by the first U.S. President

16

S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963st mtg, para. 2 U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). See Frank
Berman, The Authorization Model: Resolution 678 and Its Effects in The UN Security Council 153 (David
M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004).
17
Hydrosphere means the aqueous vapor of the atmosphere. Lithosphere includes the outer part of the solid
earth composed of rock essentially like that exposed at the surface, consisting of the crust and outermost
layer of the mantle, and usually considered to be about 60 miles (100 kilometers) in thickness. Atmosphere
encompasses the whole mass of air surrounding the earth .
18
A detailed study of the causes and effects of the pollution are included in appendices 2. See infra. app. 2
19
For instance, it violates article 2 (4) of U.N. Charter. This article provides “The Organization and its
Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following
Principles…. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations …” U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The invasion infringes the
League of Arab States. Article V of the League provides “Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes
between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited.” Charter of the League of Arab States art.
V; In addition, the invasion was a clear violation of Islamic Brotherhood Rules. See Dr. Abdullah AlGneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda [Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts and Iraqi allegations]
18 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic); Indeed, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
implicates the General Assembly’s definition of aggression and its examples. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974). Art 1, 3(a).
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Bush, “a blatant use of military aggression.” 20 The legality under international law of the
Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait is crucial

21

to establishing Iraq’s responsibility for

those environmental impacts. This legality is beyond the scope of this paper.
Chapter I of this thesis examines the sufficiency of the U.N. remedy for the
environmental damage caused by Saddam Hussein during the 1990 conflict and whether
a better remedy could have been devised. Part I of this chapter briefly surveys the
environmental impacts caused by Saddam Hussein during the conflict. Part II describes
the U.N. remedy imposed for that deliberate environmental destruction and Part III
examines whether this remedy was civil or criminal. Part IV investigates the difficulties
and disadvantages of the U.N. remedy. Part V addresses whether the U.N. remedy was
sufficient to meet the international community’s need to protect the global environment
during armed conflict. Finally, Part VI responds to arguments against the proposed
remedy, a criminal remedy.
I.

Environmental Impacts on the Gulf Region
Armed conflict is an enemy of the environment. One observer wrote “the worst of

all polluters is war.” 22 Another said that “[i]t is a truism that warfare is detrimental to the
environment.” 23 Although “the environment has been a repeated victim of military
strategy,” 24 we did little about it. Environmental destruction in war has been caused in

20

Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and It’s Oil, N.Y. TIMES, August 3, 1990, at A1, Col. 6.
Some argue that using the oil during the Gulf armed conflict represents a clear violation of the laws on
use of force. A prerequisite for this argument is that the use of force from the beginning must be unjustified
and illegal according to international law. See Anthony Leibler, Delibrate Wartime Environmental
Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67 (1992).
22
Elisabeth Mann-Borgese, The Protection of the Marine Environment in the Case of War, in the Future of
the International Law of the Environment 105-106 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1985).
23
Aruther H. Westing, The Environment Aftermath of Warfare in Viet Nam, 23 NAT. RECOURCES J.
365, 387 (1983).
24
Marc Ross, Environmental Warfare and The Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat
International Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 515, 517 (1992).
21
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many ways. 25 The Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 is an ideal example of environmental
destruction as a military tactic.
In setting fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, Saddam Hussein invented a new military
weapon. He used it to destroy the environment and Kuwaiti property. His attack on oil
was unlimited and indiscriminate; it pervaded the entire biosphere. Saddam Hussein’s
actions exceeded environmentalists’ greatest fears. 26 He proved that his threat to destroy
the environment 27 was not a “joke”. With regard to Iraqi actions against the environment,
the wonder was “What kind of people would do this? That’s what we kept asking
ourselves in Kuwait City yesterday. Day had been turned into night, so thick was the
canopy of smoke as the nation’s oil wells burned gold and orange along the black-fringed
horizon.” 28
This environmental crisis was caused on Saddam Hussein’s orders. Destruction
of oil, a natural resource, was one of the strategic aims of the Iraqi aggression. According
to captured Iraqi documents, 29 this destruction plan was called the "Deferred Destruction
Plan." Therefore, it is clear that the destruction was not inadvertent nor imposed by
pressing circumstances nor the result of aerial bombardment by the Coalition Forces as
Iraqi authorities claimed. 30 In short, it was a premeditated crime and it was calculated as
part of the overall strategic plan of the Iraqi invasion.

25

Marc Ross, Environmental Warfare And The Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat
International Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 515, 517-520 (1992).
26
Whatever Happened to….Chemical Weapons, TIMES, March 11, 1991, at 19.
27
Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23, 1991, at A10.
28
Robert Fisk, Crisis in the Gulf: Something Evil Has Visited Kuwait City, The INDEPENDENT,
February 28, 1991, at 1.
29
See infra. App. 3.
30
Letter dated 17 June 1993 From The Permanent Representative of Iraq to The United Nations Addressed
to the President of Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25976 (1993). ¶ 9, 11.
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The extent of the then Iraqi leader’s role or involvement in the destruction plan is
derived through direct and indirect (circumstantial) evidence. The indirect connection is
based upon the following analysis: according to Iraqi documents, since the Republican
Guard was responsible for implementing the destruction plan 31 and these forces received
their orders directly from the head of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein masterminded
this plan or ordered that it be created. In addition to the indirect connection theory, there
were several captured Iraqi documents which indicate that this plan was ordered by the
Iraqi leader personally. The plan caused massive pollution in the region.

Hydrosphere pollution was caused by several sources (oil fires, oil lakes and
fallen substances). This type of pollution resulted in severe and expected health risks to
both human beings and other creatures. Lithosphere pollution resulting from oil lakes
caused further damage. Atmosphere pollution was another result of the oil fires and oil
lakes. This pollution injured human and animal health without warning. The pollution
caused by Saddam Hussein’s actions had no temporal or jurisdictional limit in harming
the environment. 32
Even fish eggs and larva were affected by air pollution caused by the fire from oil
wells. One of the studies reported that some dangerous petroleum materials were found in

31

Item 2 of document 5 provides “Appointed sabotage squads to mine the oil wells and power and
electricity stations that have been prepared for deferred destruction, and preparing and finalizing all the
requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated place in order to blow
up these targets as soon as orders are issued.” This document is a memo issued 10 days after the invasion
by the Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard Infantry Brigades 19, 20, 22 and 23,
Artillery Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Air Defense Command of Nubukhath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Armored Battalion Command, Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of
Republican Guard. This document shows the involvement of the Republican Guard in implementing the
Deferred Destruction Plan. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.
32
A detailed study of the causes and effects of the pollution are included in appendix 2. See infra. App. 2.
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high concentration on the water surface. 33 It is well established that these materials cause
harm to fish eggs and larva. 34 Moreover, oil may cover and the block gills of fish causing
fish martality. 35
Oil lakes also affect soil adversely. Toxic substances resulting from the oil lakes
may accumulate in plant tissue, constituting a carcinogen which causes death to any
animal eating such plants. 36 Areas within the boundaries of the oil lakes were considered
biologically dead. 37 After the oil lake dried, oil tar or sludge remained, causing severe
disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the soil
environment. 38
Dark coloration of the soil surface leads to greater heat absorption, increased soil
temperature, and consequently increased water loss by evaporation. 39 A study
acknowledged that damages to natural vegetation were caused by the increased
temperature of atmosphere and soil, the decrease of photosynthetic activity from the

33

Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in
Iraqi Documents] 249 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
34
Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in
Iraqi Documents] 249 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
35
Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 47 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).
36
Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 (Kuwait Institute for Scientific
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).
37
M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).
38
M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).
39
M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).
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burning of many oil lakes. 40 Finally, oil lakes affected the ground water aquifer. 41 Sea
water used to extinguish the oil-well fires also contributed to the loss of soil
productivity. 42
As for the effect on public health, some studies show that asthma and respiratory
system problems increased after the pollution occurred. 43 These studies concluded that
children were more vulnerable to these types of disease than adults.44 Also, an increase in
allergies of the eyes, skin, and nose was noticed during 1991. 45 Smoke caused by oil fires
reached the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. 46
A decrease in natural childbirth and an increase of short-weight children were
recorded. 47 One of the studies suggests that air pollution caused by the burning oil wells
was one of the causes of increasing natural abortions and of congenital deformities. 48
These are some of the short term health effects reported after the invasion. Now there is a

40

M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 174 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).
41
See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells
in Iraqi Documents] 271-296 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic); See also Dr.
Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ Natural
Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 202 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).
42
The amount of sea water used to extinguish oil-well fires was estimated at about 1.5 billion gallons
(25,000 gallons daily) Due to temperature increase, water evaporates and salt remains in soil which
prevents plant growth. The amount of salt added to soil due to the use of sea water was about 76,500 tons
of salt. It cannot be washed out by a little of rain water (100-150 millimeters annually). See Dr. Abdullah
Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi
Documents] 261,266 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
43
See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells
in Iraqi Documents] 231 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
44
See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 232 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
45
See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells
in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
46
Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 261 (Kuwait University, 1992).
47
See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells
in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
48
M. Maqseed, The Effects of the Aggressive Iraqi Invasion on the Obstetric Practice in Maternity Hospital
of Kuwait, 47 (Kuwait Foundation For the Advancment Science, ed. 1995).
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long-term study of 400 families in Kuwait being conducted to examine the long-term
effects of air pollution caused by the burning of the oil wells and this study is expected to
last from 15 to 25 years. 49
Sadly, “The newest victims of this war wear no dog tags. They carry no proof of
nationality. They espouse no conviction that God or Justice or history is on their side.
Indeed they took no side.” 50 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
cautioned “What is being destroyed today-and the damage which has been and could be
caused stay with us-all of us- for a very long time. It will affect generations to come
which have had no say in the matter.” 51 It was not surprising that environmental damages
caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were cited clearly in the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 687 for the first time in history as compensable damages for which
Iraq is liable. 52
II.

United Nations Remedy for Environmental Devastation
Iraq’s international liability for the environmental damages it caused during the

Gulf armed conflict was established by the Security Council Resolution 687 stating
“Iraq… is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.” 53

49

Dr. Mustafa Al-Desouky, Impact of Oil Well Fires on the Air Quality in Kuwait, a paper presented to
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 26
(on file with author).
50
Ellen Goodman, A Crime Against Humanity and Nature, CHI. TRIB. February 3, 1991, at 4.
51
United Nations Program, Gulf War Oil spill: UNEP Appeal for International Action, News Release, 1991
No. 1.
52
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
53
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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Iraq accepted this liability in a letter directed to both the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council three days after Resolution 687 was passed. To
create a mechanism to implement Iraq’s liability, the Security Council created “a fund to
pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above [direct loss claims as a
result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait] and to establish a commission to
administer the fund.” 54
Thus, the Security Council directed the Secretary-General to “develop and present
to the Security Council for decision… [and] recommendations for the fund to meet the
requirement for the payment of claims… and for a programme to implement the
decisions, including: administration of the fund, mechanisms for determining the
appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of
the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be
suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements
of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity assessed by international financial
institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi
economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by
which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating
losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect
of Iraq’s liability, and the composition of the commission.” 55
On May 20, 1991 the Security Council passed Resolution 692 adopting the
Secretary-General’s recommendations to establish the commission and the fund

54
55

S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg, P.18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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administration. 56 Less than three months later, the Security Council approved the
suggestion of the Secretary-General that the fund receive up to 30% of the annual value
of petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq. 57
The United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC), suggested by the
Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council, is not “a court or arbitral
tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially
fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses,
assessing payments and resolving disputed claims; it is only in this last respect that a
quasi-judicial function may be involved.” 58 The UNCC is a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations Security Council.
Establishing the UNCC was a unique and unprecedented event 59 in international
law. The UNCC differs from the mixed claims commissions commonly used to resolve
international disputes for over 200 years. First, the UNCC’s commissioners were not
chosen by disputing parties, but were appointed by the Governing Council, the supreme
body of the UNCC, after nomination by the Secretary-General. Second, the UNCC did
not follow adversary procedures permitting parties to appear before panels of
commissioners. Importantly, commissioners are independent to ensure impartiality of the
process. 60

56

S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2987st mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991).
S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 3004st mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (1991).
58
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution (687) 1991,
May 2, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22559.
59
See David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition of
International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 2 (1994); Stanley J. glod, International
Claims Arising Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT’L L. 713, 719 (1991).
60
See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 9 (1998).
57
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The UNCC consists of three main bodies: the Governing Council, Panels of
Commissioners, and the Secretariat. The claims process begins with the Secretariat and
ends before the Governing Council. The Governing Council, whose membership reflects
the composition of the Security Council at any given time, is charged with “establishing
guidelines on all policy matters... Organizing the work of the commission and the
procedures to be applied to the processing of claims and to the settlement of disputed
claims…” 61 In addition, the “amounts recommended by the panels of commissioners are
subject to approval by the Governing Council.” 62 The Governing Council’s decisions are
final and not subject to appeal. 63
Panels of commissioners consisting of three members have to “report in writing
[to]the Governing Council on the claims received and the amount recommended to be
awarded for each claimant.” 64 The Secretariat provides administrative, technical, and
legal services to the Governing Council and panels of commissioners. 65
Regarding claims resolution, panels of commissioners are required to apply
“Security Council Resolution (687) and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, the
criteria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any

61

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution (687) 1991,
May 2, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22559, at 19, II/M-4.
62
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council,
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 40 (1), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).
63
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council,
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 40 (4), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).
64
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council,
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 38 (e), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).
65
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council,
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 34, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).
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pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary,
commissioners might apply other relevant rules of international law.” 66
As a general matter, panels of commissioners are required to reach decisions
regarding claims within six months from the date the commissioners receive the claims.
However, where claims are “large and complex”, a panel is allowed to review them for
up to 18 months. Environmental claims were considered “large and complex claims.”
Deadlines were established to file claims. 67
III. The Nature of the United Nations Remedy
In municipal law, when violation of the law causes environmental damages,
administrative, civil, and criminal remedies are available to natural legal persons. Some
of these remedies may not be available in international law due to state sovereignty or to
the lack of legal structure or political will.
It can be argued that the U.N. remedy imposed on Iraq is civil. However, if
international law creates criminal responsibility for violating states, one of the remedies
would be payment of compensation. The similarity of the compensatory remedy in
criminal and civil actions makes it difficult to determine whether the U.N. liability
imposed is criminal or civil.
Both types of liabilities arise from the same legal source: violation of an
international obligation. It should be noted that under international law imposing criminal
responsibility on a state’s nationals does not prevent imposing any other kind of

66

Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council,
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 31, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).
67
U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing , http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited
April 1, 2006).
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responsibility on the state itself. 68 In the context of the debate regarding the penal
responsibility of states, proponents say that the penal responsibility of states is an
international expression of outrage toward a state’s policy which is in conflict with
internationally accepted norms. 69 The justification for such a view is that the state’s
population should either have prevented the commission of the international crime or
imposed a liability that would have deterred the decision-maker and stimulated the public
to take affirmative action to stop the crime or at least to attempt to prevent its
commission. 70
Although the penal responsibility of states at the international level has no place
yet in any international convention, 71 it has been argued that Germany in the wake of
World War II was subject to penal responsibility.72 Thus, the absence of this
responsibility from international conventions has led some to argue that penal
responsibility should be found in other sources of international law. 73 Others argue that
states may be subject to responsibility for international crimes, but that such
responsibility is neither civil nor criminal but international. 74

68

Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind lays down “The fact
that the present Code provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against peace and security of
mankind without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of states under international law.” Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25
(4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).
69
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
70
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 85 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
71
The concept of the penal responsibility of states was not adopted in the international tribunals’
jurisprudence regardless of the source of such tribunal, victorious states agreement (Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals), U.N. Security Council’s decisions (international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda), or international treaty (International Criminal Court).
72
Robert Friedlander, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law: Fact or Fiction?, 17 Case-W. Res. J.
Int’l. L. 79, 85 (1985).
73
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
74
Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EJIL 425, 433 (1999).
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The impression that the penal responsibility of states might exist on the
international level arises from the appearance of two terms, “act of state” and
“international crimes,” in the “1996-text of the draft code on states responsibility” 75 of
the International Law Commission (ILC). Article 19 provides:
1. An act of a state which constitutes a breach of an international
obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subjectmatter of the obligation breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a state
of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a
crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an international crime.
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law
in force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:
(a) A serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance
for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that
prohibiting aggression;
(b) A serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance
for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that
prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial
domination;
(c) A serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation
of essential importance for safeguarding and preservation of the human
environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the
atmosphere or of the seas.
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in
accordance with paragraph 2, constitutes an international delict. 76

Opponents of the penal liability of states claim that such liability violates a
fundamental principal of criminal justice requiring that both liability and punishment be
inflicted personally. 77 Thus, the center of this argument is that the penal responsibility of

75

Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp.
(No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
76
Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Third session (Apr.23-June1 and July 2-Aug.10,
2001), U.N. DOC. A/56/10 and corr. 1 (2001); see also Joseph Weiler et al. eds., A Crictical Anyalsis of
the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Walter de Grayter 1989). In its approval text of 2001,
the ILC does not recognize the penal responsibility of states.
77
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
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states allows imposing criminal sanctions on those who play no role in planning, carrying
out, aiding and abetting, or committing the prohibited behavior. 78
The penal responsibility of states does not arise in every case where an
international crime is committed. The criminal conduct should be considered a product of
state-action. State-action would exist when “collective decision-making and actions by
individuals who develop a policy or who execute a policy carry out acts which constitute
international crimes under color of legal authority.” 79 In some cases, when a decision is
taken by a dictator, individual criminal responsibility will be sufficient to do justice.
Although a review of existing international law suggests that the penal
responsibility of states does not yet exist, even assuming that the penal responsibility of
states does exist in international law, the question might be raised: Was Iraq held
criminally liable for the environmental consequences that resulted from the Gulf War of
1991? It appears that the remedy taken against Iraq as a result of deliberate environmental
destruction is civil for two reasons. First, it seems that Saddam Hussein, as a dictator,
made decisions regarding using the environment as a weapon in the war by himself. As a
result, in this case, it seems that the “State-action” requirement does not exist since the
decision to order the destruction of the environment was not taken collectively.
78

Professor Bassiouni poses several questions regarding the penal responsibility of states. These questions
are: “1. Can a state criminal responsibility be established without establishing the individual criminal
responsibility of decision-makers and of the principal executor? 2. If the individual criminal responsibility
of decision-makers and the principal executor is required, (i) what elements of criminal responsibility are
applicable to such individuals, and (ii) is a state criminal responsibility a consequence of individual
criminal responsibility or is it something separate and apart from it? 3. When a state criminal responsibility
is established, can it serve as the basis for establishing the individual criminal responsibility of persons
other than decision-makers and principal executors, and in that case (i) what are the elements of this
derivative individual criminal responsibility, and (ii) in what way does this derivative criminal
responsibility arise? 4. How can state criminal responsibility exist without becoming a form of collective
criminal responsibility that would violate fundamental principles of individual justice?”
5. Can penalties for state criminal responsibility be developed that would not penalize individuals who had
no part in the conduct for which criminal responsibility is to be imposed? See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Introduction to International Criminal Law 88 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
79
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 85 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
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Secondly, under international law, in order to impose criminal liability, the
international community is generally eager to ensure that the required international
standards for justice are preserved. These standards emphasize which authority should
decide that kind of responsibility (Judicial bodies), the standards of proof, and the
defendant’s rights. In reviewing how the U.N. remedy was imposed, many of the
standards assuring fairness in a criminal process were absent. Therefore, the U.N. remedy
imposed in Iraq for environmental destruction was not a criminal remedy.
IV.

Difficulties with and Disadvantages of the United Nations Remedy
Because it was an innovation, the UNCC faced several difficulties and challenges.

Even before the UNCC was established, some contended that the Security Council did
not have the authority to establish such a commission since this would make the Security
Council a judicial organ to solve disputed claims raised by the invasion. 80 The argument
pointed out that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the only judicial body in the
United Nations system, making that Court the only mechanism to review and resolve
such litigation. However, the argument that the ICJ must review Kuwait’s claims against
Iraq for environmental damage ignores the obstacles this remedy could have faced. 81
Another obstacle the UNCC had to grapple with was funding. The UNCC’s
operation was expected to be funded by the sale of Iraqi petroleum. To support this
method, the Security Council in 1991 82 allowed Iraq to sell its oil as a temporary

80

See Luan Low, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law
after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 471 (1995).
81
These obstacles are: First, several interested governments such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia do not
accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction. Time consumed to review such claims by the Court is another factor
supporting exclusion of such an option. Affected states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia might not be able
to devote an effort to such a litigation process since they were so busy with other burdensome obligations.
Shiilpi Gupta, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT’L EVNTL. L. REV. 251,
268-269 (1993).
82
S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 3004st mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (1991).
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exception to the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq as a result of the invasion of
Kuwait. Unexpectedly, Iraq refused the UN’s scheme. 83
To facilitate UNCC operation, it was allowed access to the Working Capital Fund
of the United Nations. In 1995, the Security Council adopted Resolution 986 providing
Iraq with the so called “oil-for-food” agreement. After some delays, the deal began to
function as of December 1996. The amount deducted for the UNCC was later reduced to
25%. On May 23, 2003 when Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1483 whereby the amount deducted for compensation was reduced to
5% of the proceeds of the sale of Iraq’s petroleum. 84 As mentioned before, the UNCC
does not follow an adversary model. Although in practice it was proved that Iraq had
been given some opportunity to be heard in the commission process, some contended that
Iraq should have been given more opportunity. 85
Another challenge the UNCC had to deal with was conflicting interests. On the
one hand, a claim should be solved within a required time; while on the other hand, the
process requires solving the claims in an unprejudiced manner especially for Iraq. 86
In addition, one of the disadvantages of the U.N. remedy concerning
environmental claims lies in the priority of these claims. Within the UNCC framework,
claims were divided into six categories: A, B, C, D, E and F. 87 Category “F” claims are
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U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited
April 1, 2006).
84
U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited
April 1, 2006).
85
See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 1, 23-29 (1998).
86
See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 1, 27 (1998).
87
The category “A” claims are submitted by individuals who had to depart from Kuwait or Iraq between
the date of Iraq’s invasion on August 2, 1990 and the date of the cease-fire on March 2, 1991. Category “B”
claims are submitted by individuals who suffered serious injury or whose spouse, children or parent died as
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claims filed by governments and international organizations for losses incurred in
evacuating citizens; damage to diplomatic premises and loss of, and damage to, other
government property; and damage to the environment. 88
In the beginning of UNCC operations, the focus was on the individual’s claims
(A, B and C), for humanitarian reasons. 89 Because these claims did not involve a large
amount of money and Iraq did not contend its liability for these losses, these claims did
not require a detailed review. Thus, the Governing Council adopted its first decision
giving these claims priority for review and payment. 90
Subsequently, the UNCC’s focus shifted to D, E and F claims very carefully and
in a detailed manner have shifted concentration to these claims. 91 The commission
divided these claims into sub-categories depending on the type of loss and the similarity
of factual and legal valuation factors. A sub-category of mixed E/F claims was
recognized also.

a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Category “C” claims are individual claims for
damages up to US $100,000 each. These claims include losses relating to departure from Kuwait or Iraq,
personal injury, mental pain and anguish, loss of personal property, loss of bank account, stocks and other
securities, loss of income, loss of real property, and individual business loss. Category “D” claims are
individuals’ claims for damages above US $100,000 each. These claims relate to loss of personal property,
loss of real property, loss of income, and individual business loss. Category “E” are corporations’ claims
and those of other private legal entities and public sector enterprises. These claims include construction and
contract loss, loss from non-payment for goods and services, losses relating to the destruction or seizure of
business assets, loss of profits, and oil sector losses. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, The Claims
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm ( last visited April 1, 2006).
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17 (1994).
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Commissioners for the Review of Higher Amount Individual Claims, Corporate Claims and Governmental
Claims, U.N. Doc. IK/96/7 (1996).
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Environmental claims were classified as “F4” claims. The Commission has
received 170 F4 claims seeking US $ 80 billion in compensation. 92 “F4” claims were
divided into two groups: first, claims related to environmental damages inflicted in the
Gulf region as a result of setting fire to oil wells or releasing oil into the Gulf; second,
claims by governments outside the region that assisted with the environmental disaster.
The deadline for filing environmental claims was January 15, 2002. 93
It is important to bear in mind that UNCC’s jurisdiction is limited to “direct loss
or damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources…” 94
The UNCC decided that direct loss included “any loss suffered as a result of military
operations or the threat of military action by either side during the period 2 August 1990
to 2 March 1991.” 95
The Governing Council established “Criteria for claims.” 96 Environmental
damages, according to the criteria, are the following: “(a) Abatement and prevention of
environmental damages, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and
stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters; (b) Reasonable measures
taken to clean and restore the environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of
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the environmental damage for the purpose of evaluating and abating the harm and
restoring the environment; (d) Depletion of or damage to a natural resource.” 97
Kuwait argued that its environmental claims should have been given priority over
other claims since they were mentioned clearly and independently in the Security Council
resolution. 98 However, mentioning these environmental damages in a Security Council
resolution was not sufficient to advance the rank of environmental claims for payment
priority. 99
After reviewing the nature of the U.N. remedy and its shortcomings, the question
is, assuming that the U.N. remedy constitutes a civil remedy, does it suffice or should we
turn to a criminal remedy as well?
V.

The Sufficiency of the United Nations Remedy
In Iraq’s case, recognizing the existence of a dictatorship in Iraq during the period

of environmental destruction, the assumption is that the decisions taken regarding
environmental destruction were taken by the then Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. The
responsibility of the then President of Iraq is the core of this paper.
There is no question that other members of the former Iraqi government could
have been found liable for the environmental damage that resulted from the Gulf War
1991. The basis of such a responsibility varies depending on the other government
members’ involvement in taking and implementing the decision for environmental
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destruction. The basis of the responsibility of the then President of Iraq will be discussed
later in this paper. 100
This part of the paper argues that the U.N. remedy for the environmental
destruction caused by Saddam Hussein’s orders does not meet the current policy the
international community adopted for protection of the environment. In this part of the
paper, the focus will be on the international community’s policy for environmental
protection. In other words, how important is the environment in the international
community’s view? And what is the best remedy to serve this policy?
The importance of the environment has been established by the highest judicial
body in international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated, in its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, “[T] he environment is
not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of
human beings, including generations unborn.” 101 The Court’s statement reflects the
increase in the importance of environmental protection on an international level.
International protection of the environment is constantly increasing both in peace
time and in war time. During peace time, protection extends to many of the
environmental elements (atmosphere, water, land, and endangered species) at
international, regional, and national levels. 102 Such protection is beyond the scope of this
paper which focuses on the international trend to move beyond the traditional civil
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remedy, against responsible states, to individual criminal responsibility in the case of
deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict.
Even though international environmental law (IEL) has emerged and focuses on
protection of the environment during peace time, 103 while environmental protection
during armed conflict has developed through the laws of war, 104 the two regimes interact.
As a result, developments in one regime contribute to developments in the other.
Therefore, it has been argued that IEL should be considered in any process of
interpretation of the laws of armed conflict. 105 Environmental protection in war time,
however, has developed more slowly. Probably one of the main reasons for this slow
development is that the law of war is based on a remedy taken in case of the occurance of
a violation. The responsibility attached to environmental violation during armed conflict
time is usually criminal. Thus, such a remedy often touches upon a sensitive doctrine
recognized in international law, that of state sovereignty, particularly criminal
jurisdiction.
In the past, environmental protection during armed conflict depended indirectly
on the laws of war. Protection of the environment was not the main purpose for enacting
these international instruments. The main reason was to humanize the tools and means of
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war. 106 In the past, protection of the environment could have been achieved indirectly
through the prohibition on chemical warfare,

107

and the protection of objects which are

considered important to the civilian population. 108
Since 1972, when the United Nations held a conference on the human
environment in Stockholm, the international community has begun to pay more attention
to environmental issues and environmental protection has begun to gain its own
independence. 109
Although the Stockholm Declaration 110 that resulted from the Conference is not a
binding instrument, it was a first step toward more protection for the environment on the
international level. The Declaration is the cornerstone on which the idea of environmental
106

Michael Howard, Constraints on Warfare in The Laws of War 1, 8 (Michael Howard et. al. eds., Yale
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protection was laid in both peace and war time. Later on, the movement from the civil
responsibility of the state to criminal responsibility of the individual is reflected in
international legal instruments. 111
Five years after the Stockholm Declaration, responding to the conduct of the
United States military armed forces’ against the environment in the Vietnam War, two
steps were taken in the context of environmental protection during armed conflict. The
first was adoption of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict. 112 Protocol I deals with
environmental protection in several articles and considers environmental destruction
during international armed conflict a violation of the laws of armed conflict. 113
The second step taken was the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1976 and opened for signature in 1977. 114 Although this
Convention kept to the traditional remedy against a state violating the Convention’s
provisions, it is a remarkable step affirming environmental protection when a military
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 (2)(b)(iv), UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998); Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art.
20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
112
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977).
113
Article 35(3) provides “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” Article
55(1) prescribes “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of the method or means of
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
arts. 35 (3), 55 (1), 1125 UNTS 3 (1977).
114
Article I(1) provides that “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I (1), 31
UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152 (1977).

33

Sufficiency of the U.N. Remedy
action is about to be taken. These two steps paved the way for the notion that deliberate
environmental destruction as a military strategy during armed conflict violates the
common conviction of the international community.
Consequently, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 115 began an endeavor to particularize environmental protection globally by
focusing on a specific element, water. Protection of other specific elements has also
occurred, including the atmosphere, the ozone layer, 116 biological diversity, 117 climate
change, 118 and endangered species. 119
The importance of the UNCLOS is rooted in its unique features. It authorizes
states to use criminal sanctions to protect the marine environment, imposing an obligation
to protect and preserve it. 120 The Convention calls upon states to adopt laws that prevent,
reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, seabed
activities, vessels, and the atmosphere. 121
The Convention authorizes monetary and stricter penalties against violations.122
Although it is not clear whether the UNCLOS is applicable during armed conflict, since
its terms were drafted broadly, 123 the argument that the UNCLOS is applicable during
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armed conflict can be made. 124 This Convention shows the international trend toward
criminal responsibility in the field of environmental protection and the existence of a
criminal remedy in the minds of drafters and negotiators of international conventions.
Protection of the environment during armed conflict was not absent when the
U.N. Charter of Nature 125 was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1982. Even
though a U.N. General Assembly resolution is not binding, it might serve as supportive
and as disclosing evidence of predominant international rules. 126 Two decades after the
Stockholm conference, the United Nations held its second conference on environment
and development at Rio de Janeiro. This Conference witnessed the birth of a second
environmental declaration called the Rio Declaration.127 This Declaration was more
definite and expressive than the Stockholm Declaration on environmental protection
during armed conflict. 128

their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control
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The Rio Declaration did not overlook the necessity for environmental protection
during armed conflict. 129 A noteworthy feature of the Rio Declaration was Principle 15
that provides “In order to protect the environment, a precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there is a threat of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 130
Even though it is obvious that such a clause is meant to apply to those national
guidelines or policies governing activities that might harm the environment, especially
industrial activities, there is no evidence that this approach does not apply to military
activities. In any case, this principle shows the new approach that the international
community has begun to adopt.
This approach is called the precautionary principle. Even though the
precautionary principle is new, it has not affected the traditional remedy for any violation
of the Declaration, the state’s responsibility. The precautionary principle is “a policy for
action in the face of uncertainty.” 131 It has been argued that this approach is part of
international customary law. 132
The precautionary principle is stricter in the sense that it focuses on preventing
the occurrence of adverse activities, while the traditional remedial approach centers on
the question of what should be done after environmental damage has occurred. These
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approaches are, to some extent, similar to the approaches of tort and criminal laws.
Criminal law aims mainly to prevent harm from occurring. It is precautionary or
preventive, while tort law focuses more on the victim’s compensation and is remedial, 133
although retribution and deterrence can be viewed as other goals of tort law. 134
Criminal law aims to “prevent harm to society, more specifically, to prevent
injury to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the public order.”

135

In other words,

criminal responsibility is imposed to achieve either general or specific deterrence. 136
Deterrence’s goal is to prevent adverse consequences from occurring. Preventing such
consequences is the essence of the precautionary principle of the international
community.
Therefore, any legal remedy taken toward deliberate environmental destruction
should recognize the contemporary international community’s precautionary or
preventive policy. Such a remedy should focus more on deterrence than on the victim’s
compensation. In 1996, issuing its final Draft Code on Crimes against the Peace and the
Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the preventive
approach by recognizing the notion that deliberate environmental destruction during
international armed conflict is a war crime. 137 Finally, international efforts to protect the
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environment were crowned by the inclusion of environmental protection during armed
conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 138
This movement towards criminalization of environmental destruction during
armed conflict is not unique in international law. The emergence of international criminal
law is a fact at the current time. 139 It is a movement toward criminal protection for the
environment during armed conflict does not affect or prejudice the civil responsibility of
states regarding environmental damage caused by warfare.
Again, to best accomplish deterrence against environmental damage, the stake of
potential violators must be raised and the responsibility must be narrowed and personal.
The required remedy must attack the defendant’s interests, monetary or non-monetary.
Thus, remedies must be directed toward real defendants, those who made decisions
resulting in environmental destruction, to deter others from making such environmentally
harmful decisions in the future.
Unlike municipal jurisdiction, international law does not offer many remedies
which narrow the responsibility for environmental destruction. The lack of remedy is due
to the structure of international law and to other hindrances such as state sovereignty. The
legal remedies anticipated under international law, whether civil or criminal remedies,
assume that the conduct constitutes an international crime. These remedies, including
national remedies, will be examined in light of the circumstances of Iraq’s case.
138
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If this proposition is applied to the U.N. remedy for environmental destruction in
the Gulf War, unfortunately the remedy was directed toward the wrong defendant, the
Iraqi people. Thus, in this case and in future cases, neither deterrence nor retribution will
be accomplished since in fact the responsibility was transferred from the then president of
Iraq to the Iraqi people. The compensation was paid from the public’s pockets.
In order to narrow down the responsibility in the case of Saddam Hussein several
remedies were proposed. They shared a common feature in that all of them were directed
toward the then Iraqi president. The first suggestion did not differ much from the U.N.
remedy. This remedy was to pursue Saddam Hussein civilly before municipal courts
other than Iraqi courts. 140
This remedy would not have been enforceable against Saddam Hussein if he had
lacked the funds to pay compensation, especially after his capture. In addition, even
assuming he had had the funds, such a remedy might have posed a serious question
regarding compensation already paid under the U.N. remedy, for that could amount to a
double recovery by claimants for the same damage.
A second proposal was extremely aggressive and most widely unlawful. It has
been argued that, in the case of Saddam Hussein, assassination should have been an
option. 141 The proposal relied on military means to pursue political objectives and,
assuming it was permissible under international law, was not helpful. One of the goals of
a legal regime is to let people know what is wrong and to determine wrongful behavior
by imposing a legal remedy. Assassination is per se extra legal. Moroever, it is generally
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available only during armed conflict. This option, assuming its legality, would not have
been available after the capture of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, because he was no longer at
war with the Coalition, killing him extra legally would not have constituted assassination,
but would instead have been an act of cold-blooded murder. In addition, this suggestion
would have raised a serious question: who would have been in charge of applying this
remedy? Did the U.N. Security Council or any state have this right? Such a proposal
would have created international tension and a threat to international peace and security.
The same dilemma would have occured if Saddam Hussein were expelled. 142
Holding a criminal trial was the only acceptable remedy remaining in the case of
Saddam Hussein. While there may be some impediments to criminal prosecution
generally, 143 they were not present in the case of Saddam Hussein. Although, this option
had proponents 144 and there was discussion of the idea of having an international criminal
trial of Saddam Hussein, 145 the U.N. Security Council failed to take action for several
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reasons. 146 As a result of this failure, some conclude that the failure to establish an
international criminal court for the Gulf War will be a serious precedent in international
law against criminal prosecution for environmental damage during armed conflict. 147
After obtaining custody of Saddam Hussein, this remedy should have been
reconsidered for several reasons. First, assuming that deliberate environmental
destruction is an international crime, 148 the maxim, “no crime without punishment,”
should be followed. Therefore, some believe that establishment of such an international
criminal court is a peremptory norm under international law. 149
Additionally, in a criminal trial, the stakes are very high since the responsibility is
personal. Thus, there is a probability that the chance for deterrence through a criminal
case will be greater than through a civil case. 150 It has been said that a criminal remedy
does not deter in all cases; this has been proved by an increase in recidivism. 151 The
response to this argument is that it is impossible to have a general rule providing effective
deterrence in all cases. There are a number of factors influencing any criminal, having to
do with the criminal himself or with his circumstances. Therefore, a criminal remedy
might not work in some cases, while working in others.
The criminal remedy meets the current international policy protecting the
environment. Such a policy requires a tool prohibiting harmful action, not a policy
146
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requiring care or remedy when the action is taken. 152 Criminal remedy is crucial to
accomplish deterrence, retribution, and education. Criminal remedy is meant to prevent
harmful actions to the environment from being committed. More likely, international
prosecution of crimes against the environment will constitute an importantly persuasive
precedent in the field of international law. This precedent will enhance and strengthen the
field of international criminal law regarding environmental violations. 153
Saddam Hussein’s case concerning the environment was a clear case, in light of
both the intentionality of his behavior and the seriousness of the damage. Hopefully, such
an egregious case will not often occur on the international level. As a result, the
opportunity to apply international criminal law to protect the environment will not occur
again in the near future. This would require taking this unique opportunity to protect the
environment by a stronger tool, the criminal remedy. Unfortuntly, even though Saddam
Hussein’s case was a unique chance for the international community to express a strong
policy, this chance was lost.
Finally, assuming that deliberate environmental destruction during the armed
conflict of the Gulf War is an issue that threatened international peace and security,154 or
that the prohibition of massive and international environmental destruction without
military necessity was jus cogens norm, 155 Saddam Hussein’s action should have been
addressed with a strong tool to preserve the Rule of Law. For all the above reasons, a
152
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criminal remedy was a peremptory remedy that should have been taken by the
international community.
VI. Arguments against a Criminal Remedy for Environmental Destruction in the
Gulf Region
Although the criminal remedy has its advantages, it has been criticized as well.
For instance, in the case of Saddam Hussein, several arguments have been made against
prosecuting war crimes. Some of those arguments lost their merit after the collapse
ofSaddam Hussein’s regime and his capture. 156
One of the arguments raised against establishing war crimes trials is that
“…identifying specific individuals (for prosecution) is very difficult.” 157 Such an
argument is not new in international law. This argument did not prevent the establishment
of special tribunals at Nuremberg, in the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda. Generally, a
trial can be designated to be specific concerning those offenses and criminals over which
the tribunal would have jurisdiction.
At the Nuremberg trials, the four big powers (the United Kingdom of Britain, the
United States, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made it clear that the
tribunal would have jurisdiction over major criminals “whose offenses have no particular
geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacities as
members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.” 158 While other criminals “will
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be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liberated countries and
of the free Governments that will be created therein.” 159
Environmental offenses committed during the Gulf War involved thousands of
defendants. Thus, bringing these criminals before one jurisdiction would have been so
heavy a task that it would probably have caused the failure of the process. There is no
question but that this process would require cooperation among several countries and
international organizations. But this argument does not apply to a criminal prosecution of
Saddam Hussein.
A second argument against criminal prosecution was that the creation of a
criminal tribunal would have raised “the risk of visiting “victor’s justice” upon the loser
of a conflict.” 160 Such an argument assumes that the tribunal judges would represent
only those countries that were against Iraq in the war. To minimize this risk, it has been
suggested that some of the tribunal judges should have been from countries that took no
part in the conflict. 161
Another argument claimed against holding war crimes trials is the difficulty of the
evidence-gathering process. 162 This argument might have been valid in other cases, but
not in the case of environmental offenses committed by the then president of Iraq. These
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offenses are well documented in both aspects, plan and effect. 163 Moreover, they have
been subjected to a lengthy investigative process.164
The last argument was that of cost. It has been said that the cost of the trial would
have outweighed the benefits of the trial. 165 In response, it has been argued that the trial
was important since it might have played a role in shaping Iraq’s future policy concerning
its treatment of people and the environment.166 Finally, it is a fact that:
“[T]he prohibition of the now documented barbarous activities of Iraq falls
under a “peremptory” rule of international law, which is an absolutely
binding rule allowing no form of degradation whatsoever.” 167
In any case, it should be noted that the availability of the criminal remedy in cases
of deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict is not a decisive or
conclusive factor in determining whether to resort to this remedy at the international
level. By and large, the question of whether to use this option should be left to the
prosecutor’s discretion in light of his priority policy. This discretion should be enforced
through an internationally prudent policy in order to avoid international tension. This
policy will be the core of the next chapter.
Conclusion and Observations
Warfare is an enemy of the global environment. The contemporary example of
this notion was the Gulf War of 1990-1991, in which Saddam Hussein invented a new
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weapon against the environment called oil. Using that weapon, he caused massive
pollution in the region, extending to the hydrosphere, lithosphere and atmosphere.
Addressing environmental impacts and other damage, for the first time in its
history, the U.N. Security Council established a Commission to determine the scope of
Iraq’s responsibility and to establish fair compensation for the damages it caused.
Because the penal responsibility of states does not exist at the current time in
international law, the Security Council’s remedy is a civil remedy.
The Security Council’s remedy faced several difficulties and disadvantages
resulting from lack of cooperation by the Iraqi Government and the low priority of
environmental claims. Moreover, the remedy probably would not have served the
contemporary goals of the international community’s policy of deterring future
environmental damages from armed conflicts.
As an alternative, it is proposed that a criminal remedy should have been sought
against the real culprit, the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. A criminal remedy would
have reflected the importance the international community places on environmental
protection. In addition, this remedy could have been a tool to narrow the responsibility as
a required prerequisite for deterrence, complimenting the precautionary approach the
international community has begun to adopt for environmental protection.
This remedy against Saddam Hussein would have served as a persuasive
precedent in international criminal law. Applying this remedy to Saddam Hussein’s
destruction of the environment would not have encountered the obstacles common in
international criminal remedies. Because the availability of a criminal remedy for the
environmental devastation of war does not determine when such a criminal remedy will
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be warranted, the determination should be left to international prosecutors, guided by
prudent prosecutorial policy.
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Chapter II
International Crimes
and International Prosecutorial Policy
International prosecution differs from national prosecution due to differences in
the structures of international and domestic law. It is necessary to understand similarities
and differences between both domestic and international prosecutions. With that
understanding, we can review the legal considerations and determine whether an
international prosecution is warranted in a particular case. Since some of these
considerations are not sufficiently clear under international law instruments, however, it
is important to find a well-developed basis as a guide for international prosecutors in
making the decision as to whether or not to prosecute.
Before adopting a basis for international prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute, a
legal basis for it should be established under the framework of international law. This
chapter will be divided into three parts. In Part I, the similarities and differences between
international and domestic prosecutions will be explored. In Part II, the considerations
international prosecutors use in making the decision to prosecute will be reviewed,
including sufficiency of evidence and gravity of the crime under international law.
In Part III, because the latter consideration is not sufficiently clear within the
framework of international criminal law, international prosecutors must look to how
domestic legal systems deal with it. Therefore, the study reviews the international basis
for adoption of domestic factors determining the gravity of the crime. Finally, domestic
factors determining when a crime is grave are explored and applied to the case of Saddam
Hussein’s actions against the environment.

49

International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy
I. International and Domestic 168 Prosecutors: Similarities and Differences
An increase in harmful actions against the environment is well known, both
during peacetime and in time of armed conflict. Environmental crimes committed during
peacetime might include illegal dumping of domestic waste, trafficking in toxic waste,
smuggling of substances that deplete the ozone layer, trafficking in nuclear materials and
illegal trade in and poaching of endangered species. 169
Environmental crimes committed during peacetime are left to domestic
authorities. These violations are controlled by domestic policies and jurisdictions. 170 On
the other hand, environmental offenses committed during international armed conflict can
be prosecuted by either domestic or international prosecutors. In addressing
environmental offenses in war, there is interaction between international and domestic
courts and prosecutors. International and domestic prosecution share common features
and differ in some characteristics. In the context of criminal justice, both judges and
prosecutors exercise wide discretion in their actions. 171 Such discretion is not exclusive to
judges and prosecutors. Defendants, in some domestic systems, might have such
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powers. 172 The same can be said of the international level.173 Conferring prosecutorial
discretion upon both domestic and international prosecutors is essential.
International prosecutors have discretion at both the investigative and the
prosecutorial stages. Such discretion may involve: whether to initiate an investigation
based on information a prosecutor already has, whether to proceed to trial, with what
offense to charge the defendant, what evidence to use, and whom to prosecute.
Discretionary prosecutorial powers are necessary for several reasons. Prosecution
of violations of the laws of war following armed conflict could involve thousands of
defendants and hundreds of crimes, making it impossible to prosecute all violators. The
limited resources available to a prosecutor adds to that impossibility, emphasizing the
necessity for the prosecutor to exercise discretion. 174
In addition, prosecutorial power “forms the cornerstone of prosecutorial
independence.” 175 A prosecutor, in some domestic legal systems, is part of the executive,
as in the United States. This prompts the view that “prosecutorial discretion is needed to
insulate the prosecutor from political interests and to prompt impartiality and
independence.” 176 Moreover, it has been argued that “[T]he exercise of discretion may
also function as an informal means of testing public reaction to a change in enforcement
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practice that may lead to legislative revision in the area.” 177 Finally, such discretion is
required to “individualize justice.” 178
Accepting the prosecutor’s discretionary power does not mean that this power is
absolute. Thus, considerations bounding the exercise of this power are necessary. Yet,
before examining these considerations, the differences between international and
domestic prosecutions should be clarified.
In determining whether to initiate an investigation, an international prosecutor
should consider international public policy. At the ICC, therefore, “[T]he prosecutor may
still determine that a full investigation is not warranted if taking into account the gravity
of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nevertheless substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 179
The term, “the interests of justice” is vague. The term may include the question
whether initiating an investigation will have any effect on the political environment of the
state over which the prosecutor is exercising jurisdiction. 180 Balancing political and legal
considerations may place the prosecutor in a dilemma in some circumstances. Weighting
political interests over legal interests may affect the credibility of the criminal justice
process.
Unlike domestic prosecutors, an international prosecutor often must create a
cooperative environment with states that are interested in the prosecution. To fulfill his
duties, an international prosecutor must follow a prudent policy in the investigation,
177
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during trial, and after the trial in order to execute the trial’s sentence.181 It has been said
that “[T]he principal problem with the enforcement of international humanitarian law
through the prosecution and punishment of individuals is that the implementation of this
method ultimately hinges on, and depends upon, the goodwill of the states.” 182 Moreover,
unlike domestic prosecutors, an international prosecutor’s power to initiate an
investigation depends upon how the case reached the prosecutor. 183
Under domestic jurisprudence, prosecutorial power differs from one legal system
to another. 184 The national prosecutor’s power to charge is not free of tension. 185
Domestic prosecutors have a wider power to decide whether to initiate an investigation
than do international prosecutors. For instance, domestic prosecutors are not supervised
by courts in their decision not to go to trial, as they are at the international level. 186
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In addition, the domestic prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be based on
several justifications such as: the attitude of the victim, the cost of the trial, undue harm
to the suspect; alternative procedures providing the potential for adequate punishment,
effective civil sanctions, the willingness of the suspect to cooperate in achieving other
system goals, or informal administrative procedures that more satisfactorily achieve the
objectives underlying the criminal statutes. 187 Some of these justifications are available
for international prosecutions, while others are not.
Domestic and international prosecutors’ powers interact with each other. For
instance, within the framework of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, international
prosecution has primacy over domestic prosecution, while, within the framework of the
International Criminal Court, primacy is given to domestic prosecution. 188 After
examining the similarities and differences between domestic and international
prosecutions, this study will examine aspects of international prosecutorial power. The
legal considerations reviewed in this part are the sufficiency of the evidence and the
gravity of the offenses in light of the case of Saddam Hussein’s actions against the
environment. Before reviewing these considerations, it should be clear that the purpose of
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reviewing these considerations and focusing on environmental offenses is to propose a
guideline for ICC prosecutors. 189
II. Prosecutorial Considerations under International Law
International prosecution decisions take into account several considerations, both
political and legal. Some of these considerations pertain to the authority of the U.N.
Security Council, the Assembly of States Party to ICC, and jurisdiction or public policy
interests 190 while others relate to the sufficiency of evidence and the gravity of the crime.
The two latter considerations will be the focus of the following part.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
The first question an international prosecutor must ask in determining whether to
prosecute is whether there is sufficient evidence to secure conviction. Under most
domestic laws, the question of the sufficiency of evidence is left to the prosecutor to
decide. However, such a position is not true in international criminal law jurisprudence.
Even under international criminal statutes governing international criminal courts (ICC
and ad hoc tribunals), the position differs.
Under ad hoc international criminal tribunal statutes, a question regarding
evidence may arise twice before any international prosecutor. First, the prosecutor
considers the evidence when he decides whether to initiate an investigation regarding
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specific facts he has received. 191 Second, the prosecutor again considers evidence when
he has to decide whether to prosecute. There is no doubt that the standard between the
two stages, initiating an investigation and initiating a prosecution, differs.
However, in determining whether to prosecute, the prosecutor’s view regarding
evidence is not sufficient since “Upon determination that a prima facie case exists, the
prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of facts and the
crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the statute. The indictment shall
be transmitted to a judge of trial chamber.” 192 The judge of trial chamber can confirm or
dismiss the indictment. 193 The judge’s decision depends upon whether he is satisfied that
a prima facie case has been established by the prosecutor.
Under the ICC statute, the prosecutor resolves the question of evidence in three
stages. The first and third stages are similar to those stages under ad hoc tribunal statutes
mentioned above. Between these two stages, initiating an investigation and prosecuting,
there is an additional stage in the International Criminal Court’s statute. The statute
distinguishes between two kinds of investigations, preliminary investigation and in-depth
191
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investigation. Initiation of a preliminary investigation is left to the prosecutor’s
discretion, 194 while an in-depth investigation requires the prosecutor to get judicial
authorization. 195 Such approval is required only when a prosecutor decides to initiate an
investigation proprio motu. 196 Such approval is not required when the case reaches the
prosecutor through the U.N. Security Council or a state party. 197
Returning to the standard of evidence the prosecutor applied in deciding whether
to prosecute under ad hoc tribunal statutes; “prima facia case” is the standard. 198 This
standard should be understood in conjunction with the standard provided by article 47 of
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 199 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, in explaining the
standard the trial judge should apply in reviewing the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute,
stated “Although the meanings are close, I am not completely convinced that “prima
facie case” fits exactly the standard of “reasonable grounds.” 200 The “reasonable
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Article 104 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence Provides that “1. In acting pursuant to article
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1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998). Such approval disappeared in the Special Court for Sierra Leone
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Trial Chamber.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
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Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 (4), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM
1159 (1993).
199
Article 47 (E) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides “ The reviewing Judge shall
examine each of the counts in the indictment, and any supporting materials the Prosecutor may provide, to
determine, in applying the standard set forth in Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Statute, whether a case exists
against the suspect.” ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006)
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John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 186
(Transnational Publishers 1998).
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grounds” standard is a prosecutorial standard used in determining whether to prosecute.
According to this standard, a prosecutor has to have reasonable grounds to believe that an
accused committed the action charged with the existence of the required mens rea.
Judge McDonald adds “[T]he prima facie case has the same meaning provided by
the Draft statute for an international criminal court adopted by ILC.” 201 Under that Draft,
prima facie case is understood to be a credible case which would, “if not contradicted by
the Defense” be a sufficient basis upon which to convict the accused on the charge. 202 In
connection with this standard, whether there is sufficient evidence, Saddam Hussein’s
case will be discussed in the next chapter of this research. 203
2. The Gravity of the Crime
After satisfying the requirement for sufficiency of evidence, the international
prosecutor must determine whether the criminal actions in question are grave enough to
trigger the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals.
Internationally, the gravity of the crime is an issue which plays a significant role
in different parts of the criminal justice process. It may affect the admissibility of the case
before the International Criminal Court 204 and the prosecutorial power. If the gravity of
the crime is so great compared to the interests of justice, the prosecutorial power may be
reviewed by the Pre-trial Chamber. The prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with
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Quoted in John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda 96 (Transnational Publishers 1998).
202
John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 96
(Transnational Publishers 1998).
203
See infra Ch. III.
204
Article 17(1)(d) of the ICC statute provides “ Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article
1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:…The case is not of sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court.” See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17 (1)(d),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).
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prosecution is not effective until it is confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber. 205 Thus, the
prosecutor is bound to proceed with either the investigation or the prosecution if the Pretrial Chamber does not agree with the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed. 206
Since “the gravity of the crime” is a very important factor in the process of
international criminal justice, this factor’s meaning should be made clear for prosecutors
investigating international crimes, particularly environmental crimes that require
investigative skills and special training. The gravity of environmental crimes should be
understood since many international judges, as well as domestic judges, are not well
versed in environmental protection and therefore may not be sensitive to the seriousness
of environmental crimes.
Some judges may believe that environmental cases are more appropriately
handled by means of international settlements than by criminal prosecution. This attitude
may affect their ability to consider punishment adequate to achieve deterrence as a
primary goal for prosecution. At the international level, the gravity of the offense is
determined on a case-by-case basis without clear guidelines. For example, it has been
ruled that:
“[I]n order for violation of international humanitarian law to be “serious”
within the meaning of the Statute [ICTY Statute], two elements must be
fulfilled. First, the alleged offense must be one which constitutes a breach
of a rule protecting important values. Secondly, it must also be one which
involves grave consequences for the victim.” 207
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53 (3) (b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).
206
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court art. 110(2), ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10,
and Corr. 1 (2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).
207
The charge in this case was plundering a village. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
¶ 1154 (November 16, 1998).
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Unfortunately, the Tribunal in the previous case did not provide guidelines outlining
when those consequences are “grave.” However, the Tribunal adopted the value of the
stolen property as a standard for determining whether the violation was “serious.” 208
Nevertheless, where the gravity of the crime is important, there is no single international
criminal instrument providing a benchmark for criminal gravity. The importance of the
gravity of the crime is also vital in the sentencing stage, since a sentence may be appealed
by the prosecutor or by the convicted person on the grounds of disproportion between the
crime and the sentence. 209
Although adoption of a policy in pursuing prosecution is not new for the
international community, 210 in order to avoid tension between domestic jurisdiction and
international judicial intervention, guidelines instructing international prosecutors
concerning the gravity of the crime are critical. The purpose of these guidelines is to
establish a priority policy for the pursuit of prosecution and to protect human rights. 211
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The Tribunal dismissed the charge based on the fact that “the evidence before the Trial Chamber fails to
demonstrate that any property taken from the detainees in the Celebici prison-camp was of sufficient
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a waiver of prosecution.” U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 189(1990).
211
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 provides “ All [including defendants] are
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A/810 at 71 (1948). Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21(1), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM
1159 (1993); See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 20 (1), S.C. Res. 955, UN
SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); see the Special Court for
Sierra Leone Statute art. 17 (1), S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315
(2000).

60

International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy
Moreover, the guidelines will be useful for international prosecutors since international
criminal law, substantive and procedural, is not yet well-developed.
An international prosecutor has only one place to seek guidelines concerning the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion: the domestic level. In the criminal justice process,
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in domestic legal systems is the appropriate
discipline from which to extract prosecutorial guidelines at the international level. Before
examining these domestic considerations regarding the concept of “the gravity of the
crime,” the basis for adoption of domestic considerations in the international legal system
should be established.
III.

The International Legal Basis for Adoption of Domestic Prosecutorial
Considerations
Article 38 (1)(c) of the International Court of Justice statute provides that “The

Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply: the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.” 212 Relying on these “general principles” as a source, the drafters of the
Permanent Court of International Justice statute intended to avoid a situation in which the
Court would announce that the claim is non-liquet, i.e, it could not be upheld or rejected,
because of the lack of international rules governing the issue in dispute. 213 Although
neither the Permanent Court of International Justice nor the International Court of Justice
has issued a judgment based on such a source, 214 this does not undermine the source’s
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215
(1945).
213
Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 130 (Malcolm Evans eds.,
Oxford University Press 2003).
214
Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 131 (Malcolm Evans eds.,
Oxford University Press 2003).
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importance. This source is expected to play an important role in developing international
law on both the procedural and the substantive sides.
This source can be interpreted in several ways. It might mean that these rules can
be derived from a comparison among different domestic legal systems and the discovery
of those considered common to all or to a majority of those systems. 215 Another
interpretation is that these general principles are those rules applied by the ICJ, including
rules applicable directly to international legal relations such as pacta sunt servanda, i.e,
what has been agreed to must be respected. 216 Some have classified these rules into three
groups: general principles of interpretation, procedural standards of fairness and
substantive general principles. 217
Accepting the view that general principles are those derived from national legal
systems, it has been said that they can be identified through three approaches: a
comparative approach, a categorical approach and a mixed approach. 218 A comparative
approach requires conducting a comparative-law project. Thus, “general principles,”
according to this approach, are rules which are recognized by all major systems of law
and are applied by the most representive systems of domestic law. Such an approach has
been criticized as being burdensome. 219
The categorical approach focuses on those principles which are “inherent in the
very nature of law and might be discernible from a single legal system or without
215

See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 131 (Malcolm Evans eds.,
Oxford University Press 2003).
216
See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 132 (Malcolm Evans eds.,
Oxford University Press 2003).
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Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law, 57
AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 287 (1963).
218
Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 66-81 (1994).
219
Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 68 (1994).
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reference to any municipal system at all.” 220 A third approach would adopt those rules
which are inherent in the legal order and which have been examined by judges to
evaluate their character as a candidate for these general principles. 221
This paper adopts the categorical approach in identifying those principles which
fall within the concept of “general principles recognized by civilized nations.” As a
matter of fact, these principles are recognized as a source in international law and furnish
international law with many procedural and substantive rules in different fields of law.
The international rules governing contracts provide an example. 222
Per contra, there is no doubt that “Direct translation between domestic and
international jurisprudence may well do violence to the real values and policies served by
principles ostensibly accepted at both levels.” 223 Therefore, these domestic principles can
be adopted only as long as they do not contradict international standards of fairness and
the structure of international law, especially if they serve internationally recognized
interests regarding the protection of human rights, such as defendants’ rights to be equal
before the law.
In the context of international criminal law, Professor Mohammed Cherif
Bossiouni has stated that “Increasingly, comparative criminal procedure furnishes
international law with general principles of law, which are identified from national laws
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with norms of general part and the procedural part of domestic criminal law and which
apply to the direct enforcement system.” 224
An international resort to domestic criminal laws is common as shown in the
practice of international judicial bodies such astribunals and courts. Such a resort occurs
in the several stages of criminal justice proceedings such as crime concept and
sentence. 225 More recently, the “general principles” source was adopted expressly in the
Rome Statute. Article 21(1)(c) provides that “The Court shall apply:(c) Failing that,
general principles of law derived by the Court from the national laws of the legal systems
of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws by which the States would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.” 226
The motive for the establishment of procedural safeguards such as the
prosecutorial guidelines derived from domestic criminal laws based on the “general
principles” source is the desire to protect human rights. This desire allows international
law to borrow from an area of law which was formerly governed exclusively by domestic
laws.
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 5 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
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For instance, several procedural guarantees in international criminal justice owe
their existence to domestic legal systems. Their adoption has been accomplished through
the judicial experience more than through the legislative process. These guarantees are
varied and belong to all stages of judicial proceedings. Examples of these safeguards are
the right to life, liberty, and security; the right to be recognized before the law and to
equal protection of the law; the right to be free from arbitrary arrest; the right to be free
from torture, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment; the right to be
presumed innocent; the right to a fair trial; the right to legal assistance; the right to a
speedy trial; the right to appeal; the right to be protected from double jeopardy and the
right to be protected from ex post facto laws. The rules of evidence have passed through a
similar progressive process as well. 227
In conclusion, taking into account the common practice international criminal law
draw upon to domestic criminal justice systems, and concepts the desire to protect human
rights in international prosecutions, specifically the right to equal application of the law,
requires adopting international prosecutorial guidelines defining the gravity of the crime
from the domestic law source of “General Principles.”
1. The “Gravity of the Offense” and Domestic Considerations
At the outset, it should be clear that the presence of other considerations affecting
the decision to prosecute, such as the availability of investigative and litigation resources,
the existence of non-criminal remedies and the anticipated ends of the criminal
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prosecution, is assumed. 228 As with international law, under domestic jurisprudence, if a
crime is deemed serious, this characteristic can affect many aspects of the criminal justice
process, especially the procedural side. The gravity of the crime affects statutory
limitations for both the prosecution and the execution of the sentence, 229 the jurisdiction
of judicial and investigative bodies, 230 the defendant’s rights, 231 the prosecutor’s power
to dismiss or drop the case, 232 custody, 233 the speed of both the investigation and the
trial, 234 the manner of the investigation 235 and both the available punishment and the
process of sentencing. 236
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Professor Gershman divides these considerations into legal, political, experimental and ethical
considerations. See Bennett Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging
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9 (Kuwait).
231
Due to the gravity of the offense, several defendants’ rights are affected. For instance, under the U.S.
criminal justice system, the defendant’s right to be tried by a jury does not apply in the case of petty
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Criminal Law 49 (William Publishing 2001).
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Law 25 (William Publishing 2001).
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Moreover, the gravity of the crime can be one of those factors that guide pre-trial
judges in deciding the issue of pretrial or provisional release. 237 Also, the gravity of the
crime should be considered by prosecutors when they have to decide whether to enter
into a guilty plea agreement with any potential defendant. 238
This part of the paper assumes that general principles are derived from domestic
legal systems. However, the methodology of extracting these principles from domestic
systems is based on the categorical approach which focuses on the nature of the national
law and does not require attributing those principles to any specific domestic legal
system. Thus, it is enough that these principles or considerations are inherent in the
nature of any domestic criminal law.
Some of these considerations may not apply in some circumstances (crimes),
while they may apply in others. The importance of these considerations varies from one
territory to another 239 and from time to time. Whether prosecutors adopt any of these
considerations as policy or guidelines governing the power of the prosecution differs
depending on how much the domestic legal system has developed in that country.
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In countries that have an undeveloped legal system, these general principles, upon
which prosecutorial considerations concerning the gravity of the crime are based, do not
require direct adoption by the domestic legislatures for a decision as to whether to
prosecute. Therefore, these considerations can be indirectly extracted from either
legislation or policy.
So, these considerations might be adopted expressly by prosecutors in some
countries, while in others these considerations are in the prosecutor’s minds but not in
their manuals. In the latter case, prosecutors resort to both laws and legislative history in
order to determine when the crime is considered grave or serious. On the other hand,
some countries have developed specific considerations for environmental crimes, while
other countries are satisfied with general considerations controlling prosecutorial decision
or discretion towards all kinds of crimes including environmental crimes.
By and large, these considerations can be used in either direction, either for
prosecution or to dismiss the case. Some of these considerations are meant to be used
only against the decision to prosecute. 240 There is no doubt that some domestic
considerations are not suitable for adoption at the international level mainly because of
the structure of the international legal system. 241
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In England, the Code of Crown Prosecutors provides examples of these considerations, such as whether
the court is likely to impose a nominal penalty, whether the defendant has already been made the subject of
a sentence and whether any further conviction would be unlikely to result in the imposition of an additional
sentence or whether the offense was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or misunderstanding of the
law. However, these considerations do not include the gravity of the crime. See the Code of Crown
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that it has been issued by a legally recognized legislature.
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In some countries, such as England, Australia and South Africa, these
considerations are called “Public Interest” considerations. Some public interest
considerations have no relation to the issue of the gravity of the crime. 242 However, the
above countries have reduced the prosecutorial screening stage to a couple of questions.
The first inquiry concerns the sufficiency of evidence, while the second is reached when
a prosecutor answers the first question in the affirmative. The second question is whether
the public interest requires the decision to prosecute. 243 The public interest can be
measured through examining several considerations, some of them relating to the gravity
of the crime.
Moreover, in order to extract general principles, “In certain cases it may be
necessary to examine some of the non-Western legal systems, such as Muslim or Hindu
Law, now actively represented in the family of nations.” 244 Gravity considerations are
present as well in certain religious legal systems such as the Islamic Criminal Justice
system. 245 Some countries, such as Australia, set criteria determining which one of the
suspects should be the target of the prosecution. 246
242
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Again, these considerations should not be viewed as exclusive considerations and
an application of them should not be done strictly. Some considerations might apply in
some circumstances, while they might not in other circumstances. In sum, these
considerations will serve as a luminous tool to seek and to do justice. In this part of the
paper, the considerations reviewed are: the impact of the crime, the manner of its
commission, mens rea, and motive.
a.

The Impact of the Crime
The first consideration determining whether the crime is serious is the harm or

damage resulting from the commission of the offense. The more serious harm leads to the
charge of a more serious offense, assuming the similarity of the elements of the offense
except for the resulting damage. 247 The consideration of harm might not apply in some
offenses that do not result in harm when just committed. 248 The extent of the harm may
affect the classification of the offense and the sentence. 249 This consideration is shown
clearly in those policies governing prosecutorial decisions. 250

Cherif Bassiouni ed., Ocean Publishers Inc. 1982). See also Mathew Lippman ET AL., Islamic Criminal
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More importantly, in international environmental offenses, the impact of the
crime may affect the question as to the existence of an international crime. Under
international jurisprudence, deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict
does not constitute an international war crime unless the impact of the crime is serious. 251
In determining when the harm or damage is gross in the context of crimes, a
prosecutor has to consider both actual and potential harm, and short and long-term effects
to both the environment and to human health. 252 In addition, a prosecutor has to take into
account the social and economic impact of the offense. 253
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In terms of the impact resulting from the 1990-91 Gulf War, there was massive
environmental destruction. Such severity is unique on several grounds. First, the
environmental pollution occurred as a result of more than one pollution source, both the
oil fires and the oil lakes.
Secondly, the pollution affected all of the environmental elements including the
atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the lithosphere, the biota and the public health. In terms of
atmospheric impact, the concentration level of sulfur dioxide exceeded the safe levels
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). 254 Also, hydrocarbons were
found in a high concentration in some areas of Kuwait. 255 One of the effects of smoke
from the fires was a decrease in the regional temperature. 256 This drop is due to the
increased concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere which dimished the amount of
sunlight stored by the soil. 257
Plants were victimized by the oil-well fires. Oil rain killed plants in Kuwaiti
territory. 258 Higher temperatures in the areas surrounding the oil wells caused the
destruction of vegetation. 259 Soot caused by the oil-well fires hindered the growth of
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plants. 260 Lack of oxygen due to heat was an additional source of loss of vegetation.261
As for the impact on the lithosphere, oil lakes played a role in affecting the soil adversely.
Some toxic substances resulting from the oil lakes accumulated in plant tissue and
constituted a carcinogen which kills any animal eating those plants. 262 Areas within the
boundaries of the oil lakes were considered biologically dead. 263 After drying, oil tar or
sludge remained, causing severe disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological
properties of the soil environment. 264
With regard to the effect on public health, some studies showed that asthma and
respiratory system problems increased after the pollution occurred. 265 These studies
concluded that children were more vulnerable to these kinds of disease than adults. 266
Also, an increase in allergies of the eyes, skin, and noise was noticed during 1991. 267 As
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for the economic impact, the cost of the burned oil was estimated at approximately 200
billion dollars. 268
b.

The Manner of the Commission
By and large, the manner of commission of the offense should be considered as

well in determining the gravity of the offense. Although the manner plays a role in
determining the harm or damage that results from the offense, it becomes more important
when the offense does not cause any harm at all. In determining this matter, there are
several factors which can be classified by the manner of the commission of the offense
such as the nature of the weapon 269 (in case of environmental offenses, the pollutant), the
crime scene or location, 270 the time of the crime 271 and the commission of the offense by
more than one person. Some national criminal laws aggravate an offense solely because it
was committed by more than one person. 272
In the Gulf War of 1991, the way the offense was committed has contributed to
the massive pollution. The first point to be noticed is the use of oil as a weapon. This
weapon accomplished two fundamental aims of Iraq’s then President, targeting his
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opponents’ wealth and their environment. It is well established that oil is a substance that
is very dangerous to water, air and soil. 273
The concentration of the pollution is another consideration for this review. Some
estimated the flow of oil at 60 million barrels; 274 others reckoned it at 24 million. 275 The
flow of oil formed approximately 570 oil lakes around the country. 276 Some of these
lakes were 5 kilometers in length and 500 meters in width. 277 They covered a space of 49
Km/square. 278 The depth of these lakes ranged from 60 to 120 Cm. 279
The amount of oil burned was estimated at 2.5 to 6 million barrels daily.280
Assuming that 2.5 million barrels were burned daily, the resulting substances were; 20-40
thousand tons of black smoke, 250 tons of carbon monoxide, 20 thousand tons of sulfur
dioxide, 1500 tons of toxic substances, and 500 tons of nitric oxide. 281 Soot and oil mist
were noticed on soil as a result of the burning oil. 282
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Three types of oil flames were formed: black smoke, white smoke, and a clean
flame without smoke. 283 In addition, the means used to set the fire in the oil well heads is
a particularly wicked one. The means was dynamite, used to ensure either the fire or the
flow. 284
According to captured Iraqi documents, 285 it is estimated that the number of
actors used to execute this operation and cause so great an impact is thousands of
individuals, including military, technical, and non-military personnel. This fact indicates
the seriousness of the crime and its intentionality.
c. Mens Rea
Another general principle in determining the gravity of a crime arises from the
fact that an intentional offense is graver than an unintentional offense, whether such
offenses are based on recklessness, negligence or strict liability.
In most offenses, such as those relating to life (murder and assault), property
(property destruction and arson), as against the environment, when a crime is committed
intentionally, the punishment is more serious. Thus, the intention of the offender is an
indicator of the gravity of the crime. 286 In the same context, the French Penal Code
stipulates that “There is no serious crime or major crime in the absence of an intention to
commit it.” 287
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In the Gulf War of 1991, it was reported by the Australian Foreign Minister that
there is “Credible evidence that the spill was deliberately engineered by the
Iraqis…..These particular environmental consequences are not to be attributed ….to the
inadvertent effect of artillery action or things of this kind.” 288
Iraq tried to deny the link between the environmental impact and its actions by
claiming that the oil fires were caused by Coalition forces and that, even if environmental
destruction had been caused by Iraqi troops, “military personnel and civilians were
brought to trial for acts committed in Kuwait and the competent courts pronounced
sentences against them, up to and including capital Punishment…” 289
The response to these claims is the following. First, the plan to set fire to the oil
wells is documented in materials captured after the liberation of Kuwait. Secondly,
holding trials of low-ranking military personnel does not exempt the real defendant, the
then president of Iraq, from responsibility as long as this responsibility is proven.
Internationally, it is well-established that calling the person who commits the crime to
account does not exonerate the person who orders the commission of the crime.
Concerning mens rea, it has been ruled that the mens rea of the accused can be
inferred from general circumstances. 290 Based upon Saddam Hussein’s orders, Iraq had
set a plan for environmental destruction in motion long before the beginning of the war.
This plan can be inferred from the threat of Iraq’s then president to destroy the
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environment if the Coalition forces compelled the Iraqi forces to withdraw from
Kuwait. 291
The plan to commit this environmental disaster was discovered after the liberation
of Kuwait. Such a plan is well-documented in evidence seized after the liberation. These
documents, in addition to linking Saddam Hussein to this plan, contain details about
destruction groups, the names of group members, specific missions for each group, the
substances used to blow up the oil wells and the names of commanders who had the
power to issue orders to execute the plan. 292
Moreover, some of the documents seized are dated prior to 1991, proving how the
plan was arranged from the beginning. In addition, the number of oil wells set on fire
refutes Iraq’s argument that the pollution which resulted was a foreseeable consequence
of armed conflict or an unplanned event. All this evidence and these events in their
general circumstances serve to prove the intentionality of the crimes committed based
upon Saddam Hussein’s orders.

d. Motive
As a general rule in criminal law jurisprudence, a motive is not considered in
deciding whether a crime has been committed. 293 However, in some domestic legal
systems, it is well established that motive can be deemed one of the factors that play a

291

Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23, 1991, at A10.
For those documents. See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya
[Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi Documents] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).
293
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 12 (3ed, West Group 2000).
292

78

International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy
role in aggravating the offense. For instance, under the German criminal justice system, a
crime is aggravated when an environmental offense is committed or if the defendant was
driven by “greed for profit.” 294 Motive is included in prosecutorial policies especially
when the motive has a discriminatory basis.295
In England, in the sentence stage, the Magistrates must determine first whether
the gravity of the crime requires more than the punishment within their powers. If the
crime is so grave, they must transfer the case to the trial court for sentencing. One of the
factors determining the gravity of the crime is the motive of the defendant. 296 The same
can be said when the crime is committed with a wicked motive such as vengeance. The
adoption of reprisal as a basis for criminalization is not new in the international law field
as well. 297
Understanding Saddam Hussein’s motive for actions committed against the
environment during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 raises the question of military necessity
which is essential to prove the defendant’s motive and to determine the nature of the
breach of the rules of armed conflict. Thus, considering the environment as public
property, it is illegal to destroy public property unless there is a military necessity
justifying such destruction. 298 This characteristic, whether a grave breach or not, imposes
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stricter obligations on states regarding the criminal responsibility of those who violate the
laws of armed conflict. 299
The principle of necessity requires that military actions involving the use of force
must be reasonably necessary to achieve the desired goals. 300 The purpose of such a
requirement of necessity basically is to avoid undue or unnecessary injury or suffering.
The military necessity doctrine is subjective.301 As a result, such justification is widely
criticized by commentators. 302 Consequently, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to
determine when the military action or tactic is excessive. 303
The customary law of armed conflict rejects the argument that any military action
that causes victory is deemed necessary. 304 For instance, using certain weapons is strictly
prohibited even if refraining from using these weapons would cause the loss of the
war. 305 Regarding environmental destruction during the time of armed conflict, it is
settled that the four main principles - humanity, discrimination, proportionality and
necessity - are applicable to this kind of destruction whether the destruction was caused
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intentionally or recklessly. 306 The common practice proves that environmental
destruction should be taken into account when the question, “Is there a military necessity
to execute a military action or tactic?” is raised. 307 The ICJ states that:
“States must take environmental considerations into account when
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate
military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements
that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles
of necessity and proportionality.” 308
Therefore, achieving limited military gains is not justified by necessity if the
environmental damages are gross. 309 Evaluating the decision of Iraq’s then President
regarding the environment during the Gulf War in light of the question as to whether
there was a military necessity requires examining those arguments produced by some
commentators to justify Iraq’s action.
While Saddam Hussein did not actually plead military necessity, such a claim
would most likely fail if he had done so. The first justification for blowing up the oil
wells is to hinder the efforts of the Coalition’s pilots to locate and bomb Iraqi troops. 310
The response to such an argument is that any military action used, under the necessity
doctrine, should be capable of regulation and limitation. 311 Blowing up oil wells does not
satisfy this requirement because the military goal in this case would depend entirely on
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the wind which is unpredictable. Consequently, there is no ability to regulate such an
action.
The second argument that has been made to justify the setting of these fires is to
eliminate resources that would otherwise be available to Coalition forces on the
ground. 312 It would seem that this argument has merit. However, the argument fails
because of the unlimited availability of the fuel needed to carry out the war and because
the Coalition forces could not have used the oil because it was not refined. 313 Even if we
assume that the Coalition forces could have refined the Kuwaiti oil, a review of Iraqi
documents 314 shows that the manner of the commission of the crime, blowing up the oil
wells, was not meant to prevent Coalition forces from using the oil. It was meant instead
to destroy this natural and financial resource. Otherwise, the goal, preventing Coalition
forces from using the oil wells, could have been accomplished by means of destroying
the oil well heads, without the need to set the oil on fire. In addition, the tremendous time
Coalition forces would have needed to refine Kuwaiti oil is another factor supporting the
exclusion of the possibility that Coalition forces would use the Kuwaiti oil.
Moreover, it has been contended that the means, blowing up oil wells, was not in
proportionality to the objectives sought. 315 In the absence of military necessity, Saddam
Hussein’s motive for committing this action should have been determined by both the
present and historical circumstances existing at the time of the crime.
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Historically, Iraqi administrations, including Saddam Hussein’s regime, showed
their desire to annex Kuwait for financial advantage, since annexation would give them
control of Kuwaiti oil. 316 Moreover, one of the arguments Saddam Hussein used to justify
his invasion of Kuwait was that both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were
conspiring against Iraq to increase their production of oil, thus decreasing the price and
harming the Iraqi economy. 317 This argument demonstrated Saddam Hussein’s desire to
annex Kuwait to improve the Iraqi economy by controlling Kuwait’s share of oil in the
market and to pay Iraq’s debt which was a result of its war against Iran. In addition,
Saddam Hussein threatened 318 to blow up Kuwaiti oil wells if an attempt to liberate
Kuwait was made. Taking into consideration all the above circumstances, one can
conclude that Saddam Hussein’s main concern was the oil and his desire to retaliate
against his enemy, Kuwait, by inflicting greater injuries, destroying Kuwait’s main
natural and financial resource, as reprisal for the United Nations effort to liberate Kuwait
and enhance the rule of law at the international level. In sum, the destruction of the
environment was driven by one motive - reprisal.
If one reaches the conclusion that military necessity was absent in Iraq’s actions,
it is logical to conclude that the destruction must be deemed a grave breach of the laws of
armed conflict. This grave breach is a war crime that triggers the Universal Jurisdiction
doctrine. 319 As a result:
“…[A]l nations bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are required by
existing international treaty obligations to search out and prosecute or
316

See infra. App. 1.
See Ch. I note 2.
318
Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23, 1991, at A10.
319
See Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of
Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N.GAOR, 28th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N.Doc. A/9030 (1973).
317

83

International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy
extradite persons alleged to have committed “grave breaches” of these
Conventions.” 320

Conclusion and Observations
Prosecutorial discretion differs between domestic and international levels. There
is no question that, internationally, prosecutorial discretion is essential. However, this
discretion should not be absolute. Therefore, proposing legal considerations in
determining when international prosecution is warranted is necessary to avoid
international tension and to protect human rights.
In terms of legal considerations, an international prosecutor, before pursuing a
criminal charge, must resolve two questions: the sufficiency of the evidence and the
gravity of the offense. The scheme for evaluation of the evidence differs between ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and the framework of the International Criminal Court. In
light of the evidence required, it is enough for international prosecutors, to pursue a
criminal case, to have a credible case which would be sufficient to convict an accused.
As a second requirement, an international crime must be sufficiently grave in
order to commence an action or prosecution before international criminal tribunals or
courts. In spite of the fact that the gravity of the offense is an important element in
international criminal practice, there is no single international instrument providing
guidelines to clarify for international prosecutors under what circumstances the criminal
actions in question may be considered grave.
As a result of this legal absence, a resort to domestic criminal justice systems, as
well developed sources of law, becomes necessary. It is motivated by the desire to protect
320

John Norton Moore, War Crime and the Role of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 403, 404
(1991).
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human rights. The phenomenon of resorting to national systems is a legally recognized
necessity in international criminal law.
An examination of domestic legal systems brings us to the conclusion that several
considerations, including damage, intent, the manner of commission, mens rea and
motive are common considerations for domestic prosecutors who must decide whether
the offense in question is grave. An evaluation of Saddam Hussein’s case against the
environment in light of these considerations shows that Saddam Hussein’s actions against
the environment are grave crimes and grave breaches of the laws of armed conflict. This
situation would trigger the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine. 321

321

The Universal Jurisdiction principle means that each state is required, based upon an international
customary obligation, to look for and to prosecute individuals accused of international crimes without the
need to link such authority to a territorial or national nexus concerning committed crimes or their parties.
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Chapter III
Substantive Aspects of
International Criminal Prosecution
Substantive analysis of Saddam Hussein’s liability for international environmental
crimes raises two issues. The first is whether he satisfied the actus reus aspect of the
crime, i. e., whether he can be vicariously liable for the environmental crimes of his
subordinates acting under his direction. The second issue is whether Saddam Hussein’s
criminal responsibility requires that the actions committed by his subordinates against the
environment be criminal. If so, by which international instruments are their actions to be
considered criminal?
I.

The International Basis of Criminal Responsibility

Although the issue of whether an individual may enjoy rights and incur
obligations under international law is not yet settled, 322 it is a different question than
whether an individual can be criminally liable for international crimes.

323

Individual

criminal responsibility for international crimes is currently the universally accepted
norm. 324 An individual’s international criminal responsibility may arise during both
peace time and war time. During armed conflict, crimes can be committed by both
subordinates and superiors. In the context of the responsibility of superiors, both military

322

Mark S. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM J. INT’L L. 533
(1956); Leslie C. Green, International Law 91 (1984).
323
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that “[C]rimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced.” See NAZI CONSPIRACY And JUDGMENT of THE
IMT 66 (1947) Quoted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 65
(Transnational Publishers 2003).
324
See Farhad Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law,
Vol. I, 153, 57 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
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and political leaders may be included. 325

In the wake of World War I, the first attempt to try individuals responsible for the
war, including heads of state, was begun by establishing the Commission on the
Responsibility of Authors of the War. This Commission was charged with considering
certain questions about the origins of the war. 326 The Commission concluded, “All
persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been,
without distinction of rank, including Chiefs [of] States, who have been guilty of the
offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to
criminal prosecution.” 327
On 28 June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles ended World War I. 328 For a number of
reasons, the provision regarding prosecuting the German Emperor, William II, included

325

In some cases, it has been held that the responsibility of a person who can affect the decision to commit
the crime is graver than the responsibility of the executor. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R6,
Decision of Trial Chamber I- Review of indictment pursuant to Rule 61 (March 6, 1996).
326
The commission’s task was to determine: “1. The responsibility of the Authors of the war. 2. The facts
as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their
Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war. 3. The degree of responsibility for those
offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staff, and
other individuals, however highly placed. 4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the
trial of these offences. 5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may be raised in the
course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.”
See M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Commission on The Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties, 14
AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (1920).
327
M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Commission on The Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties, 14
AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 117 (1920).
328
The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was the peace treaty which officially ended World War I between the
Allied and Associated Powers (France, Russia, Italy, Britain, United States) and Germany. In the treaty,
Germany recognized the Allied Powers’ right to prosecute and punish those individuals who violated the
laws and customs of war. The pertinent articles in the treaty are 227-230. Article 227, relating to the
responsibility of the head of state, provides “The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II
of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of
the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan…..”
The treaty contains as well articles 228-230 which imposed on Germany obligations concerning
extradition, production of documentary and other evidence, and the personal jurisdiction of the military
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in the treaty, was not implemented, 329 “[T]he failures of post-World War I justice were
transformed into a partially valid precedent because that was what was needed to justify
raising expectations of the international society.” 330

No doubt, the failure to bring those who were responsible for World War I to
international justice contributed to the subsequent direct enforcement of international
criminal law rules, including those relating to individual criminal responsibility, after
World War II. The desire to deter the occurrence of war crimes was motivated by the
atrocities committed in World War II. 331 Since the criminal trials of World War II, the
appearance of provisions relating to the criminal responsibility of the head of state in
international instruments has increased. These international instruments may take the
form of international criminal tribunals’ statutes, draft codes, or international treaties. 332

tribunal. See Treaty of Versailles signed June 28, 1919. Art. 228 available at
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html (Last visited June 30, 2007).
329
Those grounds were “[1] The political climate of that time was not prepared for the prosecution and
punishment of individuals of other states; [2] there was no expressly pragmatic consent by all the greater
powers of the time for the establishment of an international criminal court; [3] the principles of
international criminal law were not clear to the international legal community as a whole; [4] public
opinion in Germany was against any form of prosecution of its individuals.” See Farhad Malekian,
International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law Vol. I, 153 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1999); In addition, another factor contributing to this failure is the refusal of the Government
of the Netherlands to surrender William II of Hohenzollern based on the argument that the Versailles treaty
was not binding since the Netherlands was not a party to the treaty. See Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes:
History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,92 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999);
while others believe that the non-establishment of a criminal tribunal after World War I has also been
attributed to “…the World “was not internationally mature,”…improper drafting of the war crimes clauses
the priority of the Allies to maintain peace and political agendas which prevailed over the justice norms.”
M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped
International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 244, 289 (2001).
330
M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped
International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 244, 290 (2001).
331
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions: From Verailles to Rwanda
in International Criminal Law Vol. III, 31, 39 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
332
Affairmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal,
G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951); Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid art. III, (Nov. 30, 1972), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/11.htm (Last visited
June 29, 2007); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
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Before examining these instruments, a distinction should be drawn between the
question of responsibility, a substantive question, and the question of immunity, a
procedural question. 333 The former question concerns whether heads of states can be
guilty of committing international crimes, while the latter focuses on whether judicial
proceedings can be commenced against heads of states. 334

The statutes of almost all international criminal tribunals contain provisions
rejecting the status of head of state as the basis for immunity, mitigation, or
exoneration. 335 The best examples of these tribunals are the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). 336 Moreover, the
International Criminal Court statute or Rome Statute, which is the fruit of an international
treaty, adopts the view that the status of the accused does not affect the question of his or

Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991 art. 7 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993);
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453rd
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 27 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (2002).
333
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60.
334
For the immunity issue, see Infra Ch. IV, Sec. III.
335
For instance, article 7 of IMT Charter provides “The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating.” See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat.
1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945); This norm, with the exception of the “mitigating role,” has
been recognized as one of the rules of international law by the United Nations General Assembly. See
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment
of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); 1950 ILC Yb 374, vol. II;
44 AJIL 126 (1950).
336
Article 7(2) of ICTY statute provides “The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993);
32 ILM 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).
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her criminal responsibility. 337 In addition, several international treaties emphasize the
same doctrine. 338

By and large, although legal norms for the criminal responsibility of heads of state
for war crimes exist, it has been said that “[T]he hard task is to implement those norms by
bringing those criminals before courts.” 339 Thus, the availability of legal norms alone is
not sufficient under the regime of international law to bring these norms into practice
before judicial organs. A decision to commence an international criminal prosecution is a
decision with political and legal dimensions.

Only political reasons can justify the International Military Tribunal’s
prosecutions of Admiral Erich Raeder, appointed Chancellor (Head of State) as successor
to Adolph Hitler, and other German high-ranking officials, 340 while the Japanese
Emperor Hirohito was not indicted before the Far East Military Tribunal.341 In any case,
this paper is concerned only with the legal side of the story.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). The International Law Commission, in both drafts concerning these
crimes against Peace and the Security of Mankind, adopted the notion that the head of state can no longer
defend himself from criminal responsibility by claiming that because of his or her status he is not
responsible. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 7, 1996, 51 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind art. 3, 1954, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954);
45 AJIL 123 (1951).
338
For instance, article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
provides “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
339
Farhad Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law,
Vol. I, 153, 189 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
340
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 73 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
341
For reasons not to indict the Japanese Emperor, see Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New Customary Law of
Head of State Immunity: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 299-306 (2002).
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Under the current rules of international criminal law, the criminal responsibility of
a superior, including a head of state, can be based either on an act or a failure to act, as
summarized by the United Nations Secretary-General’s report:

A person in a position of superior authority should, therefore, be held
individually responsible for giving the unlawful order to commit a crime
under the present statute. But he should also be held responsible for failure
to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behavior of his subordinates.
This imputed responsibility or criminal negligence is engaged if the person
in superior authority knew or had reason to know that his subordinates
were about to commit or had committed crimes and yet failed to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or repress the commission of
such crimes or to punish those who had committed them. 342
In addition to these statute-based grounds, a third basis has emerged through ad hoc
practice of international criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTY). This basis is called “Joint
Criminal Enterprise” or “Common Plan.” 343

As a result, the criminal responsibility of the superior, including a head of state,
can be assigned by claiming that his or her involvement in the commission of the
international crime in question was direct involvement by: (1) issuing an unlawful order;
(2) participating in a criminal common plan; or (3) indirect involvement through his or
her failure to either prevent the commission of the offense or punish the responsible
subordinates.” These three theories for the criminal responsibility of the superior will be
examined in depth in the following part of this chapter.

342

Report of The Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, ¶ 56; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16,
1998) ¶ 333.
343
Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 292 (Oxford University Press 2005).
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1. Superior Responsibility Based on an Unlawful Order

The criminal responsibility of a superior, including a head of state, may arise from
various actions. 344 One of those actions is issuing an unlawful order by a superior to his
subordinates to commit an action which is considered a violation of the laws of war. This
form of responsibility is considered a form of accessorial responsibility. 345

The superior’s order to his subordinates to commit an offense was reaffirmed as a
basis for criminal responsibility after World War I. 346 During World War II, the Allies347
announced their intention to punish indivduals of the Axis 348 forces who were “guilty of
or responsible for these crimes [committed in occupied territories], whether they have
ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated in them”(emphasis added). 349 After the
cessation of hostilities, article II (2) of the Control Council Law No. 10, governing the
trials of World War II criminals, implemented this intention by including this basis. 350

344

Participation in the commission of the crime can be, as summarized by the ICTY, through planning,
instigating, ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting. See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT98-33-1 (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610.
345
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 103 (2005).
346
Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,91
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
347
The Allied powers were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the
United Kingdom.
348
The Axis countries were Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan.
349
Editorial Comment: Retribution for War Crimes, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (1943).
350
It provides “….Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to
have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same”(emphasis added). See
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946).
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An order, as a basis for the charge of criminal responsibility, appears in most of
the World War II trials without objections or denial of it as grounds for the charge. 351 In
some cases, the responsibility even included unexecuted orders. 352 An example of an
unlawful order is the execution of partisans on suspicion only and without proof. 353 The
defense of misinterpretation of orders by subordinates was raised during the World War
II trials. This defense, however, does not appear to have been accepted by the British
Military Court at Hamburg, in Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle. 354

351

See count I in Trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VI, Trial
of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst, Case No.36, P. 111; Trial of Albert Kesselring. Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals, Vol. VIII, Case No.44, P. 9; See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, Trial of
Wilhelm List and others “The hostage Case”, Case No.47, P. 35; See Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals, Vol. XII, The Germen High Command Trial, Case No.72, P. 2-3.
352
The United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held, in The Hostage Case, that “The order was
clearly unlawful and so recognized by the defendant. He contends, however, that no captured Commissars
were shot by troops under his command. This is, of course, a mitigating circumstance but it does not free
him of the crime of knowingly and intentionally passing on a criminal order.” See Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals, Vol. VIII, Trial of Wilhelm List and others “The hostage Case”, Case No.47, P. 90
However, this rule is not absolute. Concerning the responsibility of the superior who issued an unlawful
order that was impossible to carry out, the British Military Court, in Trial of Generalobrest Nickolaus Von
Falkenhorst Case, held that “The question of the state of mind of the accused when he issued the order
becomes important from the point of view of mens rea, because if he knew that the order could not be
carried out, then no question of criminality should arise.” See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol.
XI, Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus Von Falkenhorst, Case No.61, P. 29.
353
Providing examples of unlawful orders, the United States Military at Nuremberg, in The German High
Command Trial, laid down that “[the defendant] held the executive power for his area, and it was his duty
to exercise it for the protection of the population. He was obligated not to deport them, not to despoil them
of their property, nor to send both those innocent and those guilty of aiding the so-called bands to
concentration camps…..The orders to do those things were criminal orders, and they were fully
implemented by him.” See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XII, The German High Command
Trial, Case No.72, P. 121.
354
The responsibility for unexecuted orders was raised in this case. The order was “(1) No attempt of any
kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs
counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. (2) Orders for
bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply. (3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements
would be of importance for your boat. (4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for
women and children in his bombing attacks on German Cities.” The charge was “he [the accused],…..,
when senior officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, in violation of the laws and usages of war, gave orders to
commanding officers of U-boats who were due to leave on war patrols that they were to destroy ships and
their crews.” The Defence argued that the order was ambiguous and that it prohibited saving crews but was
not an order to kill them. However, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five years
imprisonment. See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle, Case
No.54, P. 76-78.
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After the World War II trials, the international obligation of states to criminalize
the conduct of those who ordered a crime became part of international customary law. 355
Later on, charges based on orders continued to play a role in ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. 356 Subsequently, the “Individual’s responsibility based on an order” rule has
been reaffirmed in several international criminal instruments. 357

Rules governing criminal responsibility based on an order under the jurisprudence
of ad hoc tribunals are not fundamentally different from those established during the
World War II trials. Under ICTY jurisprudence, commission of a crime by an order
means “A person in a position of authority using that position to convince another to
commit an offense.” 358 While the ICTR views giving an order as “[A] third form of
participation, implies [implying] a superior-subordinate relationship between the person

355

Geneva Convention IV article 146(1) provides “The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article”(emphasis
added). Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(1949).
356
The U.N. Commission of Experts laid down that “A person who gives the order to commit a war crime
or crime against humanity is equally guilty of the offence with the person actually committing it. This
principle, expressed already in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, applies to both the military superiors,
whether of regular or irregular armed forces, and to civilian authorities.” See Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security, Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc,
S/1994/674. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991 art. 7 (1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159, (1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (1), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess.,
3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); The Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute
art. 6 (1). S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000).
357
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 2 (3), 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No.
10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); The same occurs with the International Criminal
Court statute. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25 (c)(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9;
37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
358
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-1 (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610.
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giving the order and the one executing it, with the person in a position of authority using
such position to persuade another to commit an offence.” 359

The actual presence of the superior while the crime is committed is not necessary
for conviction. 360 Responsibility can be imposed on the person who gave the order upon
proof that he directly or indirectly intended that the crime be committed. 361 In other
words, the mens rea of the person who issued the order matters, not that of the person
who executed the order. 362 Even a person who ordered an act or the omission of an act
with awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the
execution of that order holds the required mens rea for responsibility based on that
order. 363 There is no requirement for the specific form of order and it need not be given
directly by the superior to the subordinate. 364 Moreover, the superior’s responsibility
includes all that naturally results from the commission of the act in question. 365

To overcome the difficulty of proving environmental offenses, some have
suggested the creation of a presumption by which commanders are deemed to have
ordered crimes committed by subordinates although proponents of this proposition admit
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Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3 (December 6, 1999) ¶ 39; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (June 7, 2001) ¶ 30; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T
(December 1, 2003) ¶ 763; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T (January 22, 2004) ¶ 594;
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998) ¶ 483.
360
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997) ¶ 691.
361
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 278; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkezi,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 386; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T
(June 7, 2001) ¶ 31; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 445.
362
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 282.
363
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 42; Prosecutor v.
Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 445.
364
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 281; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkezi,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 388.
365
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997) ¶ 692.
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that such an approach would violate the principle of the presumption of innocence.366
Adoption of this approach is an unsettled question, and the debate continues among
international and regional judicial authorities. 367

2.

Principles of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)
This form of responsibility holds an individual responsible for all crimes

committed pursuant to a common plan or design involving the commission of a crime, if
the individual participated with others in the common design. Thus, even if the crime was
committed by particular participants, other participants in the design may be held
responsible. 368

In the World War II trials, a similar term, called “common design,” was used.
“Common design” is defined as “a community of intention between two or more persons
to do an unlawful act.” 369 Under international ad hoc criminal tribunals jurisprudence,
JCE became a regular form of responsibility for political and military leaders. 370

JCE is a form of liability which is not explicitly described by the tribunal’s statute
but is implicit in Article 7/1 of the ICTY statute and in the World War II trials. 371 The

366

William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 84 (Cambridge University
Press 2001).
367
Although the European Court of Human Rights permitted this approach in some cases, article 67 of the
Rome statute rejects it. For the European Court of Human Rights view, see Salabiaka v. France, Series
App. No. 141-A, 7 October 1988; Pham Hoang v. France, Series App. No. 243, 25 September 1992, ¶ 28;
see as well Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 66, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM
1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
368
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 82.
369
See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XV, The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Case
No.60, P. 14.
370
Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 292 (Oxford University Press 2005).
371
The ICTY Chamber held that “Joint criminal enterprise” liability is a form of criminal responsibility
which the Appeals Chamber found to be implicitly included in Article 7(1) of the Statute. It entails
individual responsibility for participation in a joint criminal enterprise to commit a crime.” Prosecutor v.
Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-1 (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610.
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conclusion, reached by the ICTY, that JCE derived its existence from the practice of the
World War II trials, has been criticized. 372 Before examining the required elements for
this basis of criminal liability, it is necessary to distinguish between this concept and
other concepts which might cause confusion due to the similarity of their elements.

The first concept which might be compared to JCE is the conspiracy concept.
Conspiracy as a substantive crime appears in several international instruments
criminalizing conduct such as the international drug trade, slavery, apartheid, and money
laundering. 373 In the World War II war crimes trials, conspiracy was considered a
substantive crime (conspiracy to commit a crime against peace) and as a theory of
liability under which each defendant could be convicted for any acts committed by coconsipirators “in the execution of such a plan.” 374 However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials rejected conspiracy as a substantive crime in war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 375

Both conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise require the existence of an
agreement. The difference is that joint criminal enterprise, unlike conspiracy, requires

372

Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113 (2005)
(arguing that the World War II trials support the second category “Camp Concentration” but not the rest).
373
Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 58 (2003).
374
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 117 (2005).
375
Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 58 (2003); see Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,
Vol. VI, The Justice Trial, Case No.35, P. 5; the ICTY statute provides for conspiracy in only the genocide
charge. See art. 4 (3) (b) of the ICTY Statute. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 4 (3)(b), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2
(1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).
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that each defendant participate in an action in furtherance of the agreement. 376
Consequently, conspiracy is viewed as an easier basis on which to prosecute than JCE
since the former does not require proof of participation in an action. 377 In addition, unlike
conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise is not a substantive crime. 378

The second concept which is similar to JCE is the criminal organization basis
used in the World War II trials. 379 According to this basis, the prosecutor must establish
that the accused “became or remained a member of the [criminal] organization with
knowledge that it was being used for the commission of [criminal] acts.” 380 Thus, the
criminality of the organization must be proved first. Then, the prosecutor must prove that
the accused freely joined the organization and that he or she knew the organization was a
tool through which crimes were committed.

Although both concepts have a common feature, collective responsibility, the JCE
theory does not require the existence of an organization. Moreover, to be convicted based
on JCE, an accused, unlike a criminal organization, must participate in the commission of
the crime. In sum, the criminal organization charge is a membership charge or offense.
During the World War II trials, there was debate as to whether an accused must hold a
leading position in the criminal organization in order to convict him or her based upon

376

Prosecutor v. Multinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction- Joint Criminal Enterprise, Appeal Decision (May 21, 2001) ¶ 23.
377
Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (2003).
378
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 119 (2005).
379
The concept of “Criminal Organizations” adopted in Nuremberg Charter (Articles 9, 10.) however, it
was not included within those rules adopted by General Assembly. John R.W.D. Jones & Steven Powles,
International Criminal Practice 410 (Transnational Publishers, Inc 2003).
380
See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, The Flick Trial, Case No.48, P. 28.
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this position. 381 In conclusion, the argument that joint criminal enterprise amounts to
either conspiracy or organizational responsibility is rejected by the ICTY. 382

While under international criminal ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, situations in
which a JCE-based conviction can be accomplished are divided into three categories. 383
The so-called Concentration Camp cases are most pertinent here because they are a
precedent for charging Saddam Hussein in his actions against the environment. This
category, derived from the World War II trials, is represented by “[A] ‘Systemic’ form of
joint criminal enterprise. It is a variant of the basic form, characterized by the existence
of an organized system of ill-treatment. An example is extermination or concentration
camps, in which the prisoners are killed or mistreated pursuant to the joint criminal
enterprise.” 384

381

See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VII, The Trial of Obersturmbannfuhrer Rudolf Franz
Ferdinand Hoess , Case No.38, P. 11; for a review regarding the emergence of the concept see Law Reports
of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIII, The Trial of Ulrich Greifelt and others, Case No.73, P. 42-67.
382
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic ET Al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeal Decision on Dragoljub Ordanic’s
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction- Joint Criminal Enterprise (May 21, 2003) ¶ 23, 25.
383
“The first such category is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common
design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan among the coperpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a
different role within it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill. The objective and subjective
prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have,
effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common
design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material assistance to
or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the
killing, must nevertheless intend this result.” The second category is the so-called extended responsibility
which “concerns cases involving a common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators
commits an act which, while outside the common purpose, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the effecting of that common purpose. An example is a common purpose or plan on the part
of a group to forcibly remove at gun-point members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to
effect “ethnic cleansing”) with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is
shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common
purpose, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result
in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.” See Prosecutor v.Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal
Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 97, 99.
384
Prosecutor v.Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 98.
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More than one participant, the existence of a common purpose, and the
participation of the defendant in that common purpose are the three requirements for the
JCE actus reus. The participants need not be organized in a military, political, or
administrative structure and the common plan need not be previously arranged or
organized. 385

The required element of participation “[I]nvolves the perpetration of one of the
crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not involve commission of a
specific crime under one of the provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture or
rape), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the
common purpose.” 386 Moreover, the difference between participating in a joint criminal
enterprise as a co-perpetrator or as an aider and abettor depends upon the depth of
involvement. 387 Lastly, it has been ruled, regarding the required mens rea, that “With
regard to the basic form of joint criminal enterprise what is required is the intent to

385

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeal Judgment (July 15, 1999) ¶ 227; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 79.
386
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-98-32 (February 25, 2004) ¶ 100.
387
The Court provided that “Participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of “commission” under
Article 7(1) of the Statute. The participant therein is liable as a co-perpetrator of the crime(s). Aiding and
abetting the commission of a crime is usually considered to incur a lesser degree of individual criminal
responsibility than committing a crime. In the context of a crime committed by several co-perpetrators in a
joint criminal enterprise, the aider and abettor is always an accessory to these co-perpetrators, although the
co-perpetrators may not even know of the aider and abettor’s contribution. Differences exist in relation to
the actus reus as well as to the mens rea requirements between both forms of individual criminal
responsibility: (i) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton
destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the
crime. By contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some
way are directed to the furtherance of the common design. (ii) In the case of aiding and abetting, the
requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the
commission of the specific crime of the principal. By contrast, in the case of participation in a joint
criminal enterprise, i.e. as a co-perpetrator, the requisite mens rea is intent to pursue a common purpose.”
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 102.
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perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all coperpetrators).” 388

3.

Command Responsibility

Command responsibility is described in the statement, “Clearly, assignment to
command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and heavy responsibility.” 389
This responsibility requires “a balance” between military necessity and the dictates of
justice or humanity. 390 Criminal command responsibility is imposed in order to ensure
respect for the rules of armed conflict by controlling commanders. 391 Command
responsibility, which originated in national military law, gradually became the basis of
the international law on responsibility. Nationally, it can be traced back to 500 B.C. 392

At the international level, the dubious legality and uncertainty about this
responsibility was one cause of the failure to establish an international criminal tribunal
after World War I. 393 As a result, command responsibility, or “failure to act”

388

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 101.
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).
390
It has been said that “The Customary International Legal norms that have evolved reflect a balance of
the principles of military necessity and humanity. With respect to the first principle, a modern army
requires delegation of authority and control and a large degree of decentralization to function effectively.
[H]e [commander] has a right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be legally
executed. At the same time, the military commander is not permitted, solely through his delegation of
authority and control, to escape criminal liability for war crimes committed by subordinates.” Lieutenant
Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility
of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107 MIL. L. REV. 71, 131 (1985).
391
The U.S. Supreme Court in the General Yamashita case stated that, “The law of war presupposes that its
violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some
extent responsible for their subordinates.” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 348-49 (1946); see also Prosecutor
v. Hadzihasanovic ET AL., Case No. IT-1-47-AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility (July 16, 2003) ¶ 16.
392
For the developing history of the command responsibility doctrine, see Major William Huges Parks,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973).
393
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 298 (Transnational Publishers, Inc
2003).
389
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responsibility, existed for the first time internationally only after World War II. 394 Since
World War II, many international instruments dealing with criminal aspects of
international law contain a provision explicitly governing command responsibility. 395 In
short, under contemporary international criminal law, command responsibility is a wellestablished norm of international customary and conventional law. 396

The doctrine of command responsibility emerged from the leading case, the
General Yamashita case, 397 after World War II. It developed through subsequent
international cases held before international ad hoc criminal tribunals. Examining this
basis requires reviewing the Yamashita case and concept under the ad hoc tribunals’
jurisprudence.

The doctrine of command responsibility was not enunciated in the Far East
Tribunal Charter, but was developed through the trials conducted according to the
Charter. 398 One of those cases was that of General Tomoyuk Yamashita. Tomoyuk
Yamashita, formerly Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the
394

Although the Nuremberg trials have been criticized, the trials have had their positive aspects in
establishing new international criminal rules. Command responsibility is one of them. M. Cherif Bassiouni,
The Nuremberg Legacy: Historical Assessment in War Crimes: The Lagacy of Nurmeberg 291(Belinda
Cooper ed., TV Books, LLC. 1999).
395
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 3, 1954, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No.
9) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954); 45 AJIL 123 (1951); Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 86 (2), 1125
UNTS 3 (1977); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (3), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM
1159 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (3), S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 6, 1996, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute art. 17 (1). S.C. Res. 1315,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000).
396
Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 333.
397
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).
398
Major Michael Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary
Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 176 (2000).
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Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, was “charged with unlawfully
disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as commander to control the acts of
members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes.” 399 The basis of the
charge was not an unlawful order issued by the defendant, but the prosecutor’s theory
that the defendant must have known of the crimes committed by his subordinates in the
Philippine Islands and that he failed to prevent them. The various crimes include
starvation, execution without trial, torture, murder, rape, and the burning and demolition
of large numbers of buildings, places of business, places of worship, and educational
institutions without adequate military necessity. 400

The defense argued that the basis of the charge, command responsibility, was not
recognized by international law and did not constitute a war crime and that consequently
the Commission did not have jurisdiction to try his client. In addition, the defense
contended that the prosecutor had failed to establish a link between the defendant’s act
and the alleged crimes or at least to establish that the defendant knew about the alleged
crimes. 401

The evidence presented in the trial concerned the crimes committed by the
defendant’s subordinates. It established that the alleged crimes were widespread with
regard to both space and time. By stipulation, both the prosecutor and the defense agreed
that the defendant occupied the commanding position at the time the crimes were

399

Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).
400
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita 1, 4 (1946).
401
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita 1, 28-29 (1946).
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committed. The prosecutor tried only a few times to prove the connection between the
defendant’s act and the committed atrocities. 402
The Commission’s verdict was issued 7th December 1945. The Commission
commented on the Prosecutor’s evidence by stating:

“The prosecutor presented evidence to show that the crimes were so
extensive and widespread, both as to time and area, that they must either
have been willfully permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the
accused…….Nevertheless, where…., revengeful actions are widespread,
and there is not [an] effective attempt by a commander to discover and
control the criminal acts, such commander may be held responsible, even
criminally responsible.” 403
The Commission’s statement indicates that it attributed knoweldge to the
defendant because of the widespread nature of the offences. A staff judge who daily
reviewed a summary of the evidence stated “The pattern of….destruction of property is
widespread in point of time and of area to the extent a reasonable person must logically
conclude the program to have been the result of deliberate planning..” 404 It seems, as
well, that the Commission was not convinced by the defendant’s argument that, during
402

The evidence is summarized in the following paragraph: On the sixth day of the trial, Narciso Lapus,
imprisoned by the United States as a collaborator, attempted to connect Yamashita directly to the
commission of atrocities on the islands. As private secretary to General Artemio Ricarte, an elderly
compatriot of the legendary Emillio Aguinaldo, around whom the Japanese had hoped to rally the Filipino
people, Lapus insisted he had gained information that would incriminate Yamashita. That ruthless, cruel
officer, he swore, had notified Ricarte twice in October 1944 that he had ordered his officers “….wipe out
the whole Philippines if possible…”He also testified that Ricarte had informed him that Yamashita had
refused to modify that order. The old general, according to Lapus, also claimed that Yamashita had rejected
one appeal by arguing that “war is war and the enemy should not be given quarter …..”See Richard L. Lael,
The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility 84 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1982);
See also A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita 120-123 (The University of Chicago Press 1949).
403
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).
404
Quoted in Major William Huges Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 32
(1973); The Canadian Regulations 10 (4) make the following provisions:" (4). Where there is evidence that
more than one war crime has been committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or group while under
the command of a single commander, the court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence of the
responsibility of the commander for those crimes.” Canadian Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals by
Military Courts Reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War
Crimes Commission (1948), Volume IV, Annex, P.128.
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the war, communication between him and his subordinates was cut off. The
Commission’s statement, “willfully permitted by the accused or secretly ordered by the
accused,” is confusing as to the basis of the charge. Is it “an order” or is it a “failure to
act”? The evidence presented regarding the defendant’s act and the alleged crimes
supports the order basis.

The Commission convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death. After the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands rejected the defendant’s petition on appeal, the
defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter Court reviewed
the defendant’s arguments concerning the legality of the establishment of the
Commission and the legality of the charge, “failure to act.” The Court did not review the
issue of the sufficiency of evidence. 405

The Court derived its view of the commander’s duty to prevent the commission of
the crime from several international conventions, 406 rejecting the defendant’s arguments.
Although he was in agreement with the Court on the issue of the legality of the
establishment of the Commission, Justice Murphy, in his dissenting opinion, rejected the

405

As a response to the defendant’s argument concerning the legality of his charge, the Court responded:
“But it is urged that the charge does not allege that petitioner has either committed or directed the
commission of such acts, and consequently that no violation is charged against him. But this overlooks the
fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army commander to control
the operations of the members of his command by 'permitting them to commit' the extensive and
widespread atrocities specified. The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army
commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his
command for the prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are
likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be
charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations result. That this
was the precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the prosecution at the opening of the
trial.” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946).
406
In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1946).
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existence of the theory of command responsibility in international law. 407 On 23rd
February 1946, the defendant was executed. 408 The noteworthy point of this case is the
evidence presented and the way the Commission inferred the defendant’s mens rea from
several facts including the number of illegal acts, their location, their scope and the time
during which they occurred.

At least two objections might be raised to the theory of command responsibility.
The first objection is to linking commanders to all crimes committed by their
subordinates. 409 Consequently, conspiracy is viewed as an easier basis for a superior’s
criminal responsibility for a subordinate’s conduct than command responsibility. 410 The
argument based on command responsibility is more difficult because the prosecutor has
to prove that suordinates committed crimes, but conspiracy liability can be established
without the need to prove that others committed underlying offenses. 411 The second
objection concerns those offenses requiring a specific intent. 412

Although command responsibility based on the “failure to act” theory was not
included in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in 1977 the Protocol I Additional to the
407

Justice Murphy, in his dissenting view, stated that “… International Law makes no attempt to define the
duties of a commander of any army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor does it impose liability
under such circumstances for failure to meet the ordinary responsibilities of command. The omission is
understandable. Duties, as well as liability to control troops, vary according to the nature and intensity of
the particular battle. To find unlawful deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult and
speculative calculations….” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30-42 (1946).
408
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 2 (1946).
409
William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 83 (Cambridge University
Press 2001).
410
Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (2003).
411
Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 47-53, 56 (2003).
412
It has been argued that no command responsibility can be imposed in crimes requiring specific intent,
such as murder, or genocide, unless the command has such intent. Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes
and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 306 (Oxford University Press 2005).

107

Substantive Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, filled the gap by including the doctrine of command
responsibility in its provisions. 413

Unlike the Joint Criminal Enterprise basis, the command responsibility is
explicitly provided in the ICTY statute.414 The statute does not distinguish between
command responsibility and superior responsibility. The former is mainly meant to
address the responsibility of indirect superiors such as the commander in chief while the
superior responsibility encompasses the responsibility of the direct superior of the
criminal subordinates. 415 Therefore, it is logical to assume that rules controlling the
superior responsibility are applicable to command responsibility with the exception of
rules requiring or assuming a direct or close relation between the superior and
subordinates.

413

Article 86 (2) provides “The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by
a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible
measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.” Article 87 provides those duties the
commander shall fulfill. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977).
414
Article 7 (3) provides “The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (3),
S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).
415
For instance, the International Criminal Court Statute makes this distinction. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998); see as well The Canadian Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act defines a military
commander as “a person effectively acting as a military commander and a person who commands police
with a degree of authority and controls comparable to a military command.” While a superior is “a person
in authority, other than military commander.” Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act S. C. 24 § 5.4
(2000)(Can.).
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Command responsibility can be raised only when there is a legal duty or
obligation to act. 416 Moreover, as a general rule, members of the armed forces are subject
to national military laws and to international regulation of armed conflicts. However,
non-military personnel, including political leaders, are not subject to international laws of
armed conflict unless an agency relationship can be established between those persons
and the armed conflict. 417

Although command responsibility is the legal and logical concomitant to the
defense of “obedience to superior orders,” 418 conviction of the subordinate does not
relieve the commander of responsibility. On the other hand, exonerating the subordinate
based on the defense of “obedience to superior orders” does not necessarily support
conviction of the superior because orders can be either wrongly understood or wrongly
applied.

Under the ICTY jurisprudence, there are three elements of superior responsibility
“(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) the superior knew or had
reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act
or punish the perpetrator thereof.” 419

416

Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 334.
Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 196;
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A (January 27, 2000) ¶ 148.
418
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity 449-83 (Kluwer Law International 1999); see also
D’Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility and Levie, “Some Comments on Professor
D’Amato’s Paradox,” 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 604-II (1986).
419
Prosecutor v. Delalic et Al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 346. The source of the three
conditions is International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary regarding Geneva Protocol I.
See ICRC commentary ¶ 3543 available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750112?OpenDocument
(last visited July 15, 2006).
417
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The superior-subordinate relationship requires a hierarchical relationship, direct
or indirect, and the prosecutor must show that the accused has exercised “effective
power” over those said to be his or her subordinates and to have committed crimes. 420
“Effective control” means that the superior, whether de jure or de facto, military or
civilian, has the power or authority to prevent the offense or to punish subordinates. This
effective control does not need to be permanent. 421 Based on this standard, two or more
superiors can be held criminally liable for the same crime if it can be shown that the
perpetrator was under both of their commands at the relevant time. 422

The fact that the superior might have been de jure superior to the offender, or that
he had the ability to give orders, is not enough or conclusive to prove that he had
effective control. Other relevant factors can be considered to determine whether there
was a superior-subordinate relationship. 423 The superior-subordinate relationship must be
distinguished from a lower form of influence or authority. Some individuals may be
respected enough to persuade others to follow them, exercising some influence over these
others. This lower level of influence, however, is not sufficient to prove a superiorsubordinate relationship. 424

Regarding the temporal existence of the superior-subordinate relationship, the
majority of the ICTY Appeal Chambers believe that there should be a perfect temporal
420

Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment (July 3, 2002) ¶ 50.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001, ¶ 399; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No.
IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 459; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 300;
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment (July 3, 2002) ¶ 50; Prosecutor v.
Delalic et el., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 251-252; Prosecutor v.
Kajelijeli , Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T (December 1, 2003) ¶ 771.
422
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 303; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 93.
423
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T (February 22, 200) ¶ 396.
424
Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 263, 266.
421
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coincidence between the time of the commission of the crime and the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship. 425 This view overlooks the fact that responsibility is
based on whether a superior failed to prevent the crime or to punish the offender. The
latter should include a defendant who was not the subordinate’s superior at the time the
offense was committed but was the subordinate’s superior subsequently when the offense
could have been punished but was not. Consequently, command responsibility should be
enforced on those who failed to punish the offender even if their superior-subordinate
relationship existed only after the commission of the crime. 426

In addition to the requirement for a superior-subordinate relationship, it must be
shown that the superior, military or civilian, knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate had committed the crime or was about to do so. 427 The knowledge
requirement is satisfied either by actual knowledge or knowledge putting the superior on
notice of the probability of the comission of such an offense. 428 Actual knowledge means
that a superior was aware that a relevant crime had been committed or was about to be
committed. Such awareness can be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence. 429

425

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility (July 16, 2003) ¶ 45.
426
Prosecutor argues in his brief before the trial court. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility (July 16, 2003) ¶ 43.
427
The court derived the mental element from the Commission of Experts Report which provides “The
forms of command’s knowledge are “It is the view of the Commission that the mental element necessary
when the commander has not given the offending order is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal
dereliction on the part of the commander as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible
consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive knowledge; that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the
commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have known of the offences
charged and acquiesced therein.” Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc, S/1994/674; see as well Prosecutor v. Delalic ET Al.,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 222.
428
Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 223.
429
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 427.
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The information which puts the superior on notice regarding the risk of the
offense is not required to be in a specific form and it can be oral or written. There is no
need for specific information. It is enough that the information simply be in general.430 In
determining whether a superior had knowledge, several factors should be considered.
These factors were derived from the final report of the Commission of Experts for the
former Yugoslavia Tribunal. 431 Regarding the commander’s knowledge “one might
consider a number of indices, including: …the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal
acts; the scope of illegal acts; the time during which the illegal acts occurred; the number
and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of
the acts; the widespread occurrence of the acts; the tactical tempo of operations; the
modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of
the commander at the time.” 432 Some of these factors are reminiscent of those factors
adopted in the Yamashita case.

The third requirement is the superior’s failure to prevent or punish. This means
that the superior failed to take reasonably necessary measures to do so. The required
measures are those which are foreseeable in all circumstances and are within the

430

Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 238; failure
to obtain such information or the argument that a superior “should have known” or that the superior failed
to exercise his duty to be informed of the criminal behavior of his subordinate are not valid grounds to base
the responsibility under the command responsibility doctrine. Prosecutor v. Delalic ET Al., Case No. IT96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 222-241. However, some national military legislation has
adopted a different view. See for instance Canadian law, under which criminal negligence in failing to
obtain the information regarding the violations is sufficient. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act
S. C. 24 § 5.1.b (2000)(Can.).
431
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992).
432
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992).
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superior’s power. 433 Necessary and reasonable measures, of course, vary from case to
case and the urgency with which a commander is expected to act depends partly on the
seriousness and nature of the offense. 434

Failure to act can include “failure to control troops, disregard of troop conduct,
acquiescence in troop activity, dereliction of duty, general complicity (incitement,
approval, aiding and abetting, accessory responsibility, conspiracy), failure to educate
troops or suppress crime, failure to prosecute troops who violate the law, failure to
enforce the law generally, failure to maintain troop discipline, failure to investigate
incidents, failure to report incidents to higher authorities…” 435

It is enough for a superior to fail to prevent or punish a crime. Although the duty
to prevent concerns future crimes of subordinates while the duty to punish concerns past
crimes of subordinates, punishing is not enough if prevention was available, but was not
undertaken.

436

The duty to prevent encompasses both that the superior knew that a crime

was planned or that he had reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime would be
committed. 437

433

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 95; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case
No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 226.
434
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (June 25, 1999) ¶ 81; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 72.
435
Jordan Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 176
(1972) Quoted in Lieutenant Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study
of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107
MIL. L. REV. 71, 132 (1985).
436
Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 336; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 83.
437
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 445.
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Nevertheless, causation is not required. 438 Between the failure to act and the
commission of the crime, such a nexus might be considered “inherent in the requirement
that the superior failed to prevent the crimes which were committed by the
subordinate.” 439

Finally, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals split on the issue of whether a
commander can be found guilty for the same crime on two grounds, command
responsibility and other bases of responsibility such as an order. Even ICTY Chambers
differ in this regard. 440 On the upper level, rejecting an approach which considers the
position of the accused, as a commander, an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing
stage, the ICTY Appeal Chamber gave indictment priority to the active basis such as an
order. 441 On the other hand, the ICTR convicted the same defendant based on two
theories for the same conduct. 442

4.

Saddam Hussein's Role in the Environmental Offenses

Several questions might have been raised regarding whether Saddam Hussein
intentionally committed crimes against the environment. Were his actions driven by
pressing military circumstances? Did Saddam Hussein order a premeditated plan to be set
in motion to commit those crimes? Was there a connection between the crimes and the

438

Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 398.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 339.
440
In Kordic and Cerkez case, the Court convicted Cerkez in both counts, while in Blaskic, the Court
rejected such approach. See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶
842; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 337.
441
Compare between Prosecutor v. Blaskici, No. IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment Case (July 31, 2004) ¶ 91
& Prosecutor v. Furundizja, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 1998) ¶ 283.
442
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T (January 22, 2004).
439
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activities of the Coalition forces? The answers to these questions can be found in Iraqi
documents captured in Kuwait after the liberation of Kuwait. 443

Saddam Hussein‘s case is similar to the case of most of the Nuremberg
defendants. As put by Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials:
Few of the defendants committed atrocities with their own hands, and in
fact they were rarely visible at or within many miles of the scene of their
worst crimes. They made plans and transmitted orders, and the most
compelling witnesses against them were the documents which they had
drafted, signed, initialed, or distributed. 444
To be admitted before international criminal tribunals, documentary evidence
must be relevant and authentic, and have probative value. 445 Iraqi documents captured
after the liberation of Kuwait are likely to satisfy the above requirements for admission of
evidence. Without question, Iraqi documents are relevant. They have probative value
because they contain the plans for destruction and the names of the perpetrators.446
Concerning the authenticity of the documents, because originals were seized and because
they were signed by well-recognized Iraqi officers, they would have been accepted before
the court. 447 This part will examine the destruction plan and the link between that plan
and Saddam Hussein in light of those documents.

The destruction of Kuwaiti oil, a natural resource, was one of the strategic aims of
the Iraqi aggression. According to captured Iraqi documents, this destruction plan was

443

This evidence was documented in detail through several references. See Devastating Oil Well As
Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting
Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait 1997).
444
Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under
Control Council Law No. 10, at 68 (G.P.O., Aug. 15, 1949).
445
See infra. App. 5.
446
All Iraqi documents show the sending persons and the receiving persons. In addition, all the documents
show those individuals who are responsible for ordering and executing the destruction plan.
447
See infra. App. 3.
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called the "Deferred Destruction Plan." 448 Therefore, it is clear that the destruction was
not inadvertent or imposed by pressing circumstances or the result of aerial bombardment
by the Coalition forces as Iraqi authorities claimed. In short, it was a premeditated crime.
It was calculated as part of the overall strategic plan of the Iraqi invasion.
Document 2 449 proves that the task of the Destruction Guard Team, established by
the Iraqi regime during the invasion, was not only to safeguard the oil wells against any
internal or external danger, but to safeguard the explosives attached to the wells to
guarantee their detonation. Document 3 required "…immediate consideration, prevention
of infringements, and continuous surveillance in order to preserve these installations." 450
In other words, all actions possible were to be taken to preserve the wells while they were
in Iraqi possession, but all actions possible were to be taken to destroy them when they
were to escape Iraqi possession.

A careful review of Iraqi documents reveals that the mechanism for implementing
the "Deferred Destruction Plan" was accurate and comprehensive. A number of steps
were planned to guarantee its execution. These steps were: identifying and preparing the
targets designated for destruction; preparing materials and equipment used for
destruction; selecting types of destruction methods; naming the destruction elements and
specifying their responsibilities and duties; selecting the destruction guard groups;
nominating the ignition groups; conducting drills of the destruction operations;

448

See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 28 (Center for Research and
Studies on Kuwait 1997).
449
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 2.
450
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 3.
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nominating patrols for follow up; and timing the implementation of the plan and its
mechanism. 451

Identifying the targets was the first step in the plan. The targets, according to Iraqi
documents, were oil wells and other oil installations including assembly centers and oil
terminals. In addition, vital strategic installations such as power stations, water
desalination plants, and petro-chemical industries were included as targets for
destruction. 452 This step included determining suitable sites for the placement of
explosives at the control valves at the underground well heads. These valves control the
flow of oil from the well. Destroying them was calculated to result in a flow of oil so
strong that it would be impossible to stop the leakage or to extinguish the resulting
fire. 453 This experience drew on the assistance of Field Engineering Corps personnel. 454

Preparing the targets for destruction required two diagrams for placing and fixing
the explosive charges at the head of the well. 455 This process required daily inspection to
ensure the presence of the explosives and the safety of the circuit. Materials and
equipment used in the plan showed the intentionality of the offense. Explosives or filling
bursting charges, electric destruction wires, igniters or kindlers, an ignition fuse, a safety
cord, explosion capsules, a detonator, sand bags, and a wireless set were the materials
used. 456 In addition to daily inspection, an experiment was conducted on the explosive

451

See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 53 (Center for Research and
Studies on Kuwait 1997).
452
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 9 Para. 1.
453
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 11.
454
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 10 Sec. (b) Sub.Sec. “Suggestion” Fourth.
455
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13.
456
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13.
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charges to check for their safety and degree of explosiveness.

457

Two basic methods of

destruction were used as well as other alternatives.

These methods showed the keenness of the Iraqi regime to successfully achieve
the plan. One of the two basic methods was an electric deferred-destruction circuit 458
while the second method is called an "Ordinary Deferred-Destruction Circuit." 459 Other
alternatives were: destruction by the artillery batteries, destruction by direct or indirect
shelling by tanks, and destruction by shots fired from the destruction guard in case other
methods were impracticable.

To exercise full control and to limit responsibility to assure success of the
deferred-destruction plan destruction personnel were named and their responsibilities and
duties were specified. For instance, the "Destruction Guard Group" was established
during the invasion. These groups of one or two infantry companies and one field
engineering company were assigned to each oil compound. 460

These groups had their own structure and mission. Every destruction group had a
commanding officer whose title was Commanding Officer of the Destruction Guard or
Commanding Officer of Protection. This Commanding Officer received the orders for

457

See infra. App. 3. Doc. 21.
This method operates by connecting a group of neighboring wells in a certain area, an oil assembly
depot, or a number of destruction points in the vital installations to an electric destruction circuit. This was
done through a network of electric wires which was connected to the detonator.
459
An ordinary method operates by using an ignition cord. This method was used when there were enough
wires available for the electric circuit.
460
See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 111 (Center for Research
and Studies on Kuwait 1997).
458
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destruction and had other jobs. 461 In addition, other groups, called the "Regiment's
Destruction Groups" or the "Ignition Groups," were established for each target. These
groups were responsible for implementing orders for detonation or ignition. Assigning
any other jobs to personnel of the destruction groups was prohibited. Prohibition shows
the insistence of the Iraqi regime that the destruction plan should be implemented quickly
and with maximum success. Moreover, these groups were headed by commanding
officers. 462

These groups conducted explosion experiments in order to determine the plan’s
positive and negative points. Times were set for these groups to implement the plan.
According to Iraqi documents, the plan was to be carried out to prevent oil resources and
other facilities from falling into enemy hands it and when the enemy threatened to end
the Iraqi occupation. 463

In case communication was disrupted and contact became impossible, the
Commanding Officers in charge of destruction would make the decision. Otherwise, the
plan would be implemented in the following sequence: the Division Commander would
issue the destruction order to the Brigade Commander who in turn would issue it to the

461

These jobs are: securing protection for the site against any attack by saboteurs or infiltrators, controlling
wayfarers and refugees within the site, reporting the activities of preparing and fitting the targets, ensuring
the presence of sentries day and night to foil possible enemy attempts to neutralize the plan, and when
destruction orders were given, submitting a detailed report describing the effect and success of the
destruction carried out.
462
See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 141 (Center for Research
and Studies on Kuwait 1997).
463
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.
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Commander of the Destruction Guard Force who would relay it to the Commander of the
Ignition Regiment Group. 464

These steps are clear evidence that the destruction of oil and the petroluim
infrastructure was intentional. The remaining question is whether there was a link
between this plan and the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. In other words, did Saddam
Hussein issue the order to commit these offenses? If not, is it possible that these offenses
were committed without his knowledge? Would he have been responsible under the
doctrine of command responsibility?

The extent of the Iraqi leader’s role in the destruction plan is derived through
direct and indirect (circumstantial) evidence. The indirect connection is based upon the
following analysis: according to Iraqi documents, since the Republican Guard was
responsible for implementing the destruction plan 465 and these forces received their
orders directly from the head of the Iraqi regime, 466 Saddam Hussein masterminded this
plan or ordered that it be created.

In addition to the indirect connection theory, there are several captured Iraqi
documents which indicate that this plan was ordered by the Iraqi leader personally. For
464

See infra. App. 3. Doc. 4, 6.
(Document 5)The pertinent document item 2 provides “Appointing sabotage squads to mine the oil
wells and power and electricity stations that have been prepared for deferred destruction, and preparing and
finalizing all the requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated place
in order to blow up these targets as soon as orders are issued.” This document is a memo issued 10 days
after the invasion by the Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard Infantry Brigades 19,
20, 22 and 23, Artillery Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Air Defense
Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Armored Battalion Command, Nubu-khath
Nasr Forces of Republican Guard. This document shows the involvement of Republican Guard in
implementing the Deferred Destruction Plan. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.
466
See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 39 (Center for Research and
Studies on Kuwait 1997).
465
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instance, Document 4 notes in its introduction that the directives concerning the
destruction of oil wells and vital installations were “at the orders of our leader the
President

in

his

meeting

with

the

Armed

Forces

General

Command

on

13/1/1991”(emphasis added). 467 The same statement is prescribed in Document 6 which
provides “The leader our President …in the meeting of the Armed Forces General
Command on 13 January 1991 ordered the following:…..Oil installations prepared for
destruction are to be blown up when the situation is too dangerous, in order not to leave
them intact to the enemy as they should be completely devastated” (emphasis added). 468

In terms of the Iraqi documents, Saddam Hussein might have been responsible
according to several theories. The basic theory is that Saddam Hussein issued the orders
for destruction. It is clear that the orders for destruction were unlawful since they were
issued without legal limitations or justifications such as military necessity.469 The only
incentive for destruction was “not to leave them [oil installations] intact to the enemy as
they should be completely devastated”(emphasis added). 470 Saddam Hussein was
responsible even though he was not present when the crimes were committed. These
orders need not be in specific forms. Moreover, the message of the orders was clear. As a
result, the defense of misinterpretation of these orders by subordinates would have been a
long-shot defense.

467

Document 4 is a memo 2/122 dated 25/1/1991 and sent by Captain Amir Sotyati Mutlak, PP.
Commander, Commando Battle Group, Division 42, and addressed to all companies. See infra. App. 3.
Doc. 4.
468
Document 6 is a memo issued on 18 January 1991 by Lt. Colonel (Armor) Ghidan Khalf Abdullah,
Commander of the Ninth Tank Battalion and addressed to all companies. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 6.
469
All Iraq documents show no “military necessity” requirement on the execution of the destruction plan.
See infra. App. 3.
470
See infra. App. 3. Doc. 6.
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As an alternative basis for responsibility, Saddam Hussein might have been
assigned responsibility based on Common Design or Criminal Joint Enterprise (JCE).
From the structure of the groups, their missions and the steps of the plan, it is obvious
that “systemic form” exists here. Therefore, the court might have been convinced that a
common plan was present and Saddam Hussein was part of this plan. The participation
attributed to him was forming the plan and shaping the groups, or at least facilitating the
plan by providing all available materials and technical assistance to the criminals.

The final basis of responsibility would have been command responsibility. This
form of responsibility requires three elements. First, the superior-subordinate relation
must exist between the accused and the executor of the offense. Indeed, Saddam Hussein,
as the formal Iraqi president or leader of Iraqi forces, was the superior of any individual
belonging to the Iraqi forces. From the Iraqi documents, this authority was not de jure,
but de facto. This could have been inferred from statements contained in Iraqi documents
mentioning his orders.

The second requirement for command responsibility is the extent of knowledge
held by the accused. The prosecutor must prove that the accused knew or had reason to
know his subordinate was about to commit such acts or had already done so. If the court
would respect documents indicating a link between Saddam Hussein and the destruction
plan, 471 it might have been sufficient for a court to make this finding. If not, the court
might have been convinced that Saddam Hussein was involved through constructive
knowledge. The court could have found Saddam Hussein’s constructive knowledge based
upon several factors, such as: the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal acts; the scope
471

See infra. App. 3. Doc. 4, 6.
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of illegal acts; the time during which the illegal acts occurred; the number and type of
troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of the acts; the
widespread occurrence of the acts; the tactical tempo of operations; the modus operandi
of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of the commander
at the time. 472

The crimes committed were extensive and widespread in terms of time and area.
They involved the explosion of more than 700 oil wells and other illegal acts. In terms of
time, the plan had been constructed at the beginning of the invasion and was executed at
the end of the invasion. This plan, from construction through execution, lasted about 8
months. 473

As mentioned before, the involvement of Republic Guard troops, the closest
military troops to Saddam Hussein, and the high rank of the commanders (General and
Colonels of different main sectors) participating in the deployment of the team in
different roles, including planning, preparing, and executing, 474 support the conclusion
that Saddam Hussein was aware of the plan.

Concerning the modus operandi or pattern of commission of the crimes, there was
similarity among all these illegal acts. This similarity can be seen in the methods used to

472

Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992).
473
A review of Iraqi documents shows that the earliest document relevant to the destruction plan was dated
August 12, 1990, ten days after the invasion. This proves that the plan was established by the occurrence of
the invasion or during the first days of the invasion. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.
474
The high-rank of the commanders can be inferred from several Iraqi documents. See infra. App. 3. Doc.
3, 5, 6, 10 and 11.
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blow up the oil wells. All the explosions were created by the same type of explosive
charges placed at the same location at each oil well. 475

Regarding the geographical location of these illegal acts, they occurred in two
parts of the Kuwaiti territory, the southern and northern parts of the country where the oil
wells were located. In sum, these illegal acts and the damage they caused were
widespread around the country. It is hard to claim that they were committed without the
knowledge of the Iraqi leader. Finally, Saddam Hussein’s location when the crimes were
committed was not essential, since it is unlikely that a head of state would be at the scene
of a war crime.

The last requirement of command responsibility is the superior’s failure to take
the necessary remedy either to prevent the crime from occurring or to punish the culprits.
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein was capable of stopping or preventing the crime
from occurring, if he knew a subordinate was about to commit a crime. Saddam Hussein
had complete authority to issue an order to prevent the occurrence of the crime. In
addition, he had a legal obligation to act in order to stop the crime. If Saddam Hussein
knew of the crime only after its commission, he was required to punish the culprits. He
punished none of the culprits. The required remedy depends on the time of the
defendant’s knowledge; if the defendant knew before the commission of the crime, the
defendant’s claim that he or she punished the culprits is not an acceptable defense.

Saddam Hussein’s knowledge before the commission of the crime, as mentioned
before, could have been derived from several factors. Moreover, it could have been
475

See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13.

124

Substantive Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
proved through his well-known threat before the beginning of the liberation war that if
the United States forced him to leave Kuwait, he would burn up Kuwait’s oil. 476
Moreover, he clearly knew of the commission of the crime subsuequently; the whole
world knew from news reports and pictures.

II.

International Legal Sources of Criminality

All the previous theories of responsibility are not sufficient if acts attributed to
Saddam Hussein’s subordinates were not criminal under international law. Under
international law, the bases of criminality are:

(1) existing international conventions which consider the act in question
an international crime; (2) recognition under Customary International Law
that such conduct constitutes an international crime;(3) recognition under
general principles of international law that such conduct is or should be
deemed violative of international law and about which there is a pending
draft convention before the United Nations; and (4) prohibition of such
conduct by an international convention though not specifically stating that
it constitutes an international crime and which is also recognized in the
writings of scholars as such. 477
The intention of the international community is a decisive factor in identifying the
causes of criminality. 478 To avoid a dilemma of whether there is a violation of principles
of legality, this paper adopts the proposition that international crime is “any conduct
which is designated as a crime in a multilateral convention recognized by a significant

476

Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, February 23, 1991, at A10
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE.
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 28 (1983).
478
It should be foreseeable that the objectives of international criminal conventions are not only to
criminalize certain conduct either at the international or national levels, but also to impose a duty to
prosecute or extradite on states. Punishing those found guilty of international crimes, creating an
environment of international judicial cooperation between states in criminal matters, setting a priority of
exercising jurisdiction between states, and excluding a defense of superior orders can be considered other
objectives of these conventions. Friedl Weiss, Time Limits for the Prosecution of Crimes against
International Law, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 163 (1982).
477
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number of states.” 479 In addition, international crimes, unlike domestic crimes, require
either an international or a transnational element; the act in question must have been
committed against the international community or have affected the interests of more
than one state.

Traditionally, international crimes are divided into several categories: crimes
against peace, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 480
Violation of the laws on the use of force (crimes against peace) and violation of the laws
on human rights (crimes against humanity) are not applicable to the case of Saddam
Hussein’s crimes against the environment for several reasons. 481 This leaves war crimes

479

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE.
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 29 (1983).
480
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
481
Crimes against peace are those acts conducted in violation of the laws on the use of force. Even though
it has been argued that the use of oil during the Gulf War in 1990 represents an example of the use of force,
this argument does not find support and clear evidence in international conventional law. See Anthony
Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL.
W. INT’L L. J. 67 (1992). Crimes against humanity are those acts which are deemed a serious violation of
human rights. There are some views that link environmental protection to human rights. As a result of this
linkage, an argument has been made that environmental devastation can be fought through provisions
within the ICC framework dealing with genocide and crimes against humanity. See Linada A. Malone &
Scott Pasternack, Defending the Environment – Civil Society Strategies to Enforce International
Environmental Law 234-37 (Island Press 2006). In spite of the fact that linking the environment and human
rights has its advantages, in some cases, a conflict between the two values is expected. For instance, the
right of each family to decide the number and spacing of its children might be contradicted by the
sustainable development concept which requires lowering the national birthrates. Dinah Shelton, The
Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals in Linking Human Rights and the
Environment 1, 1-2, 22 (Romina Pichlotti & Jorge Daniel eds., 2003). Moreover, it is said that “While the
environment is known to have an impact on human health, little has been accomplished to include health
criteria in the mushrooming international instruments on environmental protection so as to identify those
environmental hazards that have a direct- and detrimental- bearing on human health. Katarina Tomasevski,
Environmental Rights in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 257, 267 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
1995). Nevertheless, human rights, including the right to have a clean environment, are various;
developments in international criminal law have not yet reached the notion that protecting the environment
is protecting a human right. Indeed, reaching the conclusion that the existing international law regime is not
adequate to protect the environment, an argument has been made that environmental crimes should be
prosecuted when they were conducted to accomplish another atrocity, such as genocide or crimes against
humanity. Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting attacks that destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes and
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 GEO. INT’l ENVTL. L. REV. 697 (2005).
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as the only viable basis for criminal prosecution of Saddam Hussein for environmental
damages caused by his destruction of the Kuwaiti oil and petroluim infrastructure. 482

Reviewing the actions of Saddam Hussein’s subordinates during the invasion
leads to the conclusion that Iraq’s violations of the laws of armed conflict are many and
can be categorized into three major groups:

initiation of aggressive war; abuse of

Kuwaiti citizens, foreigners, diplomatic personnel, and prisoners of war; and property
damage and confiscation. 483 In this part, the focus will be on those offenses committed
against the environment, which primarily fall into the third category.

This paper concludes that the only source of law that could have been expected to
define criminality in the case of Saddam Hussein’s actions against the environment is
found in provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 protecting property. Other
conventions might be applicable to other and future cases, but not to the case of Saddam
Hussein for several reasons. 484

482

In addition to these disciplines, the laws on the use of force and the laws on human rights, there is a third
discipline, the International Environmental Law regime. This regime emerged following the World War II
era and in response to the occurrence of serious accidents that had occurred. The fruit of this regime is the
establishment of care standards and levels of liability in order to minimize a future environmental crisis and
to clarify their legal framework. In considering the environmental devastation that has occurred in armed
conflict, the International Environmental Law regime left to the laws of armed conflict the task of
minimizing the possibilities that these actions would occur. Moreover, the International Environmental
Law discipline failed to address the individual’s criminal responsibility at the international level and left the
use of a criminal remedy in some cases to national policies. A detailed study of the weakness of the of the
international environmental law regime is included in appendix 4. See infra. App. 4.
483
Thomas R. Kleinberger, The Iraqi Conflict: An Assessment of Possible War Crimes and the Call for
Adoption of an International Criminal Code and Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 14 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 69, 77-102 (1993).
484
These conventions are the Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
Protocol I would not apply to the Saddam Hussein case since Iraq was not party to the Protocol and these
provisions protecting the environment were not considered part of international customary law at least
when the actions were committed. The ENMOD Convention does not provide for a basis for criminality
and the subject matter of the Cultural Property Convention does not cover oil wells. See infra. App. 6.
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1.

Geneva Convention IV (relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War) 1949 485
The first attempt to define war crimes was during the trials that followed World

War II. 486 The Control Council Law No. 10 Article II (1)(b) provides:

War Crimes [are] [a]trocities or offenses against persons or property
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not
limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any
other purpose of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity….. 487
Wanton destruction of property, as a war crime, was included within the war
crimes list prepared by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of World
War I 488 Indeed, the destruction of property as a war crime had been identified even
before World War I. 489

After the horrors committed during World War II, the need for rules which protect
victims became exigent. As a result, four Geneva Conventions were signed in 1949 by
sixty- four nations. Those conventions extended protection to the wounded and sick in the
485

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949.
Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,93
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
487
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946).
488
Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87, 91
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
489
At the initiative of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907, the Hague conference was held. This
conference resulted in four conventions that control the means of war. The first convention (Huge I) is
related to asphyxiating gases, the second convention (Huge II) dealt with the use of expanding bullets, the
third convention (Huge III) prescribes the rights of neutral powers and persons, and the fourth convention
(Huge IV) describes the laws and customs of war on land. The conclusion of those conventions is
restriction of the means that can be used during the armed conflict. The relevant convention, here, is the
fourth. Although this convention does not explicitly protect the environment, this protection might be
gained through indirect means. For instance, article 23 (g) prohibits destruction of property without military
necessity. Article 3 of the fourth convention imposes monetary compensation for any violation of the
convention provisions. This convention does not provide a basis for criminal responsibility and no one had
been held liable according to article 3.
486
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field (Geneva I), the wounded and sick at sea (Geneva II), prisoners of war (Geneva III),
and civilians (Geneva IV). Principles stipulated by the Geneva and Hague conventions
formalize the modern law of armed conflict. 490 Both Kuwait and Iraq are parties to the
Geneva conventions and are bound by their terms, including property destruction
offenses. 491 The focus here will be on the Fourth Geneva Convention, primarly
concerning civilian protection. Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV provides:

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or
to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary
by military operations. 492
Violation of article 53 is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Convention and
these grave breaches are deemed criminal. 493 The only accepted justification for property
destruction during armed conflict is military necessity. As mentioned before, while the
Iraqi regime could have claimed this justification, it did not exist. 494 Therefore, the only
remaining question is whether the elements of the offense, the destruction of properties,
were present.

To establish violation of Article 53, several requirements are necessary. These
requirements are divided into categories. The first category includes general requirements
490

Col. James P. Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm, 45 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REV. 62 (1992).
491
States
party
to
the
Geneva
Conventions
are
available
at
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visit July 20, 2007).
492
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949).
493
Article 147 provides “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention….. and
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 146 requires the contracting parties or states to enact domestic
legislation criminalizing the grave breaches of the convention. Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949).
494
See supra. Ch. I. Sec. IV.
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such as the existence of both armed conflict and the nexus between armed conflict and
the alleged crimes or actions. 495

The existence of armed conflict is a precondition to the application of the article.
An armed conflict exists “Whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups
or between such groups within a State.” 496 Moreover, the second general requirement is
the existence of a nexus between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict. This nexus
exists when the crime is committed because of the armed conflict or as a result of the
armed conflict.

Both requirements, armed conflict and nexus, are present in the case of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. It is clear from decisions issued by the U.N. Security Council that
Iraq’s invasion or occupation of Kuwait was “….a resort to armed force between
States.” 497

In addition, the crime against the environment committed by the Iraqi forces
requires a nexus between the criminal act and armed conflict. Explaining this
requirement, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that “There must be an obvious link between
the criminal act and the armed conflict. Clearly, if a relevant crime was committed in the
course of fighting or the take-over of a town during armed conflict, for example, this
would be sufficient to render the offense a violation of international humanitarian law.

495

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 22-35.
Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L., 249, 274 -275 (1984).
497
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Appeal Chamber (October 2, 1995) ¶ 79-84.
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Such a direct connection to actual hostilities is not, however, required in every
situation.” 498

In applying this requirement to Saddam Hussein’s case, it was likely that a court
would have found that this nexus requirement had been met. From earlier discussion, 499
most of the Iraqi documents suggest that Saddam Hussein’s action, blowing up oil wells,
was committed in the course of fighting. In addition, this action, as previously mentioned,
was part of a policy or strategy followed by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of
1991. All Iraqi documents showed that this action was committed based upon a deliberate
destruction plan ordered by Saddam Hussein. This plan was deferred during the invasion
until the appropriate time for its execution. That time was the time of war as one of the
Iraqi documents suggests. 500

In addition to the general requirements, Article 53 protects only property within
occupied territories. The ICTY Trial Chamber states:

Article 53 describes the property that is protected under the Convention in
terms of the prohibitions applicable in the case of an occupation.
Accordingly, an occupation is necessary in order for civilian property to
be protected against destruction under Geneva Convention IV. The only
provisions of Geneva Convention IV which assist with any definition of
occupation are Articles 2 and 6. Article 2 states: "The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation . . . even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance" while Article 6 provides that
Geneva Convention IV "shall apply from the outset of any conflict or
occupation mentioned in Article 2. 501

498

Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 193.
See Ch. III. Sec. (I)(d).
500
See infra. App. 3 Doc. 5.
501
Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules
of Procudre and Evidence ( September 13, 1996); See also Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001).
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The protection of property conferred by the Geneva conventions is less than the
protection conferred by the Hague Conventions because Article 53 protects only property
in occupied territory from destruction by an occupying power, while the Hague
Convention protects enemy property more generally. 502 Occupied territory is defined as
existing “when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and
can be exercised.” 503 There is no doubt that Iraq’s action in interfering with Kuwait’s
territory is considered an occupation. 504

Property encompassed by Article 53 includes “real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations.” 505 This raises the question of
whether natural resources, such as oil, soil, forest, or air, are considered property.

502

It is held that “…[i]n order to dissipate any misconception in regard to the scope of Article 53, it must be
pointed out that the property referred to is not accorded general protection ; the Convention merely
provides here for its protection in occupied territory. The scope of the Article is therefore limited to
destruction resulting from action by the Occupying Power. It will be remembered that Article 23(g) of the
Hague Regulations forbids the unnecessary destruction of enemy property; since that rule is placed in the
section entitled “hostilities,” it covers all property in the territory involved in a war; its scope is therefore
much wider than that of the provision under discussion, which is only concerned with property situated in
occupied territory…” See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶
337.
503
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, 187 CTS 227 (1907); Adam Roberts, What is a
Military Occupation?, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 274 -275 (1984).
504
This fact can be inferred from these words prescribed by the Security Council’s decisions concerning the
Kuwait-Iraq case. These decisions include either the word “invasion” or “occupation.” See for instance,
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933st mtg, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2934st mtg, P.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938st mtg,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
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The Hague Conventions or Regulations, as part of international customary law, 506
considered forests and agricultural estates as protected properties. 507 In addition, raw
materials were included within the meaning of property in the World War II trials. 508
During the World War II trials, protecting the environment through the provisions for
protecting properties was obvious. 509 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that these
materials are included within the meaning of properties.

Offenses against property, like other war crimes, can be committed through
plunder or destruction. Destruction of property can be done through the means of
explosive “dynamite.” 510 To be a war crime, destruction of property must be extensive
and committed wantonly. 511 The standard of the extent of the damage is determined by
the facts of the case. A single act might be sufficient in some cases. 512

In determining when the destruction of property is extensive, the ICTY Trial
Chamber ruled:

[T]he crime of extensive destruction of property as a grave breach
comprises the following elements, either: (i) Where the property destroyed
is of a type accorded general protection under the Geneva Conventions of
1949, regardless of whether or not it is situated in occupied territory; and
the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the property in question or
in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction; or (ii) Where the
506

Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X, The Krupp Trial, Case No.58, P. 133.
Hague Convention (IV) article 55 provides “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator
and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile
State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 187 CTS 227
(1907).
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See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X, The Krupp Trial, Case No.58, P. 69.
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For instance, monuments were considered property during these trials. See Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals, Vol. IX, The Trial of Karl Lingenfelder, Case No.51, P. 67.
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See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, The Trial of Hans Szabados, Case No.49, P. 59.
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property destroyed is accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions,
on account of its location in occupied territory; and the destruction occurs
on a large scale; and (iii) the destruction is not justified by military
necessity; and the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the property
in question or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction. 513
In applying the previous requirements for violation of article 53 to Saddam
Hussein’s action during the invasion, one sees thatall the required elements to establish
offenses are present. First, the action was taken extensively since it was taken on a large
scale on occupied territory with the intent to destroy without the legally accepted
justification of military necessity. Second, the offense was directed toward natural
resources and the environment which is included within the meaning of property
according to conventional, customary and judicial international law. Finally, this action
was committed during an international armed conflict and with a link or connection to
this armed conflict.

However, the Fourth Geneva Convention contains no provisions for penalties.
Therefore, the question that might have been raised here is procedural; does conviction
based upon this Convention violate the principles of legality? This issue will be reviewed
in the next chapter. 514

Conclusion and Observations

In international law, criminal responsibility concerning the violation of the laws
of armed conflict encompasses both superiors and subordinates. Superior responsibility
includes political and military leaders. This responsibility can be based upon issuing
unlawful orders, joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility.
513
514

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 341.
See infra. Ch. IV, Sec. I .
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The theory of unlawful orders requires that a superior use his position which has
empowered him with the authority to be followed by subordinates. This use entitles him
to issue orders for which he is responsible as long as mens rea is present. 515 The joint
criminal enterprise theory, developed by ad hoc international criminal tribunals, requires
the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment. 516 Under the theory of command
responsibility, a superior is criminally responsible if he knew or had reason to know that
a subordinate was about to commit a criminal action or had done so and he failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent that act or to punish the perpetrator. 517

Applying any of these theories to Saddam Hussein’s actions, supported by
documentary evidence captured after the liberation of Kuwait, it is reasonable to
conclude that the then Iraqi president was criminally responsibility for the environmental
devastation that occurred during the Gulf War of 1991. 518

As a prerequisite for the then Iraqi president’s criminal responsibility, actions
committed by Saddam Hussein’s subordinates against the environment must be criminal
under international law. If the view that international criminality requires an international
conventional basis is accepted, that basis exists in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva
convention provisions protecting properties. 519 The argument that conviction based upon
this convention might violate the principle of nulla poena sine lege or no punishment
without a law authorizing it will be examined in the next chapter.

515

See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (a).
See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (b).
517
See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (c).
518
See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (d).
519
See supra. Ch. III, Sec. II (a).
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The Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Prosecution
I.

The Legality Issue

II.

The Jurisdiction Issue
1. The International Court of Justice
2. International Criminal Court
3. Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Jurisdiction
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IV.
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Chapter IV
The Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Prosecution
International custom has recognized the right of a victorious power to bring to
trial individual members of enemy armies accused of violating international laws of
war. 520 Recently, this right to prosecute has been excersied by the United Nations
Organization. 521
Assuming that the political will to try the now-deceased Saddam Hussein for
environmental offenses had existed internationally, several procedural issues might have
arisen if a trial had been proposed. These issues would have involved the legality of
punishment, jurisdiction, immunity, a statute of limitations, the right to be tried without
undue delay and the issue of the transfer of the defendant to an international tribunal.
These issues are analyzed separately in this chapter. Part I deals with the principle of
legality in the context of international law. Part II reviews the capability of the existing
international judicial bodies to try Saddam Hussein’s case. Parts III and IV grapple with
the issues of the defendant’s immunity and the statute of limitations. Part V reviews the
right to be tried without undue delay, a right which is not recognized by some national
legal systems. Finally, in Part VI, the discussion focuses on the ability of international
tribunals to gain custody of defendants.

520

Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87, 89
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
521
This right is confirmed by creating international criminal tribunals (Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) by
the U.N. Security Council to try the suspected war criminals.
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I.

The Legality Issue
The principle of legality is one of the fundamental principles in national criminal

justice systems around the world. Its source is Roman law. 522 This principle prohibits
retroactive penal legislation. This prohibition includes creation both of new offenses,
“Nullum Crimen Sine Lege,” and of new punishments, “Nullum Crimen Poena Legali,”
presumably heavier punishments. 523 This part of the paper concerns the second pillar of
the principle, Nullum Crimen Poena Legali, or no punishment without existing law.
The purposes of the principle are various. 524 In the context of international
criminal law, the importance of the principle is shown by the number of international
instruments including it. For instance, article II, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948 provides:
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at
the time the penal offense was committed. 525
Other international and regional human rights instruments contain this principle. 526
Recognizing its importance, the ICTY Trial Chamber wrote, “Without the satisfaction of
these principles [no crime and punishment without law] no criminalization process can be
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accomplished and recognized.” 527 The importance of the principle in the Rome Statute is
manifiested by its occurrence in several provisions of the Statute. 528
Nationally, the principle of nullum crimen poena legali requires that the
punishment for a criminal act must be prescribed in advance in a written law enacted by a
competent legislature. 529 Internationally, while the application of the principle of nullum
crimen poena legali partly reflects the national application, 530 it does not apply in the
same strict sense. This was reaffirmed recently when the ICTY Trial Chamber provided
that “It could be postulated, therefore, that the principles of legality [nullum crimen
poena legali] in international criminal law are different from their related national legal
systems with respect to their application and standards.” 531 As a result, the ICTY
Appellate Chamber ruled that “individual criminal responsibility is not barred by the
absence of treaty provisions on punishments for breaches.” 532
There are several reasons for applying this principle differently in national and
international law regimes. These reasons relate to the nature of the international law
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not apply to procedures and evidence matters. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-99-I-A-R77,
Appeal Chambers Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin, (January 31,
2000) ¶ 24. It seems that the Court did not consider the issue broadly. In some cases, issuing an evidence
rule imposing upon the accused a heavier burden of proof concerning his excuse or defense, like military
necessity, may affect the existence of the offense which violates the principle of legality. Therefore,
excluding a defense explicitly or implicitly, by imposing a heavier burden of proof, represents a clear
violation of the principle. For instance, during the World War II trials, excluding the defense of “superior
orders” was a clear violation of the principle of legality. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International
Criminal Law 159(Transnational Publishers 2003).
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system. Among international law sources, the principle applies only to conventions. Since
these conventions are drafted by diplomats, who are not experts in the field of
international criminal law, and since there is no uniformity of drafting techniques, it is
reasonable to expect that these conventions will not meet the principal requirement that
they be specific and unambiguous in respect of punishments. 533
Lack of uniformity in the punishment policy between states also contributes to the
absence of penalty provisions in international conventions. 534 The assumptions of
international law that international criminal rules will be enforced through national
systems, and that these national systems will redraft the rules in styles that satisfy the
requirements of different states are additional factors that lead to different applications of
the principle of legality in the national and international contexts. 535
In international criminal law, it is not necessary for an individual to know in
advance the precise punishment for a crime, so long as his actions constitute a crime of
extreme gravity for which there will be severe punishment. 536 This does not completely
address the seriousness of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s lack of penalty provisions for
crimes against property. If Saddam Hussein had been charged with environmental war
crimes in a special international tribunal, he could have raised the legality issue, even if
the instrument creating the tribunal had prescribed a punishment.
To address this issue at the international level, a commentator argued that “[The
absence of specific penalties provisions in international criminal instruments] confirms a
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law in International Criminal
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customary rule of international practice that penalties by analogy [to national
punishments] are valid.” 537 A problem with this approach might occur, however, when
there is no national legislation criminalizing the conduct which is considered an
international crime. While national systems differ in adopting the analogy approach,
differences between national and international systems discussed earlier suggest that this
is of little importance in using it at the international tribunal. 538
A problem in resorting to national sentencing systems is illustrated by Rwanda.
The ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Rwanda accepted the view that “The
principle of legality concerning the punishment will be respected if the international
tribunals harmonize their sentences with those in force in the territories where the crimes
where committed.” 539 The tribunal statute contained reference to the practice of
sentencing within territories where the crimes were committed. 540 This reference,
incorparating national sentence systems, led to various difficulties and uncertainties. 541
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To avoid these difficulties, judicial decisions held that the approach was not
mandatory. 542
The Rwandan experience suggests that leaving punishments for international
crimes to national legal systems might not serve the interests or goals which international
criminal law aims to accomplish. Probably, this is because the objectives of international
criminal law, regarding punishment, differ from those of domestic laws.543 Moreover,
even within national systems, the objectives of punishments differ from one territory to
another or within the same jurisdiction from time to time. 544 Therefore, this difference
does not sustain the certainty of law as an objective of international criminal law.
Rwanda’s objection, in the Security Council, to excluding the death penalty punishment
from its international tribunal statute represents the best example of this contradiction in
goals. 545
In the context of direct enforcement or international criminal trials, Professor
Mohammed Cherif Bassiuoni said that “[T]he requirements of the principles of legality,
nulla poena sine lege, is that the penalty be specific.” 546 Since the principle of nullum
crimen poena legali does not apply to some sources of international law, such as custom
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and laws created by precedents, 547 and since national sentencing systems might not
achieve the goals of the international criminal law system, then international customary
law might be a suitable source to determine a fair and globally accepted punishment for
international crimes, including war crimes, consistent with the legality principle.
Although during the World War II trials several authorities considered the death
penalty acceptable for those convicted of war crimes, 548 this is not the case in current
international law. Developments occurring in international human rights instruments have
caused a change in the trend of the international community toward appreciation of the
death penalty as an appropriate punishment for war crimes. 549 This development has led
to the abolition of the death penalty in recent international criminal trials, ad hoc tribunals
and the ICC, and in some national legal systems. 550
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, for instance, did not make
any exception to the right to life. 551 On the contrary, article 2 of the European Convention
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on Human Rights made the death penalty an exception to this right. 552 Both the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Fourth
Geneva Convention impose upon states a duty to inflict effective or appropriate penalties
regarding their violation. 553
Later on, the death penalty disappeared from instruments constituting
international criminal judicial bodies. 554 It does not follow from this international
movement toward elimination of the death penalty, that all national legal systems have
eliminated this penalty. But the movement suggests that this penalty will not be
acceptable to an international criminal tribunal created by the U.N. Organization. Thus, it
is probable that punishment for those who commit war crimes, including crimes against
property, would not have reached the level of death penalty punishment if an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal had been created in Saddam Hussein’s case. Inclusion of
the death penalty in the statute of a contemproary ad hoc criminal tribunal violates the
principle of nullum crimen poena legali.
II.

The Jurisdiction Issue
Jurisdiction means “A court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.” 555

Jurisdiction is a precondition for any court to try any case and the existence of
jurisdiction is an aspect of international as well as of national prosecution. However,
552
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since a complete judicial system does not exist in the international criminal law regime
and since principles of legality do not apply to the jurisdiction issue, 556 in most
international war crimes cases, the court’s jurisdiction was established after the
commission of the crime. This phenomenon will gradually disappear after the creation of
the ICC.
Examining the jurisdiction issue under international law requires reviewing the
existing international judicial bodies and their capacity to try the case of Saddam
Hussein. This does not negate the possibility of a trial of Saddam Hussein within a
national judicial system. Indeed, some war crimes trials have been conducted before
either internationally modified municipal courts, ad hoc national tribunals or domestic
courts.
A comparison of national and international trials for international crimes leads to
the conclusion that guarantees of impartiality in the punishment of war crimes can be
achieved in one of three ways: (1) an International Criminal Court; (2) appropriate
modifications of the organization of the municipal courts; or (3) a system of quasiinternational courts. 557 The existing international courts which will be reviewed in this
part of the paper are the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court
and the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
1. The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice or the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations Organization. The Court is a permanent court to which states may bring
556
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their disputes and which is empowered to provide United Nations organs and specialized
agencies with advisory opinions. The Court’s decision is binding on the parties in a case,
but not otherwise. The Court is a treaty-based institution, created and regulated by the
United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court. Therefore, the Court’s jurisdiction is
governed by these instruments.

Article 34 (1) of the Statute of the Court limits the Court’s jurisdiction by
providing that “Only States may be parties to cases before the Court.” 558 As a result, no
individual or non-governmental organization may bring a case before the Court against
an individual, a non-governmental organization, or a state. Some argue, however, that the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be open to cases brought by states
against individuals. 559 Nevertheless, the Court does not have a jurisdictional basis upon
which to decide criminal cases. 560 Perhaps the Court may consider criminal cases against
states, if and when the criminal responsibility of states becomes a recognized norm under
international law. The ICJ could not have tried Saddam Hussein’s case due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

2.

International Criminal Court

Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, it has taken the international community
nearly fifty years to create international institutions to bring individuals responsible for
international crimes to account. In 1994, the International Law Commission submitted a
558

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34 (1), 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL
Supp. 215 (1945).
559
Mark W. Janis, Individuals and the International Court in The International Court of Justice-Its Future
Role after Fifty Years 205, 209-12 (A.S. Muller ET AL. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997).
560
Since the only parties before the Court are states and since the criminal responsibility of states does not
exist at the international level at the current time, the Court has no jurisdiction to review this type of case.

146

Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
draft statute for an international criminal court to the United Nations General Assembly.
After several years of negotiations, the General Assembly convened a Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which met in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998, to
finalize and adopt an international convention establishing an international criminal
court. After receiving the required sixty ratifications, the International Criminal Court
Statute, or so- called Rome Statute, entered into force in April 2002. 561

The ICC is the first attempt of the international community to create a criminal
court with a general jurisdictional scope and application. Unlike the ICC, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had a personal jurisdiction 562 while ad hoc
tribunals, such as those in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have territorial and personal
jurisdiction.

Before examining the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, it is important
to understand that a state’s jurisdiction is determined differently from an international
tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under international law, a state may exercise its criminal
jurisdiction based on several principles. 563 However, international tribunals derive their
competence only from the instruments creating them. Thus, the jurisdiction of
international tribunal is not confined to the jurisdictional bases principles applicable to
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states. 564 The reason behind this distinction is as summarized by the Appeal Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia:

A narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a national
context but not in international law. International law, because it lacks a
centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated judicial system
operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals,
where certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be
centralized or vested in one of them but not the others. In international
law, every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided).
This is incompatible with a narrow concept of jurisdiction, which
presupposes a certain division of labour. Of course, the constitutive
instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional
powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize
its "judicial character", as shall be discussed later on. Such limitations
cannot, however, be presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced
from the concept of jurisdiction itself. 565
The ICC has narrower jurisdiction than the state with respect to the same crimes
committed in the state’s territory. Unlike ad hoc criminal tribunals, national jurisdiction
has priority over the ICC in exercising the judicial function. 566

It is important to understand the distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction
before the ICC. The difference is that:

“Jurisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the Court’s operation, in
terms of subject matter (jurisdiction rationiae materiae), time (jurisdiction
ratione temporis), and space (jurisdiction ratione loci) as well as over
individuals (jurisdiction ratione personae). The question of admissibility
564
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arises at a subsequent stage, and seeks to establish whether matters over
which the court properly has jurisdiction should be litigated before it.” 567
Even though the Court might have jurisdiction over a particular matter, it may refuse to
admit the case because the accused is being charged before the national courts or because
the offense is not so grave that it requires the Court to take an action. In sum, the
admissibility question allows the Court discretion, while the jurisdiction question is
confined by bright-line rules. However, these two questions sometimes overlap.568 ICC
jurisdiction can be classified into several aspects; territorial, personal, subject matter, and
temporal.

In light of the territorial jurisdiction, the Court has jurisdiction over the states
parties’ jurisdiction. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the non-party states, if the
U.N. Security Council refers the case to the Court. 569 In the context of commencing the
proceeding before the Court, even though non-state actors might approach a state party to
bring a case before the Court or a prosecution might seek information from governmental
organizations or an NGO, 570 the notion that a non-state actor cannot bring a case before
the Court has been criticized. 571 As an alternative, governmental organizations or an
NGO might play the role of amicus curiae or a friend of the Court. 572
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The Court’s personal jurisdiction encompasses these who ordered that the crimes
be committed, persons acting with a common criminal purpose or plan, and commanders
who failed to prevent or punish their subordinates who committed the statute crimes. 573

In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court’s statute provides:

For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (b) Other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely,
any of the following acts: ….(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause….. injury to …. damage to….
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated… 574
There is no need to examine whether these requirements, “widespread, long-term and
severe,” are met by the environmental consequences resulting from Saddam Hussein’s
action against the environment during the Gulf War of 1991 because there are other legal
obstacles, explained below, preventing the applicability of the ICC statute in the Saddam
Hussein case. However, even if we assume that these obstacles did not exist and that the
environmental consequences resulting from Saddam Hussein’s action did not meet the
above requirements of the Statute, the attempt to inflict such damages could have been
another basis for indictment. 575

In terms of temporal jurisdiction, article 11(1) of the statute provides “The Court
has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this
573
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Statute.” 576 In addition, article 24(1) of the statute states “No person shall be criminally
responsible…..under this Statute for conduct prior [to] the entry into force of the
Statute.” 577 The statute has been criticized for preventing the Court from addressing
atrocities, committed before its entry into force. 578 In harmony with the provisions of
article 11(1), it has been said that, “Unless an International Criminal Court is already in
existence at the time of the cessation of hostilities, those who link the punishment of all
war crimes to the establishment of such a court run the danger of sacrificing the
substance of an urgent task for what may well prove to be the shadow of its intricate
machinery.” 579

A review of the Court’s statute shows that, although the Court might have a basis
for both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, it could not have tried Saddam
Hussein’s case concerning the crimes committed against the environment. First, neither
Iraq nor Kuwait is a party to the ICC statute. 580 Even though the case could have reached
the Court through referral by the U.N. Security Council, temporal jurisdiction would have
prevented the Court from trying the case as all offenses against the environment during
the Iraqi invasion were committed before the entrance of the Statute into force in April
2002.
576
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3. Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Jurisdiction

The practice of using military tribunals to prosecute individuals accused of war
crimes was established after World War II. 581 After World War II, a number of
significant war crimes cases also were pursued in domestic courts, with varying degrees
of success. 582 One of the most important developments since then has been the creation
of specialized international tribunals to pursue those individuals accused of war crimes.

The first specialized tribunal, established by the United Nations Security Council
resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, was the “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.” 583 The establishment
of this tribunal was challenged before the tribunal itself, 584 which held that it had the
authority to review the legality of its establishment to the extent necessary to determine
its primary jurisdiction. 585

581

A.P.V. Rogers, War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945-1946, 39 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 780 (1990).
582
Christopher Amerasinghe, The Candian Experience in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 243 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999); Leile Sadat Wexler, The French Experience
in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 273 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed
1999); Graham T. Belwitt, The Australian Experience in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 301 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999); Jane Garwood-Cutler, The English
Experience in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 325 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers,
Inc. 2ed 1999). For head of state cases, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law
76-80 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
583
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, Sess. 48th , 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); generally see O’Brian,
The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87
AM. J. INT’L L. 639 (1993).
584
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeal Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (October 2 1995). For a critical commentary, see Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure:
Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031 (1999).
585
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995) ¶ 21.
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The personal jurisdiction of the tribunal encompasses prosecuting “persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991....” 586 The subject matter jurisdiction of the
tribunal, the “serious violations,” encompasses grave breaches of the Geneva conventions
of 1949, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. 587 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is concurrent with national courts, but can
assume primacy over national investigations and prosecutions. 588 Despite the fact that the
tribunal was slow to start, 589 it has made considerable progress in its investigations and
prosecutions. Tribunal indictments range from low-level soldiers and camp guards to
senior military and government officials. 590

The Tribunal commented that “[I]nternational prosecution should be directed to
leaders…more than minor actors.” 591 The Tribunal’s new policy focuses international
prosecutions on persons in the position of some military or political authority. To
implement this policy, the prosecutor and the Trial Chamber reviewing the decision to
prosecute take into account the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the

586

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 1,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).
587
See arts. 2-4 of the ICTY statute. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 arts. 2-4, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993);
32 ILM 1159 (1993).
588
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art.
11, SC res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).
589
Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial in Essays on ICTY Procedure and
Evidence 197 (Richard May ET Al., Kluwer Law International 2001).
590
These senior military and government officials include former Yugoslavia President Slobodan
Milosevic; Radovan Karadzic, Former President of the Bosnian Serb Republic; and General Rudislov
Krstic, Former Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps in the Army of the Republika Srpska.
591
S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR 55th Sess., 4240th mtg. (2000).
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crime. 592 As for the prosecution of non-leadership figures, the Tribunal has ruled that
“named accused [non-leadership figures] could appropriately be tried in another forum,
such as a State forum.” 593

Only a year and a half after the establishment of the ICTY, the United Nations
Security Council, relying on its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, passed
resolution 955 by which an international tribunal was created “for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and
December 31, 1994.” 594 The Tribunal or ICTR also has jurisdiction over Rwandan
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighboring states. 595

The ICTR differs from the ICTY in terms of jurisdiction in two aspects. First, its
jurisdiction is personal and territorial. Second, it has jurisdiction over genocide and
crimes against humanity, but only in view of the “internal” character of the events in
Rwanda. It covers only violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions of
1949 and crimes listed in additional Protocol II. Thus, neither grave breaches of the
Geneva conventions nor violations of the laws and customs of war are included in the

592

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence arts. 9-10,
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
593
Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica ET AL., Case No. IT-95-8, Order Granting Leave for Withdrawal of
Charges (May 5, 1998). Moreover, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence article 11 (C) bis provides “ In
determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the Referral Bench shall, in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) , consider the gravity of the crimes charged and
the level of responsibility of the accused.” Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 11 (C) bis, UN Doc.
IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
594
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).
595
Article 1 of the ICTR statute. S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).
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tribunal’s statute. Like the ICTY, the ICTR indicted and convicted senior governmental
officials as well. 596 After reviewing the jurisdiction of the two tribunals, ICTY and ICTR,
one can conclude that neither tribunal could have tried those crimes against the
environment committed during the Gulf War of 1991. Both tribunals have limitations in
exercising their jurisdiction and these limitations are based on subject matter, territorial,
temporal, and personal grounds. 597

Nevertheless, the U.N. Security Council’s precedent in creating ad hoc tribunals
might have paved the way to create an ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other
members of the Iraqi regime for all international offenses, including the environmental
offenses. The Security Council would create such a tribunal, however, only in response to
demands by interested states, especially both regional states such as Kuwait, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the new Iraqi regime and Security Council member states.

596

Jean Kambanda, the Former Prime Minister of Rwanda and the first head of government to be convicted
of genocide, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor, were convicted of genocide. See Prosecutor v.
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998; see also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR23-A, Appeal Judgment (October 19, 2000). For the appeal decision discussion see 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 656
(2001); For Akayesu case, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Appeal Judgment (June 1, 2001).
597
Although the ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes against property and may have jurisdiction over
environmental war crimes, this jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. The ICTY statute does not explicitly include environmental crimes or violations of the
Protocol I within its text; however, the Tribunal has convicted based upon violations of the Protocol I.
These violations were legally justified based upon Articles 1 and 3 of the Statute. Article 1 extends ICTY
jurisdiction to “serious violations of international humanitarian law.” Article 3 stipulates “The International
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to:” (emphasis added). See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1,
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995) ¶ 87, 91.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 arts. 1, 3,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). In regard to ICTR,
it has territiorial, personal and temporal limitations. Article 1 of the ICTR statute confers upon the Tribunal
jurisdiction over “serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan Citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between January 1994 and 31 December” (Emphasis added). Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda art. 1, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM
1598 (1994).
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Several factors suggest why this kind of court was not created. One of the
difficulties relates to the origin of the process which led to the Iraqi leader’s capture. This
capture was the result of internationally unauthorized interference 598 in Iraqi internal
affairs by the United States which invaded Iraq without an express decision from the
U.N. Security Council. This unauthorized interference raised the possibility that one or
more of the Security Council’s permanent member states could have used its veto against
any decision proposing the creation of an ad hoc tribunal.
In addition, both ad hoc tribunals faced financial hardships. 599 U.N. financial
involvement in the budget for an ad hoc Iraq tribunal probably would not have been
accepted globally, requiring contributions to the budget from those regional states most
interested in the creation of the tribunal.

Finally, Saddam Hussein’s case was greatly complicated by the tremendously
serious offenses attributed to him, especially those offenses committed against the Iraqi
people. Consequently, it is logical that the Iraqi Provisional Authority rejected the idea of
creating an international ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein. 600 As an alternative, the
new Iraqi regime welcomed the idea that all criminal allegations against Saddam
Hussein, including his crimes against Kuwait and Iran, be tried either before Iraqi
national courts or before modified national courts without external intrusion.

598

Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murders: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes
against Humanity 3 (Pluto Press 2004). For a contrary view, see Jason Pedigo, Rogue States, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, And Terrorism: Was Security Council Approval Necessary for the Invasion of Iraq? 32
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 199 (2004).
599
See William A. Schabas, The U.N. International Criminal Tribunals: former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone 622-23 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
600
Mark R. Shulman, Preface to Recommendations Related to the Trial of Saddam Hussein in The Imperial
Presidency and the Consequences of 9/11, Vol. I, 173-74 (James R. Silkenat & Mark R. Shulman eds.,
Praeger Security International 2007).

156

Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
III.

The Immunity Issue

As a general matter, immunity from jurisdiction means that a court cannot
entertain a suit, not that a defendant is immune from criminal responsibility. In other
words, immunity is a procedural obstacle but not a substantive one.

601

Immunity can be

granted at both the national and international levels. At the national level, legislators,
prosecutors, and judges can be immune. 602 Under international law, there are two types
of immunity. First, immunity is related to the status of persons, which is called ratione
personae or personal immunity. Second is subject-matter immunity or so-called ratione
materiae which is attached to official acts.

The difference between the two immunities is that “Immunity ratione personae
prevents domestic authorities, be they judicial or not, from enforcing local laws, either
criminal or civil, on internationally protected individuals. Immunity ratione materiae
prevents local judicial authorities from adjudicating cases based on the nonjusticeability
of the internationally sensitive subject matter.” 603

Rationae materiae immunity applies when the head of state leaves office. It is
deemed a limited immunity because it attaches only to official acts regardless of who
committed the act. Thus, immunity ratione materiae offers two-pronged protection:

601

Both the International Court of Justice and the Special Court of Serra Leone reached this conclusion.
See Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60; Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) ¶ 27.
602
For an official’s immunity under the U.S. legal system, see Donald L. Doernberg, Sovereign Immunity
or The Rule of Law- The New Federalism’s Choice 119-24 (Carolina Academic Press 2005).
603
Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 110 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004).
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personal immunity for the person committing the act, and non-justiceability for the act
itself under the “act of state” doctrine. 604

Rationae Personae immunity applies to heads of state, diplomats and officials on
state missions. 605 It covers all of a person's actions, whether they were done in official or
in private capacity. This immunity is temporary because it lasts only until the individual
leaves office. 606

Although the inviolability of the head of a state or government is considered erga
omnes, 607 the view that international criminals cannot claim immunity began to emerge
after the first attempt to prosecute a head of state after World War I through the Treaty of
Versailles. Later on, the World War II trials made this view the reality. 608 Within the

604

The traditional view is that, “Head of state immunity can be looked at as an aspect of state immunity.”
As a result, his or her act constitutes the act of the state. “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another within its territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers themselves.” Yitiha Simbeye,
Immunity and International Criminal Law 93 n.15, 123, 252 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004). The aim
of immunity is to protect state acts from review by foreign courts based on the claim that the act was done
by the individual not the state.
605
United Nations Convention on Special Missions art. 21, 29, 31, 34, 42, Dec. 16, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S.
231 (entered into force June 21, 1985); Vienna Convention on the Law of Diplomatic Immunity, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 12
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.
606
The purpose of this immunity is to enable people to do their jobs without fear of being prosecuted due to
political conflict. Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 110, 113-14 (Ashgate
Publishing Company 2004).
607
Erga omnes are obligations that all states are held to have a legal interest in protecting. See Barcelona,
Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, (Belgium v. Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports, 3.
608
For instance, the International Military at Nuremberg prosecuted both Admiral Erich Raeder, who was
appointed as head of state by Adolph Hitler, and Vice President and Foreign Minister Fritz von Pappen.
Although the Far East tribunal did not prosecute Japan’s head of state, Emperor Hirohito, it prosecuted a
former head of government, cabinet officers and diplomats. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to
International Criminal Law 73 (Transnational Publishers, Inc 2003); in fact, the Nuremberg Charter, and
other international legal instruments, rejected official status as a defense. Charter of the International
Military Tribunal art. 7, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945); Control
Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against
Humanity art. 11(4)(a), 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); International
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context of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the notion of non-recognition of
immunity in international crimes became well recognized. 609

The current development of most sovereign immunity for international crimes has
occurred before two courts. The first court is a domestic court, the House of Lords in
England, the highest English Court, while the second is the International Court of Justice.
The Pinochet case, 610 dealing with the former Chilean president, concerns the domestic
prosecution of international crimes. Therefore, the case will be discussed in the next
chapter, which deals with domestic trials.
In 2002, the ICJ issued a decision regarding the immunity issue. 611 The parties to
the case were Congo and Belgium. The case was raised when the latter issued a warrant
to arrest the Foreign Minister of Congo for grave breaches of the Geneva conventions of
1949 and other crimes against humanity committed before he assumed that position. By
the time the case was decided, he was no longer Foreign Minister. The essential argument
of Congo was that the Belgian action interfered with Congo's sovereignty and was

Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 3 reprinted in International
Criminal Law: A Collection of International and European Instruments 37 (Christine Van den Wyngaert &
Guy Stessens eds., Kluwer Law International 1996).
609
As a result of the fact that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal tribunals depends on their
constitutive instruments, the tribunals are not bound by the rules controlling immunity and privileges that
bind national jurisdictions. As recent examples, ICTY and ICTR prosecuted both Jean Kambanda, the
former Prime Minister of the Government of Republic Rwanda, and Slobodan Milosevic, the former head
of the Republic of Yugoslavia, before he died. See Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal
Law 176 (Cavendish Publishing 2003); see also Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2
(1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 7 (2), S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Prosecutor v.
Kambanda Case No. ICTR-97-23; For Milosevic cases see IT-99-93-I (May 24, 1999) (Kosovo); IT-01-50I (Oct. 8, 2001)(Croatia); and IT-01-51- I (Nov. 22, 2001)(Bosnia).
610
R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, [1999] 2 UKHL 97.
611
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.
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contrary to international law. As a result of this violation, Congo sought an injunction for
relief and compensation.

The ICJ equated the immunity of the Foreign Minister to the immunity of a head
of state. 612 The Court distinguished between immunity in prosecutions before
international courts and before national courts. It ruled that international criminal
tribunals have priority in exercising their jurisdiction according to the Universal
Jurisdiction over national domestic courts. 613 It has been argued that the Court failed to
recognize the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine for national prosecutions. 614

The Court affirmed that immunity is a procedural issue. Thus, it is a judicial bar
to trying the case. Granting immunity does not mean granting impunity. Therefore,
criminal responsibility as a substantive question is not affected by the question of
immunity. 615 The Court, in its decision, did not make any distinction among international
crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace.
Presumably, the decision is applicable to all international crimes. The Court agreed with
the view that “There is no way to compromise between human rights law and the law of
jurisdictional immunities” 616 and also agreed that the denial of immunity should be

612

Although the Court limited its decision to the Foreign Affairs Minister, its decision is presumably
applicable to heads of state since the Court used a justification which is applicable equally to the Foreign
Affairs Minister and the Head of State. The Court considered both of them as representative of the state.
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002)
ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 53.
613
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 61.
614
Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments
on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EJIL 853-875 (2002).
615
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60.
616
Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237, 277 (1999).
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extended not only to the former head of state, but to the incumbent head of state as
well. 617

Therefore, unlike domestic prosecution of international crimes, the Court denied
immunity to both incumbent and former Foreign Affairs Ministers before the
international tribunals. At the international level, the Court did not recognize the fact that
“Political necessity and state sovereignty appear to be entrenched factors in the battle
between more traditional principles of absolute immunity and the new norms of
international law.” 618

However, the Court decision to equalize the ad hoc tribunals and the International
Criminal Court is troublesome. 619 The ICJ decision raised tension between Articles 27(1)
and 98 of the Rome statute concerning extradition. 620 It has been argued that although the
ICC statute is not yet part of international customary law, it will be so after it has been
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Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237, 261 (1999).
Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 318 (2002).
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those states that ratified it. Michael J. Kelly, No Where to Hide, Defeat of the Sovereignty Immunity
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Publisher 2005).
620
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exercise of its jurisdiction. Article 98 of the ICC statute imposes an obligation on state parties to extradite
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state party nationals. Per contra, the problem concerns those non- party state nationals who are entitled to
immunity and who are located within the state party territory. Is the state party obligated to extradite them
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ratified by two-thirds of the U.N. members. 621 At that point, the International Criminal
Court statute will remove the immunity issue completely from the international law
dictionary.

Based upon the ICJ decision, the Special Court for Sierra Leone rejected Charles
Taylor’s argument that he was the head of the State of Liberia when he was indicted.
Thus, he argued, immunity prevented the court from exercising its jurisdiction. 622 The
rejection was based on the fact that the Special Court of Sierra Leone is an international
criminal tribunal, not bound by immunity rules according to the ICJ decision. 623 In
Saddam Hussein case, according to the ICJ decision, he could have claimed neither
ratione personae nor ratione materiae immunities concerning his actions against the
environment if the trial had been held before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal.

IV.

The Statute of Limitations Issue

The Saddam Hussein case is unique because a long period of time, about thirteen
years, had passed between the time of the commission of the crime and the time of his
capture. Therefore, the statute of limitations on either prosecution or execution might
have been raised as an objection to such a trial. The statute of limitations means “A
statute establishing a time limit for prosecuting a crime, based on the date when the
offense occurred.” 624 The statute of limitations serves several purposes. 625

621

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 81 n.102 (Transnational Publishers,
Inc 2003).
622
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) ¶ 53.
623
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) ¶ 38, 41.
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International Criminal Law does not recognize a statute of limitations. For
instance, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention 626 did not include
a statute of limitations. The reason is that World War II criminals were brought to justice
within a short time. Another reason is that in most common-law jurisdictions the statute
of limitations does not exist for murder and other serious crimes. 627

A 1966 U.N. study reached the following conclusion: “International crimes are
fundamentally different from ordinary domestic crimes and the reasons normally invoked
in favor of statutory limitation for crimes under municipal law do not apply to them.” 628
In 1968, the U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 629 opened for signature. The U.N. Convention
entered into force on November 11, 1970. Iraq is not a party, but Kuwait has been a party
since 1995. 630 This Convention is not part of customary international Law. 631 No

625

The U.S. Supreme Court stipulated that “The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to
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investigate suspected criminal activities.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 858, 25 L. Ed.
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Criminal Procedure 875 (West Publishing Co. 2004).
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international instrument contains a statute of limitations for any international crime.632
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the U.N. Convention is meant to apply only to
domestic laws, for they are the only sources of law containing a statute of limitations.
It is argued, however, that the Convention violates the principles of legality 633
because the Convention violates principles of non-retroactivity, adopted by several
international human rights instruments. 634 This is not the case, however, because the
statute of limitations controls the temporal jurisdiction of the court, while the principles
of legality have to do with creating a new crime that did not exist when the action was
committed. In other words, the statute of limitations relates to procedural rules, while the
principle of legality relates to substantive law rules.

A statute of limitations was included in the International Law Commission’s 1991
draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991). 635 However, this
provision was deleted in the 1996 draft. 636 The ICC statute rejects the application of the

631

Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of International Customary Law:
The U.S. BombArdment of Cambodia and Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429, 468 (2001)
632
Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase “Lest We Forget” Apply to Israeli
War Criminals?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 903, 930 (1996).
633
Art. 1 of the Convention laid down “No statutory limitations shall apply to the following crimes [war
crimes and crimes against humanity], irrespective of the date of their commission…”(Emphasis added). see
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
634
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, E.T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (1950). This violation led the European Community, in 1974, to sign its own convention in this matter
stipulating that the convention will not be applicable to those offenses committed before its entry into force.
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity art. 2, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974).
635
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 7, A/CN.4/L.459 [and corr.1] and
Add.1 (1991).
636
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
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statute of limitations to its crimes. 637 The ICTY adopts the view that crimes against
humanity may not be covered by a statute of limitations. 638

Based upon the fact that international crimes are not covered by a statute of
limitations, Saddam Hussein could not have claimed before an international criminal
tribunal that his crimes against the environment or property were covered by a statute of
limitations.

V.

The Right to Be Tried Without Undue Delay

In the context of international criminal law, there are several defendants’ rights
which are not recognized in some national legal systems, including the Kuwaiti and Iraqi
legal systems. 639 The right to be tried without undue delay is one of these fundamental
rights. 640 Consequently, international criminal trials might have this advantage over some
national trials in the context of human rights protection. The right to “be tried without
undue delay” differs somewhat in wording in international and regional instruments. 641

637

Article 29 of the ICC statute provides “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to
any statute of limitations.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
638
Prosecutor v. Furundizja, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 1998) ¶ 157.
639
Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960 (Kuwait). Kanon AlEjraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971 (Iraq).
640
Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, arts. 102-104
(Kuwait). Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, arts. 130-136
(Iraq).
641
Under the following instruments, the term is “the right to be tried within reasonable time.” European
Convention on Human Rights art. 6 (1), E.T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221(1950); art. 14 (3) International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 14 (3), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); African Charter art. 7 (1), O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5; 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982); American Convention on Human
Rights art. 8 (1), O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; 9 ILM 99 (1969). In addition, under the
U.S. legal system, the right is called “the right to speedy trial.” The Sixth Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution provides “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial…..” U.S. Const. amendment VI. The right to “be tried within a reasonable time,” which exists in the
European human rights convention, was distinguished from the right “to be tried without undue delay,” on

165

Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
The fair trial standards, including the right to be tried without undue delay, are
problematic before international courts, including the ICC, due to the lack of international
law sources to which a judge may resort to interpret and define fair trial standards. 642
Because of the lack of international law on the topic, national and regional cases
regarding the right, such as the U.S. and the European Court for Human Rights cases,
have been used in international criminal tribunals. 643 Therefore, this part of the research
will examine the right to be tried without undue delay before the ICTY and national or
regional cases when necessity requires it.

By and large, the right to be tried without undue delay is meant to protect the
defendant because commencing trial after a long time has passed may affect the
defendant’s ability to prepare his defense. 644 It has been ruled that the delay’s effect on
the trial can be anticipated “(1) where delay has made a fair trial for the accused
impossible; and (2) where in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the
trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial
impropriety or misconduct.” 645 Although the right to be tried without undue delay is

the basis, that the former is meant to be applied to those defendants who are in detention while the latter
applies to all defendants regardless of the detention issue. Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an
International Criminal Procedure 251 (Oxford University Press 2001).
642
Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.
INT’L L. 111, 117 (2002).
643
Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision (November 3, 1999) ¶ 96.
644
The Secretary-General’s Report provided that “the Tribunal [Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] must
fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its
proceedings.” Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) ¶ 106. In the same context, it is ruled that the accused may not waive his or
her right to be tried without undue delay because this right is an essential element of the right to a fair trial.
Prosecutor v. Kovac and others, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal by the Accused Zoran Zigic against the
Decision of Trial Chamber I Dated 5 December 2000, 25 May 2001 cited in John R. W.D. Jones & Steven
Powles, International Criminal Practice 586 (3d ed. 2003).
645
Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision ( November 3, 1999) ¶ 71.
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mainly meant to benefit the accused, it accomplishes other goals such as gaining the
public’s confidence in the proceedings and their credibility. 646

In the context of international criminal tribunals, “The influence of the
international community over the practice of the Tribunal [ICTY] is, therefore, not only
important with regard to its noted preference for more expeditious proceedings, but also
for its potential indifference to the fair trial rights of the accused.” 647 Thus, exaggerated
protection of this right might prejudice the defendant’s interests on some occasions.

Since the right to be tried without undue delay does not attach until the arrest
takes place, it may be seen from different angles. The first situation is when the defendant
is in custody and the trial does not begin until a long period of time has passed. The
second situation is when the defendant’s trial has already begun, but the proceeding
consumes a long time. 648

Internationally, the right to be tried without undue delay has been provided by all
international criminal tribunals, from Nuremberg to the ICC. 649 Guarantees to preserve

646

Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W.
INT’L L. J. 47, 63 (2003). Under the U.S. legal system, it is ruled that the right to speedy trial protects “at
least three basic demands of Criminal Justice in the Anglo-American system: ‘[1] to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation
and [3] to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.”
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969).
647
Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W.
INT’L L. J. 47, 62 (2003).
648
The European Court of Human Rights rules that the right to be tried within a reasonable time lasts at
least until acquittal or conviction, even if this decision is reached on appeal. Wemhoff v. Germany, App.
No. 2122/64, ¶ 18 (June 27, 1968).
649
Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 16, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39
AJILs 258 (1945); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21(2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM
1159 (1993); Security Council Resolution 955 art. 20(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd
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this right have been provided by customary international law as well. 650 Within the
framework of the ICTY statute, article 20 provides, “The Trial Chambers shall ensure
that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with
the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 651

Meanwhile article 21 (4) (c) of the same statute provides, “In the determination of
any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:…. to be tried without
undue delay.” 652 The difference between article 20 and article 21(4)(c) is that the former
governs the stage after commencing the trial while the latter controls the stage both
before and after commencement. 653

Regarding reasons that might lead to infringement of the right, Cassese attributed
the delay in ICTY trials to “Adoption of the adversarial system, which requires that all
the evidence be scrutinized orally through examination and cross-examination.” 654
Moreover, the causes of the delay cannot be attributed to one single source. The delay

mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 67 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
650
Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 99-108, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
(1949).
651
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art.
20, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).
652
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21
(4)(c), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).
653
This conclusion can be derived from the title of each article. The title of article 20 is “Commencement
and Conduct of Trial Proceedings” while article 21 is titled “The Rights of the Accused.” Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).
654
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 442 (2003).
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might occur because of difficulties in obtaining evidence, hurdles to securing defendants,
language difficulties, proof of “predicate conditions” to establish the court’s jurisdiction,
and the rare use of the guilty plea. 655 The fact that international courts depend upon other
entities, such as states and relevant international and regional organizations, in their
operations should be considered when the court is determining whether the defendant’s
right to be tried without undue delay has been violated or not. 656 To solve part of this
dilemma, the ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the expense of live
testimony. 657 In addition, judges have adopted several measures to respect this right. 658

Also, one of the stages which contribute to delay in starting the trial is the
screening of evidence by the pre-trial judge. However, this stage has its own importance.
It assists the court in avoiding those cases which lack sufficient evidence and in avoiding
the problem of overcrowding the courts. 659

European case law identifies causes of delay in criminal proceedings held
nationally. These are the complexity of the case, 660 the conduct of the accused, 661 and the
655

Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W.
INT’L L. J. 47, 63-64 (2003).
656
Several issues such as money, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness protection, court
personnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of the court’s orders and judgments may contribute to
delaying the commencement or to the length of the judicial proceedings. In sum, states’ cooperation with
international judicial organs is a significant factor in obtaining a speedy trial.
657
Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W.
INT’L L. J. 47, 64-66 (2003).
658
For instance, the tribunals prefer that motions be made in writing and disposed of in writing, without an
oral hearing. The justification for this practice is “the need to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.” Even if
the defense counsel requested an oral hearing, it does not mean he will be granted that request. The
chambers define the issue in dispute before them by means of pre-trial briefs. The use of a pre-trial judge is
another means to assist in expeditious trials. The right to be tried without undue delay leads the chambers to
limit the amount of time allocated to each party to present the evidence.
659
Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure 184 (Oxford University Press
2001).
660
The complexity of the case may be due to the seriousness of the offense, the number of acts constituting
a pattern of criminal behavior, and the distance in both time and location between the commission of the
offense and the investigations. Pelissier and Sassi v. France, App. No. 25444/94, ¶ 67 (March 25, 1999).
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conduct of the relevant authorities. 662 The reasonableness of the length of the judicial
proceeding should be assessed in light of these criteria. 663

In regard to a remedy to be taken in case of a violation of this right, international
courts, like national courts, have discretion in determining whether exercising further
jurisdiction in the case of a serious violation of the defendant’s rights will affect the
fairness and integrity of the process.

In spite of the fact that the court might find that there is a violation of the right to
be tried without undue delay, the ICTY statute does not explicitly provide for a sanction
for the violation of this right. In addition, it has been noted that the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY have failed to ensure compliance with the right to be tried
without undue delay by establishing a time limit such as is done in some military

Regarding the complexity of the case, the need for parties to prepare their cases should be taken into
account in determining whether the right to an expeditious trial has been violated. The European Court of
Human Rights ruled that a period of delay of five years, due to the complexity of the case and the
defendant’s requests, is not unreasonable. Ringeisen v. Austria, App. No. 13/71, ¶ 110 (July 16, 1971).
661
The behavior of the accused might also play a role in the delay of the proceedings. This behavior can be
anticipated either because of the defendant’s overuse of his available means or his failure to co-operate. In
the same context, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that “Article 6 [European Convention on
Human Rights] does not require accused persons actively to co-operate with the judicial authorities. Neither
can any reproach be levelled against them for making full use of the remedies available under domestic
law.” Ledonne (No 1) v. Italy, App. No. 35742/97, ¶ 21 (May 12, 1999).
662
Regarding a delay attributed to the behavior of the prosecution, it has been noted that, due to the
complexity of the ICTY statute defining the crimes, the prosecution took the position of transferring as
many appearances and as much evidence as possible in order to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This practice contributes to prolonging the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In addition,
motions to amend and joint indictments and their responses from the defense council are other sources of
delay. In addition, this right may affect part of the international prosecutor’s prescribed power. In ICTY
practice, it has been held that “The prosecutor’s right to submit a request for leave to amend the indictment
….must not be exercised to the prejudice of the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay.”
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14-2, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Hold Pretrial Motions in abeyance (January 28, 1998).
663
Ledonne (No. 1) v. Italy, App. No.35742/97, ¶ 25 (May 12, 1999).
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courts. 664 Disregarding this time limit can be permitted in some circumstances with
advance judicial approval. As a result, it has been suggested that dismissing the relevant
charges should be the remedy if the time limit requirement has been ignored. 665
Unfortunately, this suggestion has not been adopted by international criminal tribunals.

The ICTY judges are in favor of granting provisional release if there is
excessively long detention with no prospect of coming to trial. 666 Analogizing to the
remedy for the violation of the right to be informed promptly of charges against the
defendant, it has been argued that the remedy for the violation of the right to be tried
without undue delay should be discontinuance. 667 Unless some national modifications
were adopted in the case of Saddam Hussein, the right to be tried without undue delay
would have provided an argument supporting holding the trial internationally.

VI.

The Issue of the Transfer of Defendants to International Tribunals

This part of the paper will not include the question whether an international
obligation exists to surrender persons accused of international crimes to international
criminal tribunals. Rather, the discussion assumes the existence of such an obligation,
and examines developments before international criminal tribunals regarding obtaining
664

Joseph L. Falvey, United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 475, 504-05 (1995).
665
Joseph L. Falvey, United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 475, 504-05 (1995).
666
Prosecutor v. Simic ET Al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Milan Simic’s Application for
Provisional Release (May 19, 2001).
667
Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial in Essays on ICTY Procedure and
Evidence 197 (Richard May ET Al., Kluwer Law International 2001); For the case deciding on
discontinuance for violation of the defendant’s right to be informed promptly of charges against him, see
Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision (November 3, 1999) ¶ 71. (ruling that
the right to be informed promptly concerning the charges had been violated by the 96 day interval between
the transfer of the accused and his initial appearance before a trial court).
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custody of the defendant and its relationship to extradition principles under international
law.

Since an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the Iraqi invasion was the only
international judicial body that might have been expected to try Saddam Hussein’s case,
the discussion will focus on the practice of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, mainly
the ICTY, in dealing with the issue of obtaining custody of the defendant. Since Saddam
Hussein was in custody at the time these lines were written, this review concentrates on
the surrender issue rather than the arrest issue.

The establishment of international criminal tribunals is one of those exceptional
departures from Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter authorizing the Security Council acting
under chapter VII to interfere in the internal affairs of States. 668 The necessity to bring
those persons responsible for international crimes to justice justifies this interference. 669
However, since international criminal tribunals do not have their own police or military
forces, they cannot fulfill their functions and duties without the cooperation of the
governments of states. Such cooperation is not perfect all the time. 670

Contemplating the necessity of States’ cooperation, the Security Council, in its
decision establishing the ICTY, emphasized that “…..[A]ll states shall cooperate fully

668

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (October 29, 1997) ¶ 64.
669
Kenneth S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557, 562 (1994).
670
It is said that “[T]he experience of the Yugoslavia Tribunal demonstrates that state co-operation and
Security Council support are inextricably linked issues, and are themselves dependent on the court’s image
as a powerful institution.” Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 393 (Cavendish
Publishing 2003).
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with the International Tribunal and its organs…..” 671 Such cooperation encompasses “all
stages of the proceedings.” 672 This cooperation, as prescribed by Article 29 of the ICTY
statute, includes, but is not limited to, both the investigation and the prosecution stages
concerning “(a) the identification and location of persons;(b) the taking of testimony and
the production of evidence;(c) the service of documents;(d) the arrest and detention of
persons; and (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Tribunal.” 673 Moreover, this cooperation is not limited to orders issued by the trial
Chambers, but extends to include the assistance of the prosecutors. 674 The Security
Council’s request to cooperate led some states to enact new legislation to avoid conflict
between their national legal systems and the obligations established by the Security
Council. 675 Other states, such as the Republic of Croatia and the former Republic of

671

Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32
ILM 1159 (1993).
672
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704& add. 1 (1993), ¶ 125.
673
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). A comparison of the ICC
statute and the ICTY statute on this issue shows that the state’s obligation to transfer defendants to the ICC
is narrower than the obligation prescribed by the ICTY statute since, unlike the ICTY obligation which
extends to all states that are members of the U.N. Organization, the ICC obligation is limited to those states
which are parties to the ICC statute. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 86, 87(5), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
674
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 39 (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). In the same
context, between the ICTY and the ICTR, there is disagreement regarding whether the obligation to
cooperate includes international organizations. For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the
obligation prescribed by Art. 29 does not apply to international organizations. Prosecutor v. Simic and
others, Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion under r 73 for a Ruling Concerning the
Testimony of a Witness (July 27, 1999) ¶ 78. On the contrary, the ICTR Trial Chamber recognized the
Registrar’s right to seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Prosecutor
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Decision on the Motion for the Protection of
Defence Witnesses (October 6, 1997) Sec. D (ii).
675
England is one of these states. Concerning the new English legislation implementing the Security
Council’s decision, see Colin Warbrick, Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 947 (1996).

173

Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution
Yugoslavia, failed to enact such legislation and this failure was judicially considered a
violation of their international obligations. 676

While a state cannot be ordered to act by another state or international
organization, it is the obligation of states to cooperate and to provide judicial assistance
to an international tribunal as an orga omnes obligation which every member of the U.N.
must fulfill. 677 In addition, orders issued by the international trial Chambers, including
transfer orders, are considered “the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” 678 As a result, these orders are binding on all
members of the U.N. organization.679
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Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-, Decision on the Motion of the Defence Filed Pursuant to
Rule 64 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (April 3, 1996) ¶ 9. However, the primacy of international
criminal tribunals is limited to specific issues: jurisdiction, investigation, transfer of defendants and
punishment. To ensure primacy in the matter of the transfer of defendants, article 58 of the ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence provides that “The obligations laid down in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail
over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which
may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned. Rules of Procedure and
Evidence art. 56, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). Within the ICC statute, article 102 distinguishes clearly
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which makes the request to surrender. If such a request is made by the International Criminal Court, it is
considered a request for surrender. However, if a state makes a request to another state, then this request is
deemed extradition. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 102, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9;
37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). For reasons behind the ICC statute distinction between
extradition and surrender, see Claus Kreb, Penalties, Enforcement and Cooperation in the International
Criminal Court Statute (Parts VII, IX, X), 6 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM JUST. 126, 135 (1998);
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the Motion of the Defence Filed Pursuant to Rule 64
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (April 3, 1996) ¶ 7; Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Case No.
IT-95-13a, Decision on the Motion of the Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic (October 22, 1997)
¶ 38. In the Dokmanovic case, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has argued that
its constitution forbids the extradition of its nationals.
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Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (October 29, 1997) ¶ 25. The
Trial Chamber’s order requested the Republic of Croatia to submit documents which were considered, by
Croatia, to be documents which would jeopardize its national security.
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Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704& add. 1 (1993) ¶ 126.
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Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
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In the milieu of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the states’ obligation to
surrender and transfer accused persons found on their territories to international tribunals
is not extradition, a cooperative tool between states in criminal matters. As a result,
extradition principles between states under international law are not applicable before
international criminal tribunals as long as they are not expressly included within the
tribunals’ statutes or within the meaning of customary international law principles.680

The reason behind the trend of not recognizing extradition principles in the
context of international criminal tribunals is the fear that a state’s prosecution of its own
nationals will not be conducted in good faith. Therefore, “The formula aut dedere aut
judicare is replaced by a mandatory requirement of transfer to the Tribunal at its
order.” 681

The process of transferring defendants begins with an order issued by the judge of
the trial Chamber after confirmation of the indictment and the prosecutor’s request. 682
The order to arrest and transfer can be internationally addressed to all states. 683 Upon the
issue of an international warrant for arrest and transfer, all states shall “act promptly and
with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance
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with Article 29 of the Statute.” 684 The state to which a transfer order is transmitted cannot
review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order and it cannot either appeal or
challenge the transfer order. It is argued that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence must
be amended in order to avoid any human rights violations in the transfer of defendants by
allowing such challenges. 685

The remaining question is, what remedy is available when a state fails to execute,
or purposely refrains from executing, the surrender and transfer order? International
criminal tribunals do not have the power to impose financial fines on those states. 686
However, the tribunals’ statutes contemplated the occurrence of this issue and provided
procedures to be followed when it occurred. Article 59 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence furnishes the tribunal with the power to notify the Security Council when,
in a reasonable time after transmission of a surrender and transfer order, the state does not
report its inability to execute the orders and the reasons for this inability. 687
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From ICTY experience, it seems that this tool, the notification of the Security
Coucil, was not effective. 688 As a result, it is suggested that the Security Council should
have imposed sanctions against the governments of those states. 689 One commentator has
proposed a set of procedures to enhance and strengthen compliance with the requests and
orders of an international criminal tribunal to gain custody of defendants. 690
Notwithstanding these difficulties, an overall assessment of ICTY accomplishments in
obtaining the custody of defendants shows great success. Among 161 defendants indicted
by the ICTY, only 6 defendants are at large. 691

In the case of Saddam Hussein, if an ad hoc international criminal tribunal had
been established, it is more likely that the custodial state, the United States, would have
welcomed his transmission to the tribunal. Otherwise, the United States would have
added to its violation of international obligations one more violation. In sum, within the
framework of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the first so-called problem, namely,
obtaining custody of the defendant, which can block international justice, does not exist.
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Otherwise, this quandary would have been bucked by the international community with
several options.

Conclusion and Observations

Generally, the principle of legality or nullum crimen poena legali is not applicable
in the field of international law in the same strict sense as in national legal systems,
particularly with regard to jurisdiction. Having reached the conclusion that the existing
judicial bodies did not have jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein, the only means of trying
such a case internationally would have been the establishment of an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal.

The trial of Saddam Hussein by an ad hoc tribunal would not have been in
contradiction to head of state immunity, since that immunity is a procedural issue which
bars only national foreign judicial authorities and not international foreign judicial
authorities from judging the immune individual case for a limited time. In short, there is
no immunity before international criminal tribunals regardless of its type as long as the
actions in question are considered international crimes.

Moreover, international crimes are not subject to, nor governed by, a statute of
limitations, which exists only in national legal systems. However, international law
protects human rights to some extent, even more than some national legal systems, since
the former recognizes some defendant’s rights which are unfamiliar to the latter, such as
the right to be tried without undue delay.
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Ad hoc criminal tribunals should not confront a traditional problem facing
international or foreign courts regarding obtaining custody of the defendant. The
international law process of surrender and transfer of defendants to an international
tribunal does not amount to an extradition process. The surrender and transfer of
defendants is usually accomplished under the Security Council’s supervision. This
supervision can lead to stronger tools or remedies when needed.

In the end, the political will did not exist to create an ad hoc international tribunal
for the Iraqi invasion. Consequently, national prosecution was the only way to try
Saddam Hussein for environmental crimes.
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Chapter V
War Crimes against the Environment
and a National Criminal Remedy
Introduction
Since courts of the state where the crimes were committed, Kuwait, or courts of
the nationality state, Iraq, would have been interested in holding Saddam Hussein’s trial
concerning crimes against the environment committed during the Gulf War of 19901991; 692 the focus in this chapter will be on the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems.
Since these two legal systems operate under the civil-law regime, there is much in
common between the two systems. There are also differences with respect to Saddam
Hussein’s case. This chapter examines common aspects in Part I while Part II deals with
the Kuwaiti trial and its difficulties. Part III reviews the basis of Iraqi jurisdiction and the
flaws found in the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal established after the
collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Iraqi part intends to review the ad hoc statute
and the statute in force when the crimes were committed to evaluate advantages and
disadvantages of both statutes.
I.

Common Issues
This part of the chapter reviews how the Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal systems take

common approches to the status of international law, the availability of national
legislation, immunity, the death penalty, and issues of evidence and defendant’s rights.
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1.

International Law as a Source of Law within the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi Legal
Systems
The relationship between international law and national legal systems is governed

by two schools of thought. Adopting either of these approaches is a matter which is left to
the state itself based upon the nature of its own legal system. The two approaches are the
monist and the dualist approaches.693
The first approach, the monist approach, considers the two systems, international
law and domestic law, as parts of a single legal system. As a result, no express municipal
adoption of international law principles is required. The United States is one of those
states which have adopted the monist view. 694
The second approach, the dualist approach, views international law and the
internal law of a state as totally separate legal systems. Based upon this distinction,
international law would not form part of the internal law of a state. Consequently, the
principles of international law apply within the internal system only when they are
expressly adopted as part of the internal law of the state. 695 This approach avoids the
question as to the supremacy of one system over the other since there is no common
sphere of application of the two systems. Both Kuwait and Iraq follow this approach. 696
The Kuwaiti Constitution explicitly refers to international conventions but does
not mention other sources of international law. Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution
states “The Emir [the ruler] shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them
immediately to the National Assembly [the Congress] with the appropriate statement. A
693
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treaty shall have the force of law after it is signed, ratified and published in the official
Gazette.” 697 This reference, however, does not preclude Kuwaiti recognition of other
sources of international law; all international law sources are valid as long as they are
adopted by national legislation. 698
Without mentioning the status of international agreements within the national
legal system, Article 43 (d) of the Interim Iraqi Constitution of 1990 provides that “The
Revolutionary Command Council exercises the following competencies by the majority
of its members: …..Ratifying treaties and international agreements.” 699 In addition, the
same Constitution confers upon the Iraqi president the power to conduct negotiations and
to conclude agreements and international treaties. 700
Both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems grant adopted treaties the force of
national law. These treaties are then controlled by the constitutional principles of the
adopting state and cannot contradict them. Having acknowledged the position of both
systems concerning international conventions as a source of national law, the focus of
this paper now will move toward those rules governing international conventions as a
source of the definition of criminality within the two systems.
Crimes and their sanctions are controlled by the fundamental principle of
“legality.” This principle is expressly recognized as a constitutional principle in both
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legal systems. 701 Because international conventions have the status of the national
legislation adopting them as the source of the definition of criminality, they are bound by
the principle of legality in terms of meaning and extent. In terms of meaning the process
of defining criminality must be done through legislation.702 Criminality cannot be defined
by a decree or a rule issued by the executive power.
The principle of legality is especially important in the Kuwaiti legal system703
because the definition of criminality in Saddam Hussein’s case is the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which was negotiated and adopted by the executive branch (the Emir)
without any participation by the legislative branch. In the Kuwaiti legal system, the Emir
and the National Assembly share legislative power. 704 Consequently, the process of
enacting law requires a proposal from the National Assembly and approval of the Emir. If
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the Emir disapproves of a legislative action, however, and the National Assembly
repasses it with a two thirds vote, approval of the Emir becomes mandatory. 705 This
raises the question of whether the Emir can conclude international conventions
criminalizing actions without legislative approval, when the principle of legality requires
legislative action to criminalize them. Answering this question requires a review of the
position of the Kuwaiti Constitution concerning compromise between the Emir’s power
to conclude a treaty criminalizing certain acts and the National Assembly’s power to do
so.
By and large, national constitutions differ in their treatment of the process of
ratification of international conventions. Some constitutions leave the task of negotiation
and conclusion exclusively to the executive power without the need for approval by the
legislative power. 706 A second group of constitutions requires that all international
conventions be ratified by the legislature. 707 Others follow this general rule but require
legislative approval of international agreements in some exceptions. 708
Compromising between the Emir’s power to ratify a treaty and the National
Assembly’s power to criminalize, the Kuwaiti Constitution embraces the approach of the
last group. Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that “The Emir [the ruler]
shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them immediately to the National
705
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Assembly [the Congress] with the appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the force of
law after it is signed, ratified and published in the official Gazette. However, treaties of
peace and alliance; treaties concerning the territory of the state, its natural resources or
sovereign rights, or public or private rights of citizens; treaties of commerce, navigation
and residence; and treaties which entail additional expenditure not provided for in the
budget, or which involve amendment of the laws of Kuwait; shall come into force only
when made by a law.” 709
In any event, the Emir has the power to ratify an international treaty. Under the
international law system, Kuwait, by the Emir’s ratification, will be bound by the treaty’s
obligations. However, implementing and incorporating the ratified treaty’s rules into the
Kuwaiti legal system in some issues requires legislative action. In other words, based on
the above constitutional article, the general rule is that a decree issued by the Emir is
sufficient to incorporate international principles within the framework of the national
legal system as enforceable principles. Some exceptional treaties require legislative
approval in order to be part of Kuwaiti law.
International conventions criminalzing actions fall within the purview of these
exceptional treaties requiring legislative action for several reasons. First, since criminal
law represents one aspect of “sovereign rights,” conventions criminlazing certain actions
concern sovereign rights. Second, such conventions also touch the “public rights of
citizens.” The principle of legality is provided in Part III of the Kuwaiti Constitution,
709
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“Public Rights and Duties.” 710 Third, international conventions adding new crimes
introduce amendment of the laws of Kuwait. The Fourth Geneva Convention and its first
additional Protocol are international conventions requiring legislative approval because
they fall within those categories of treaties for which article 70 of the Kuwaiti
Constitution requires legislative action. Although Kuwait is a party to both the Fourth
Geneva Convention and its first Protocol, it signed these treaties pursuant to the Emir’s
decree without legislative approval. 711 While the failure of the Kuwaiti legislature to
enact war crimes legislation might violate Kuwait’s international obligations, 712 it would
have undercut any attempt to prosecute Saddam Hussein in a Kuwaiti court for
environmental war crimes under those international conventions.
2.

The Availability of National Criminal Legislation
The lack of national war crimes legislation is a disadvantage of prosecuting war

crimes nationally because enactment of new national legislation on war crimes could
violate the principle of legality operating at the national level. National legal systems that
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had no war crimes legislation when these crimes were committed would violate the
principle of legality. 713
Even though Iraq is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it did not enact any
national legislation concerning war crimes. 714 As mentioned above, although Kuwait is a
party to both the Fourth Geneva Convention and its first Protocol, it also failed to enact
national legislation implementing the obligations of those conventions and criminalizing
their violations.
The problem of a state’s failure to enact domestic criminal legislation
implementing and fulfilling its international obligations is not new in international law.
When states lacking national war crimes legislation are called to prosecute war criminals,
they adopt contradictory approaches. The first approach ignores the principle of legality
by prosecuting under national criminal legislation enacted after the complained actions.
This occurred in national trials after World War II. The second approach respects the
principle of legality by prosecuting under limited legislation already in force when the
complained action was committed. An example is the trials held before Rwanda’s
national courts. 715 Violations of rules applicable before commission of the action are the
only basis for national trials complying with the principle of legality.
In the case of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait or Iraq could have avoided international
responsibility for violation of their obligations to enact legislation enabling them to
prosecute international war criminals, or for violation of their international obligation to

713

Violation of the principle of legality occurs when national authorities enact new war crimes legislation
to conduct trials when their international obligation to prosecute suspected war criminals found in their
territories arises.
714
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 217 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
715
See William A. Schabas, Preserve Effects of the Nullu Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad
Hoc Tribunals, EJIL Vol. 11 No.3 521, 26 (2000).

188

Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution
protect human rights (the principle of legality,) only by prosecuting Saddam Hussein for
violating criminal legislation in force when the offense was committed.
In addition, to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, some domestic
modifications, procedural and substantive, are necessary. Some of these modifications
will be clarified in this chapter. In the Kuwaiti and Iraqi criminal justice systems, the core
legislation controlling criminal trials is the Penal Code. 716 This legislation deals with the
substantive aspect of criminal proceedings. In the procedural part of criminal
proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Code controls the action from the original complaint
to the execution of the sentence.
In both Kuwaiti and Iraqi core legislation, the principle of legality is
reaffirmed. 717 It is the standard by which a distinction between a State where “law” is
arbitrary and a State which abides by the rule of law is made. Unlike the requirement for
the principle on the international plane, any crime and its punishment must be prescribed
in advance by written law. This written law must be issued by the legislature and
published in the official Gazette. Despite the fact that this principle has been criticized, it
still benefits defendants to some extent.718 Pre-existing national criminal legislation could
have been used as a basis for prosecuting Saddam Hussein criminally for his actions
against the environment and could have been found in the Penal Code. These laws,
however, do not refer to war crimes. 719 Avoiding failure to fulfill the state’s international
obligation to prosecute for international war crimes justifies interpretating these pre716
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existing laws to apply during both peace and war. At the same time, the texts of these
laws do not indicate that they apply only during peace time.
Even though there is a lack of national legislation criminalizing environmental
war crimes, national prosecutors have several tools with which to prosecute the accused
for underlying actions. Specifically, in the matter of Saddam Hussein’s actions against
the environment, the prosecutor may consider those actions to be crimes against property,
arson, harming animals or offenses against the public health.
Under the Kuwaiti criminal justice system, a proceeding could have been
commenced based upon the charge that Saddam Hussein’s actions are considered crimes
against property. Article (250) of the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that “Any person who
willfully destroys a public installation or a resource of national wealth, causing the
closure of the installation or a reduction in its utility or damage to that resource entirely
or partly, is punishable by life imprisonment.” 720
This provision differs in two aspects from Article 53 of the Geneva Convention
IV 721 which criminalizes destruction of property during war. First, it does not require that
the proscribed action be conducted during international armed conflict, nor does it require
a connection between the action and the event (warfare.) Secondly, this provision does
not furnish the accused with the defense of military necessity. Consequently, it would
have been easier to use national legislation to prosecute the defendant since it does not
require the prosecutor to prove these additional elements, the lack of military necessity,
the existence of armed conflict and a nexus between this conflict and the committed
crime. On the other hand, the lack of the defense of military necessity constitutes a
720
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disadvantage of the national trial approach since this provides less human rights
protection. Under both systems, it could have been argued that the necessity defense is
generally available for all offenses. 722
In addition to crimes against property, a Kuwaiti prosecutor could have
prosecuted for violation of the provisions criminalizing arson. Article (243) of the
Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that “Any person who willfully sets on fire an oil well and
causes damage to others is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years
and a fine not exceeding 10,000 dinars [30,000 dollars] or any of these penalties.”723 The
punishment is increased if explosives are used in carrying out the crime. 724
Corresponding provisions are included in the Iraqi Penal Code. The Iraqi Penal
Code is more specific concerning the place where the fire was set or where the
destruction occurred. Article 353(1) stipulates, “Any person who…destroys or causes
other damage to an oil installation is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding
seven years or by detention if such damage could lead to the closure of that installation.
The penalty will be a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years of detention if the
crime actually causes the closure of such installations.” 725

722

Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.25 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 63 (Iraq). It is questionable whether military necessity is
included with the general necessity defense since there is no war crimes statute or case law within the two
systems. However, a Kuwaiti or Iraqi court might interpret the defense of necessity broadly to include
military necessity. This interpretation is acceptable because of a well-known rule allowing broad
interpretation of criminal statutes as long as they relate to defenses. Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr.
Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The Handbook of Explaining
General Rules] 124 (2003).
723
Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.243 (Kuwait).
724
The punishment is life imprisonment in this case. Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of
1960, art.247 (Kuwait).
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 353 (1) (Iraq).
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If the defendant destroys or damages an oil installation by arson, he may be
punished by life imprisonment. 726 Life imprisonment is mandatory if the arson was
carried out by means of explosives and serious damage resulted. 727
Neither the Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi Penal Codes recognize “order” or “command
responsibility” as a basis for criminal responsibility. However, other theories of
responsibility could have been used. For instance, principal, accessory and conspiracy
provisions may make someone criminally responsible for criminal actions committed by
others. Article 47 (2) of the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides, “The following are considered
to be principals to an offense: Any person who participates in the commission of an
offense that consists of a number of acts and who willfully carried out one of those acts
during the commission of that offense.” 728 One of those acts might be planning an
offense. Articles 56 and 48 (3) provide for conspiracy and deliberate assistance as bases
for holding an individual as accessory to an offense. 729 Finally, under the Penal Codes of
both countries, an accessory to the crime receives the same punishment as that of the
principal. 730 A personal defense available to one of the principals or accessories, such as
obedience to a superior order, does not affect the responsibility of other principals or
accessories. 731
In conclusion, although national crimes legislation upon which the prosecution of
Saddam Hussein could have been based exists, the lack of national war crimes legislation
constitutes a flaw that could have been attributed to the national trials approach. More
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 342 (2) (Iraq).
Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 346 (Iraq).
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Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.47 (2) (Kuwait).
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 47-48 (2)(3) (Iraq).
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Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.52 (Kuwait); Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 50 (Iraq).
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 40 (2), 50 (1) (Iraq). Kanon AlJazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.37, 50, 52 (Kuwait).
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specifically, holding Saddam Hussein’s trial based upon national crimes legislation
would raise doubt about some issues. Immunity is one of these issues. 732
3.

Saddam Hussein’s Immunity before National Courts
Assuming that Kuwait or Iraq had enacted ad hoc legislation regarding war crimes

to try Saddam Hussein for his actions against the environment, one might have asked to
what extent he could successfully have claimed immunity before Kuwaiti or Iraqi courts.
To answer this question, it is essential to review the international rules governing the
immunity of a head of state before national courts. This issue is important because, if the
immunity claim could have succeeded, then immunity must be considered a disadvantage
in national trials for war crimes.
Saddam Hussein’s argument for immunity is a losing argument in the Iraqi legal
system in light of the ICJ’s decision. The ICJ held that “such persons [An incumbent or
former Minister of Foreign Affairs] enjoy no criminal immunity under international law
in their own countries and may thus be tried by these’ countries’ courts in accordance
with the relevant rules of domestic law.” 733
On the other side, a review of the Kuwaiti legal system shows that there is no
national legislation controlling the immunity of a head of state except those provisions
contained in the Kuwaiti Constitution. 734 In any case, this legislative vacuum does not
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International law rules governing immunity are meant to be applied to individuals accused of
international crimes, but not national crimes. For instance, although the ICJ’s decision regarding immunity
is deemed to be the final word concerning the current international rules regarding immunity, it is
applicable only to individuals accused of international crimes. Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.
733
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 61.
734
Article 54 provides the Emir with absolute immunity and Article 110 grants the National Assembly
members immunity concerning those statements and actions attributed to them while they are in sessions.
Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 54, 110 (1962). In fact, these provisions
play a role in keeping Kuwait from joining the ICC statute. See Adel Al-Tabtabyie, Al-Netham Al-Assasee
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provide Kuwait with an excuse to violate its obligation to respect the sovereignty of the
state regarding immunity, laid down by international customary law.
Recently, the issue of conflict between the rules of immunity and the rules
governing individual criminal responsibility in international crimes has been raised. This
issue has been reviewed before national courts in England, in the House of Lords; 735 in
France, in the Cour de Cassation; 736 and in the ICJ. 737 The ICJ decision will be reviewed
in depth because it is the most comprehensive decision of the three and the most recent.
The first national case was tried in the House of Lords and concerned a former
head of state. 738 On December 24, 1999, a panel of seven members of the House of Lords
ruled that the defendant was not immune to a charge of torture. The decision is important
because the Court did not consider international crimes to be official acts or acts of state
covered by the immunity doctrine of ratione materiae. This type of immunity begins
when an official leaves office. Consequently, it would not have been available for
Saddam Hussein with regard to those actions committed against the environment that are
considered international crimes.
The second national case was tried before the Cour de Cassation of Paris against
Mouammar Ghaddafi, Leader of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 739
Ghaddafi was charged with murder for complicity in a terrorist action. On March 13,
Ll’mah’kamah Al-Jenaieh Wa Madaa Taarozoh Maa Al-Dostor Al-Kuwieti [Contradiction between the
Statute of the ICC and Rules of the Constitution of Kuwait] 37-56 (Kuwait University 2003).
735
R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, [1999] 2 UKHL 97.
736
Cass. Crim. March 13, 2001, Bull. Crim., No. 1414.
737
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.
738
The case concerned the former head of state of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Duarte. After the
defendant entered England in September 1997, he was arrested on the basis of provisional arrest warrants
issued by UK magistrates, at the request of Spanish courts. General Pinochet was accused of involvement
in torture actions while he was in office. For analysis of this decision, see Andrea Bianchi, Immunity
Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237 (1999).
739
Cass. Crim. March 13, 2001, Bull. Crim., No. 1414.
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2001, the Court accepted the Prosecutor’s plea of immunity and declined jurisdiction
over the case. This decision was criticized. 740 It coincided with the conclusion of the
House of Lords concerning the absolute immunity of an incumbent head of state from
foreign criminal jurisdiction regardless of the gravity of offenses attributed to him.
In the case before the ICJ, 741 the Court implicitly recognized the immunity of
heads of state under international law. 742 Although the decision was limited to the
immunity of a Minister of Foreign Affairs, its reasoning applies to heads of state. 743
To resolve the conflict between a state’s international obligation to search out and
to prosecute individuals responsible for international crimes and the obligation to respect
the sovereignty of the state, the Court stated that, “[A]lthough various international
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on the
state obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their
criminal jurisdiction, such an extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities
under customary international law.” 744
In admitting that immunity does not amount to impunity, the Court ruled that
“[T]he immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister
of Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.
First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own
countries…. Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the
740

Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour De Cassation, 12 EJIL 595 (2001).
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For the case facts, see supra. Ch. IV Sec. III.
742
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 51.
743
The Court considered both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of state “as representative of the
state solely by virtue of his or her office.” Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 53.
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Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 59.
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state which they represent or they have represented decides to waive this immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, he or she
will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other states.
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one state may try a
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state for acts committed prior to or
subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as for acts committed during that period
of office in a private capacity.” 745
Finally, in its response to Belgium’s argument that exceptions to an incumbent
official’s immunity can be inferred from the Pinochet and Ghaddafi cases, the Court
stated that, “[I]t [the Court] has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists
under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity.” 746
Two comments may be made about the ICJ decision. First, the Court did not set a
bright-line rule concerning when the action is considered to have been committed in a
private capacity. The Court did not expressly rule that international crimes are committed
in a private capacity. Secondly, the decision removed immunity from any official who
leaves office, without considering the reason for his leaving the office. Consequently, the
decision did not address a situation in which a defendant has been forced to leave office
as a result of an internationally illegal act.

745

Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002, ¶ 61.
746
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002, ¶ 58.

196

Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution
In the case of Saddam Hussein, assuming that the action of the United States in
invading Iraq was contrary to international law, does the illegality of this action have an
impact on Saddam Hussein’s immunity ratione personae? In other words, could Saddam
Hussein successfully have claimed that he was still the de jure President of Iraq and that
the illegal action of the United States did not affect his position? If so, he would have
been immune from Kuwaiti criminal jurisdiction.
The answer to this question depends on the issue of government recognition. It is
well established under international law that an unrecognized government will usually be
denied immunity as one of the consequences of its lack of recognition. 747 Consequently,
no immunity exists for an individual, including a head of state, who comes from a
country whose government is not recognized by the state conferring immunity. Whether
Saddam Hussein could successfully have claimed immunity before Kuwaiti courts would
have depended on whether Kuwait recognized Saddam Hussein as the legitimate
president of Iraq. The answer to this question should be evaluated based on the practice
of the state of Kuwait in light of those international rules controlling the issue of
government recognition.
By and large, recognition of governments is subject to the discretion of a state and
is deduced from the circumstances of each case. Some countries, such as England, adopt
criteria by which to recognize governments. 748 Other countries, such as the United States
and Kuwait, leave the task of recognition to the executive power. 749 Government
747

Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 113-14 (Ashgate Publishing Company
2004).
748
Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law 150 (LongMan 1992).
749
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (1994). Kuwait does not have case law or national legislation
that clearly prescribes this issue. However, the recognition power can be inferred from article 74 of the
Kuwaiti Constitution which dictates that “He [the Emir] shall also accept credentials of representatives of
foreign countries.” Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 74 (1962).
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recognition can be exercised expressly or implicitly. An implied recognition takes place
when the acts of a state, such as the formal initiation of diplomatic relations or the
conclusion of bilateral treaties, leave no doubt as to the intention to grant recognition. 750
Until 1990, Kuwait had formal diplomatic relations and had concluded several
bilateral treaties with Iraq. Consequently, Kuwait had recognized the Iraqi government
headed by Saddam Hussein. After the Gulf War of 1991, diplomatic relations between
the two countries were severed. This severance per se did not result in the withdrawal of
recognition of Saddam Hussein’s government as long as a formal notification by the
Kuwaiti government announcing the withdrawal of recognition was not issued. 751
Alternatively, withdrawal may take place by the recognition de jure of a rival
government. 752 In reviewing the practice of Kuwait, it appears that Kuwait did recognize
the new Iraqi government. Although no express notification was issued, the practice of
Kuwait proved its recognition of the new government. 753 As a result of this recognition, it
was very likely that Saddam Hussein’s claim of immunity ratione personae would not
have succeeded in a Kuwaiti court if his trial had been commenced.
The matter would have been different if, after the liberation of Kuwait, had
Saddam Hussein admitted his mistakes, voluntarily agreed to pay compensation, and
resumed diplomatic relations with Kuwait. It is likely that such a position, taken by
Saddam Hussein, would have affected the Kuwaiti position on the invasion of Iraq by the
United States. If after invading Iraq, Saddam Hussein had fled to Kuwait and the latter
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Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law 169 (LongMan 1992).
Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law 176 (LongMan 1992).
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Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law 177 (LongMan 1992).
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Kuwait allowed the United States to use its territory to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On several
occasions the State of Kuwait announced its support of the new Iraqi government. The State of Kuwait
announced its intention to resume diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi government as soon as safety was
guaranteed in Iraq.
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had been asked to extradite or prosecute him, his claim of immunity might have
succeeded before the Kuwaiti courts.
In conclusion, in some cases other than that of Saddam Hussein, immunity could
be a disadvantage of national trials for war crimes since it might bar the commencement
of criminal proceedings against a head of state who is recognized as the legitimate
president of his country by the state where he is located and where the criminal complaint
is filed. But this is not the case with Saddam Hussein.
4.

The Death Penalty Issue
Although the death penalty may be considered legitimate by some national legal

systems, it is considered a violation of human rights by the international legal system.754
Therefore, the availability of the death penalty in a national system disfavors use of that
system to prosecute international crimes.
If international judicial action had been taken in the case of Saddam Hussein’s
actions against the environment, given the current trend of the international community, it
is more likely that the death penalty would have been unacceptable as an appropriate
punishment for war crimes.
In this part of the paper, several questions will be reviewed: whether the Kuwaiti
and Iraqi legal systems recognize the death penalty, what factors justify infliction of this
punishment by Kuwaiti and Iraqi courts, and the likehood that this punishment could
have been imposed in Saddam Hussein’s case.

754

William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law 211 (Cambridge
University Press 2002).
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Both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems formally accept the death penalty as
one of the primary punishments for national crimes. 755 At the sentencing stage, unlike
international criminal practice and the legal system of the United States, neither the
Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi legal systems furnish their courts with sentencing guidelines
ensuring the uniformity of the application of the punishments.
In addition, within both systems, the death penalty might not be prescribed by the
text criminalizing the committed action itself. However, aggravating circumstances can
play a role in having this punishment for the committed action as an option in some cases
but as mandatory in others. For instance, the punishment can be aggravated to reach death
penalty level if the offense was committed during time of war. 756 The relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim restricts the judge’s ability to impose only the
death penalty, requiring him to choose among several punishments. For instance, under
the Iraqi Penal Code, in murder cases, the punishment is aggravated from life
imprisonment to the death penalty if the victim is a parent of the offender. 757 Finally, the
circumstances of the case relating to the means of its commission, premeditation and the
purpose for which the offense was committed, can be aggravating circumstances as
well. 758
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 85 (1) (Iraq). Kanon Al-Jazaa
[The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.57 (1) (Kuwait).
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Article 8 of Law No. 31/1970 amending the Kuwait Penal Code stipulates “The following persons are
punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of years: Any person who willfully destroys an
oil pipeline or installation used by the armed forces. The penalty will be death if the offense occurs during
time of war.” Kanon Besh’an Tadeel Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Law concerning Amendments to The Sanction
Law], Law No. 31 of 1970, arts. 8 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of
1969, art. 163 (1) (Iraq).
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 406 (1)(d) (Iraq).
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 406 (1)(a) (Iraq). Kanon AlJazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, arts. 149, 150, 180 (Kuwait).
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In the case of arson and offenses involving the destruction of property, the
punishment may reach the level of life imprisonment in some cases. For example, article
342 (2) (b) of the Iraqi Penal Code states, “Any person who willfully sets on fire
moveable or immoveable property…(2) The penalty will be life imprisonment if the
following places are set on fire…(b) An oil rig or well.” 759 Concerning offenses against
property, article 346 of the same Code stipulates, “Any person who willfully uses or
attempts to use explosives, thereby endangering the property of others, is punishable by a
term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years. The penalty will be life imprisonment if
the explosion causes serious damage to such property.” 760
In addition to these specific aggravating circumstances, the Iraqi Penal Code
recognizes general aggravating circumstances. Holding public office or public authority
is one of those circumstances. These circumstances may raise the level of punishment in
some cases to the death penalty.
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Applying general aggravating circumstances such as

those mentioned above to the crimes of arson and property destruction allows a
sentencing court to inflict the death penalty upon those individuals condemned for these
offenses, such as Saddam Hussein. 762 In short, the imposition of the death penalty under
national legal systems, especially the Iraqi legal system, was probable. The same could
have been said regarding the Kuwaiti legal system, but with a different legal context.
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Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 342 (2)(b) (Iraq).
Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 346 (Iraq).
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Article 135 (4) of the Iraqi Penal Code provides “Without prejudice to the special conditions prescribed
by law for an increase in the penalty; the following are considered to be aggravating circumstances: ….the
use by the offender in the commission of an offense of his position of employment or the abuse of any
authority or influence deriving from such position.” If any of these aggravating circumstances exist in the
commission of an offense, the court may impose the death penalty if the penalty prescribed for the offense
is life imprisonment. Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 135 (4) (Iraq).
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Article 136 (1) of the Iraqi Penal Code provides that, “If there exist any aggravating circumstances in
the commission of an offense, the court may rule as follows: (1) If the penalty prescribed for the offense is
life imprisonment, the death penalty may be imposed…” Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law
No. 111 of 1969, art. 136 (1) (Iraq).
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Even though imposing the death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein might
have been considered legal in light of the principle of legality, there was a high
possibility that this penalty would have been imposed arbitrarily due to the lack of
sentencing guidelines within the national legal systems. Without question, the possibility
of imposing this punishment arbitrarily constitutes a flaw which might have been
addressed by national war crimes trials.
5.

The Issues of Evidence and of Defendant’s Rights
The existence of flaws in procedural protection within national legal systems

constitutes a problem for national war crimes trials. Examples of these flaws are the lack
of rules governing evidence, especially documentary evidence, 763 and the lack of some of
the defendant’s rights, such as the right to be tried without undue delay. These flaws
suggest that war crimes trials be held internationally. To examine these flaws, the
Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems will be reviewed with regard to these issues.
There is no independent legislation in the Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal systems
addressing the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings. Generally, evidence is
controlled by provisions included in the Penal Procedure Code. Unlike provisions made
in international criminal instruments, national provisions regarding evidence do not make
a distinction between the stage at which evidence is admitted and the ruling. 764 These
provisions govern evidence which is legally recognized as the basis for conviction.
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If the trial of Saddam Hussein concerning his actions against the environment had been held, it would
have depended mainly on documentary evidence. Therefore, this part of the paper will focus on
documentary evidence.
764
Although it is a fact that the above distinction has no value in the light of the end of the proceedings,
admission of almost all evidence presented might consume time. This affects a defendant’s rights to
prepare a defense and his right to be tried without undue delay.
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In light of the evidentiary aspect, a comparison between the two systems on one
hand and the international system on the other hand shows that they have both
common 765 and different features. 766 Even within the common sphere, the extent of
evidentiary principles is inconsistent. 767 This comparison is conducted in light of these
evidentiary principles and their relationship to the protection of human rights, more
specifically protection of the defendant’s rights.
Although neither national system explicitly contains a rule requiring evidence to
be relevant and have probative value, it is a judicial practice to enforce this principle
during the stage when evidence is weighed. Finally, the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code has
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Both national and international legislative systems have common principles governing some procedural
issues such as the admission of written statements in lieu of oral testimony, a written defense in lieu of oral
argument and the rejection of evidence which is not subject to parties’ argument.
766
At the level of international criminal law, there are some rules which do not exist in either of the two
national systems. For instance, evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct, judicial notice and lawyer-client
privilege are not recognized by either national system. However, despite the fact that these principles are
not recognized, it does not follow that national judges cannot apply them. The principles can be applied in
the mental evaluation of the evidence by judges. It is more likely however, that judges will be reluctant to
rely on them because they are not recognized by the legislature. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
arts. 93, 94, 97, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
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Common principles exist within the two compared systems to a different extent in some cases. For
example, international criminal instruments adopt the corroboration rule regarding a child’s testimony.
Within the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code, Article 213 (B), generalizing the rule to all testimonies, stipulates,
“One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not corroborated by other convincing evidence or a
confession from the accused. The exception to this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of proving a
case, which must be followed.” An example of this exception is provided by Article 181 (D) of the same
Code. Article 181 (D) states, “If the defendant confesses to the charge against him and the court is satisfied
of the truth of his confession and that he understands its implication, then it listens to his defense and issues
a judgment in the case without any requirement for further evidence.” In addition, in international criminal
law, a court may exclude any evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to
ensure a fair trial” or “if [evidence is] obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or
if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” On the
contrary, this principle, in both national systems, is limited to those confessions which are given “as a result
of coercion, whether it is physical or moral, a promise or a threat.” Both national systems recognize the
testimony of experts as evidence. Unlike the international system, they do not confer upon a defendant the
right to challenge the qualifications of the testifying experts. As an alternative, a defendant may present a
contradictory expert’s testimony or report. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence arts. 89 (D), 90 (B), 95,
UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006); Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of
1960, arts. 159, 170 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of
1971, arts. 181 (D), 213 (B), 218 (Iraq).
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its own advantage over both the international and Kuwaiti systems by not permitting
hearsay as evidence. 768
With regard to documentary evidence, both national systems assign this type of
evidence to a principle which controls all types of evidence. This principle provides that a
court, in its verdict, may resort to any evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry
or the hearing. 769 This evidence may consist of witnesses’ statements, written records of
an interrogation, other official discoveries, or reports of experts and technicians. Based
upon this principle, documentary evidence will be evaluated just as any other evidence is
evaluated. The Iraqi Penal Procedure Code does not impose upon the court an obligation
to examine the authenticity of the document. 770 The Kuwaiti Penal Procedure contains no
provisions dealing exclusively with documentary evidence.
Unlike international criminal instruments, the Kuwaiti and Iraqi systems do not
explicitly refer to certain defendant’s rights such as the right to a fair trial, the right to a
speedy trial, the right to cross-examine witnesses and the defendant’s right not to be
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. In spite of this fact, some rights
can be implied from the rules mentioned above. However, some national evidentiary and
procedural principles may raise doubt concerning their violation of the defendant’s rights
mentioned above. For instance, Article 179 of the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code states that
“The Court may ask the defendant any questions considered appropriate to establish the
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Article 169 of the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code states “The testimony should be based upon the facts
which the witness is able to recall through one of his senses.” Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal
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truth before or after issuing a charge against him. A refusal to answer will be considered
as evidence against him”(emphasis added). 771 This provision clearly infringes upon the
defendant’s right not to be compelled to testify against himself. Such a principle is not
found in the Kuwaiti Penal Procedure Code.
The lack of rules of documentary evidence and of the defendant’s right to be tried
without undue delay within the two national legal systems constitute a flaw which could
have been addressed had Saddam Hussein’s war crimes trials been held nationally.
Unless national modifications, including procedural protection, documentary evidence
rules and the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay, were made, these flaws
were reasons to hold war crimes trials internationally. Otherwise, arbitrary conviction
would have been highly expected in the case of Saddam Hussein.
II.

The Kuwaiti Trial
A review of the Kuwaiti legal system in light of the Saddam Hussein case raises

several questions relating to the basis for jurisdiction, obtaining custody of the defendant,
trying the defendant in absentia, and execution of the Kuwaiti sentence in Iraqi territory.
1.

The Basis for Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is necessary to make laws functional. More importantly, establishing

jurisdiction is a prerequisite to any extradition process. Jurisdictional power encompasses
the functions of the three powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in every nation.
This power grants a state the authority to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce those laws and
judgments that concern conduct occurring within the territory of that state. The
adjudication power is discussed here.
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Under international law, a state may claim jurisdiction using one of several
principles. These principles are the territorial principle, the active personality principle,
the passive personality principle, the protective principle, and the universality
principle. 772 As the territorial and active personality principles are the most common
jurisdictional principles used or claimed by the majority of states and are most clearly
related to Saddam Hussein’s case, 773 the paper will focus on them. This part of the paper
will discuss the territorial principle. The subsquent section on Iraqi jurisdiction will
address the active personality principle.
Before examining the territorial principle, it should be made clear that, unless an
international convention establishes priority among the above principles, there is no
international customary rule governing the hierarchy of these principles if a dispute
concerning jurisdiction between states is raised. Concerning national crimes, the
territorial principle is considered the primary basis for criminal jurisdiction. 774 According
to this principle, a state is competent to prosecute all offenses committed, in whole or in
part, within its territory. A territorial nexus is a basic requirement for this principle. This
principle rests upon the doctrine of sovereignty by which every state has the authority to
assume power over its own territory. 775 Without the territorial principle, statehood does
not exist in international law. 776
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The arguments for the territorial principle are that it serves justice by allowing
immediate access to evidence as well as minimizing expenses and judicial time. 777 In the
context of national prosecutions, under the territorial principle, Professor Cassese also
argues that, “[I]t is more likely for the cathartic process of criminal trials to have effect:
the victims and their families relive their tragedies; the whole society becomes aware of
what has happened and is thus put in a position of better coming to terms with, hence of
psychologically overcoming, past crimes.” 778
At the international level, the territorial principle is expressly adopted in the
context of genocide. 779 Based upon this principle, national prosecutions for the crime of
genocide were conducted in Rwanda for the first time in the history of the Genocide
Convention.
Unlike international law, most often national criminal justice systems set a
comprehensive framework governing the jurisdiction issue. Within this framework, the
territorial principle is always prescribed as the primary rule controlling the application of
the national criminal law. For instance, the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides, “The
provisions of this legislation [the Kuwaiti Penal Code] apply to every individual in the
territory of Kuwait committing an offense as prescribed by this legislation.” 780
The territorial principle applies in two forms. Subjective territoriality requires that
at least one of the offense’s elements be committed within the territory of the asserting
state. Objective territoriality requires that the impact of the offense occur in the territory
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of the asserting state. 781 The Kuwaiti provision above deals with the subjective form. As
regards the objective form, 782 the Kuwaiti legislation, unlike the Iraqi Penal Code, does
not set a general rule regarding offenses which are committed abroad but impact Kuwaiti
territory. However, the Kuwaiti system recognizes the objective form in a limited number
of offenses, not including arson and destruction of property. 783
Unlike normal arson and destruction of property offenses, the objective form may
present some difficulties in crimes against the environment because they may be
committed within one territorial jurisdiction, but impact the environment in the other
territorial jurisdiction.
Because Saddam Hussein’s order for action was given in Iraq, an argument might
have been raised that Kuwait lacked jurisdiction (the objective form.) However, Article
11 of the Kuwaiti Penal Code states that, “This legislation applies to all parties to the
offense of which all or part occurs in Kuwait even though any of those parties may be
abroad at the time of commission and regardless of whether any of those parties is a
principal or accessory to the offense.” 784 In any case, even though the territorial principle
may be a basis for jurisdiction, it is not enforceable without obtaining custody of the
defendant.
2.

Obtaining Custody of the Defendant
At the international level, obtaining custody of the defendant is called extradition.

Extradition is defined as, “The official surrender of an alleged criminal by one state or
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nation to another having jurisdiction over the criminal charged.” 785 Extradition represents
an effective tool between states in criminal matters. Some believe that the obligation to
extradite suspected war criminals exists without the requirement of a treaty while others
believe that a treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral, is necessary to claim the existence
of this obligation. 786 As contemporary practice in international law supports and confirms
the second view, this paper will assume that this view prevails. 787 Based upon this
assumption, the possibility of being unable to obtain custody of the defendant represents
a difficulty in holding war crimes trials nationally. This requires a review of the
possibility of obtaining custody of Saddam Hussein by Kuwait.
At the international level, the basis for extradition between states can be found
based upon reciprocity, comity and an international convention. Between Kuwait and
Iraq, reciprocity and comity as bases for extradition would not be appropriate methods to
secure custody of Saddam Hussein because of the tremendous crimes Saddam Hussein
committed against the Iraqi people. As a result, an existing treaty would have been the
only path through which both states could have been satisfied. A review of the history of
the relationship between the two states shows that there is no bilateral treaty in existence
regarding this issue. However, within the Arab League Organization, there is a
multilateral extradition treaty which both Kuwait and Iraq ratified. This treaty is the
Extradition of Criminals Agreement between Arab Countries [hereinafter the
Convention.] 788
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According to the Convention, each State Party is bound to deliver up a criminal
sought by another State Party according to conditions and circumstances prescribed by
the Convention. 789 This obligation includes everything found in the possession of the
fugitive criminal at the time of his arrest, whether the proceeds of the crime, or materials
that will serve as evidence to prove the crime. 790
Extradition becomes obligatory when the offense prescribed by the Convention as
an extraditable offense is committed in the territory of the state which seeks the surrender
of the fugitive criminal (hereinafter the requesting state). 791 The Convention recognizes
the territorial principle as a basis for both jurisdiction and requests for extradition.
Therefore, since crimes against the environment were committed in the territory of
Kuwait, Kuwait could have been a requesting state under the Convention.
The request to extradite can be made for the purpose of either prosecution or
execution. If the request concerns prosecution, the Convention requires that the crime
charged be punishable by imprisonment of a year or more according to the laws of both
requesting and requested states. 792 In applying this provision to arson and offenses
involving destruction of property, both acts are considered criminal and are punishable
according to the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Penal Codes. 793 As a result, these offenses meet the
requirement of this provision.

789

The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art. 1, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art. 12, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
791
The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.2, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
792
The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.3, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
793
Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.25 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, arts. 342 (2), 353 (Iraq). Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law],
Law No. 16 of 1960, arts. 243, 250 (Kuwait).
790

210

Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution
If the request is made to execute a sentence issued against a fugitive criminal, the
punishment prescribed by the sentence must be at least two months’ imprisonment. 794
Because the Kuwaiti criminal system permits criminal trials in absentia, it is possible that
a sentence might have been issued with the punishment mentioned above.
Despite the fact that the Convention imposes upon state parties an obligation to
extradite, it allows these states to reject the request for extradition based upon several
theories. These theories pertain to the nature of the offense, the protection of human
rights and the nationality of the fugitive criminal.
In terms of the nature of the offense, the Convention does not permit a claim of
extradition for crimes of a political character nor for acts connected with such crimes. 795
The Convention also removes certain offenses, not including arson and destruction of
property, from the definition of political offenses. 796 The Iraqi Penal Code makes a
distinction between ordinary and political offenses. Defining political offenses, Article 21
stipulates, “A political offense is one which is committed with a political motive or which
violates the political rights either of the public or of the individual. All other offenses are
considered to be ordinary.” 797 Based upon this standard, it seems that neither arson nor
destruction of property meet the requirement of the standard of political offenses.
A statute of limitations argument is another basis upon which to refuse the
surrender of the fugitive criminal. Article 6 of the Convention states, “A fugitive criminal
shall not be surrendered under the provisions of this treaty, when from lapse of time,
according to the laws of the place within the jurisdiction of which the crime was

794

The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.3, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.4, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
796
The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.4, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author).
797
Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 21 (1) (Iraq).
795

211

Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution
committed, the criminal is exempt from prosecution and punishment for the crime for
which the surrender is asked.” 798 Unlike the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Kuwaiti
system recognizes the statute of limitations in both prosecution and punishment.
In felony cases, such as arson and destruction of property, Article (4) of the
Kuwaiti Penal Code states, “A prosecution for a felony must be commenced within ten
years after the commission thereof.” 799 Applying this principle to the time when Saddam
Hussein became available for surrender, 2003, Iraq could have claimed that the time limit
of ten years since the commission of the crime in 1990 had passed. However, the Kuwaiti
Authorities might have responded that the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that the statute of
limitations stops running when an investigative step is taken. 800 Therefore, since on
November 9, 1992, Kuwait established a special division within the public prosecutor’s
office to investigate 801 those offenses committed during the Iraqi invasion, the statute of
limitations for all those offenses stopped running from that date.
In addition to the statute of limitations, a double jeopardy argument might be
raised according to the Convention. According to Article 5, a surrender shall not be
granted when a fugitive criminal whose surrender is sought was previously convicted,
acquitted or is actually under prosecution for the same offense for which the surrender
request is made. 802 Based on this provision, Iraq could have claimed that those offenses
committed against the environment were currently under investigation or prosecution
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before the New Iraqi Special Tribunal. This is a valid basis upon which Iraq could have
made a successful claim. 803
The nationality of the fugitive criminal is recognized as one of the valid bases
upon which to reject the surrender request, according to the Convention. Article 7
provides that, “Under the stipulations of this treaty, none of the High Contracting Parties
shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals providing the rejecting state conducts the
trial before its own courts.” 804 The importance of this provision is dual. First, it confirms
an internationally recognized justification for refusing extradition of the state’s own
nationals. Secondly, it balances the requirement to seek justice and the sovereignty rights
of the state by imposing upon the requested state the obligation to prosecute the fugitive
criminal. By this provision, the Convention cedes priority of the territorial principle to the
active personality principle.
In the same context, Professor Mohammed Cherif Bassiouni argues that a state’s
obligation “to extradite or to prosecute” is not alternative, but coexistent. 805 It was more
likely that Iraq, in the case of Kuwait’s request to surrender Saddam Hussein, would have
resorted to the defendant’s nationality provision of the Convention to reject the request
since the criminal had committed tremendous offenses against the Iraqi people. This
provision could have been used in all crimes attributed to the defendant as long as Iraq
was willing to prosecute the defendant for the crimes upon which the request was based.
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These bases for rejecting a surrender or extradition request, as noted above, are
clearly provided by the Iraqi Penal Procedures Code. However, the same legislation
eliminates any possibility of extraditing an alleged criminal found in the territory of Iraq.
Article 358 (2) stipulates that, “Extradition is not permitted in the following
circumstances: If the offense could be tried before the Iraqi courts in spite of occurring
abroad” 806 (emphasis added). Based upon this provision and the fact that the Iraqi Penal
Code adopts the notion of universal jurisdiction, it is clear that in almost all cases,
extradition is not permitted. 807
The Iraqi legal provision above does not conflict with the Convention since the
Convention confers upon Iraq the discretion to choose between extradition and
prosecution. Consequently, if Iraq chose, by adopting the universal jurisdiction doctrine
to enforce its jurisdiction, to prosecute all cases which fell within its jurisdiction, there is
no violation of the Convention as long as Iraq implemented its conventional obligations
by prosecuting suspected criminals for the crimes for which the extradition request is
made.
Finally, unlike the Iraqi Criminal Procedures Code, 808 both the Convention and
the Kuwaiti Criminal Procedures Code contain a flaw in that they do not provide for
national judicial supervision ensuring the proper application of their provisions or
requirements. The lack of such provisions is probably due to the fact that an extradition
decision is considered an act of sovereignty which is a nonjusticiable act according to
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Kuwaiti Law. 809 Finally, in other cases, the difficulity of obtaining custody of the
defendant might support holding war crimes trials internationally. 810
3.

Trial in Absentia or Transferring the Whole Judicial Proceeding
Holding war crimes trials in absentia represents a regressive step in the context of

human rights protection. Therefore, such trials should be considered a disadvantage of the
national trial approach and a reason to conduct them internationally. Given the difficulty
of securing custody of the defendant, the Kuwaiti Government would have had to choose
between two options, either trying Saddam Hussein in absentia or transferring the whole
judicial proceeding to Iraq.
If the former were the first Kuwaiti choice, then provisions for both legal notices
and execution of foreign sentences must have been respected. Generally, the Kuwaiti
Penal Procedure Code permits trials in absentia as long as provisions for legal notices are
respected. Before going to trial, the investigating authorities have the right to seek Iraqi
judicial assistance. The source of this right is based upon a multilateral agreement to
which both Iraq and Kuwait are parties, The Letters of Request & Legal Notices
Agreement between Arab Countries (hereinafter the Agreement). 811
The Agreement recognizes the right of each state party to request [hereinafter the
requesting state] from another party (hereinafter the requested party) to conduct any
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judicial procedure concerning a case pending in the requesting party’s judicial system. 812
This request is conditional upon the notion that the requested procedure does not
contradict the public system of the requested state. There is no doubt that the term “public
system” is a broad term which can be the basis for the rejection of any request. In any
case, based on the above provision, Kuwait may request from Iraq that it be allowed to
conduct any investigative procedure such as questioning witnesses or interrogating
defendants.
If the procedure is conducted according to this Agreement, it is conducted as it
would be in the territory of the requesting state. 813 In addition to conducting judicial
procedures, the Agreement allows that legal notices of judicial documents, such as
notices of the court’s sessions and sentences, be issued in the same manner as the judicial
procedure mentioned above. 814 In this context, the legal notices are viewed as they would
be if issued within the territory of the requesting state.815 This is important in light of
Kuwaiti provisions governing a trial in absentia.
Neither the Agreement nor the Kuwaiti Penal Procedures Code account for a
situation in which the defendant is in the custody of another country while a trial against
him is conducted, making it impossible for him to attend the trial. So, even though there
is an obstruction preventing the defendant from attending, a trial can be conducted as
long as the defendant is given legal notice, probably violating his human rights.
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While allowing a sentence to be issued in absentia, the Kuwaiti Penal Procedures
Code limits the right of the convicted person to object to the sentence issued only816
within a week either of the arrest or of the legal notice given to the defendant. 817 As a
result, an authorized attorney may not submit an objection request on behalf of the
defendant thereafter. If the time limit has passed without submission of the request, then
the defendant has only the right to appeal the sentence before a higher court, the High
Appeal Court. 818
When a sentence in absentia becomes a decision to which no objection can be
made, it may be appealed within the twenty days. 819 When this time limit has passed
without submission of an appeal request, the sentence becomes final and may be
executed, 820 unless the defendant appeals the sentence to the Supreme Court. This course
of action is based exclusively upon the discretion of the defendant. Finally, the Kuwaiti
Penal Procedures Code terminates a case if the defendant dies during any stage of an
investigation or a trial.821 Based on both the Agreement and the provisions of Kuwaiti
Criminal Procedure Code, a sentence in the case of Saddam Hussein could have been
issued in absentia.
In terms of sentence execution, neither the Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi Codes contain
provisions regarding the execution of foreign sentences. However, there is a provision
included within the Extradition of Criminals Agreement between Arab Countries. Article
17 of that Agreement stipulates that, “It is permissible to execute custodial sentences
816
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between party states providing a request is submitted by the sentencing state and the state
where the sentence is to be executed approves.” 822
Since the authority of Iraq to execute a Kuwaiti sentence is discretionary only, it
is highly likely that Iraq would have rejected this request. The rejection might have been
based on the argument that Iraq had priority in exercising jurisdiction over the case
according to the same agreement. The only advantage to trying Saddam Hussein in
absentia in Kuwait would have been the possibility of using this case as a precedent for
future national prosecutions of crimes against the environment throughout the world.
This advantage may not be available in the Iraqi criminal justice system because it
does not recognize other trials as a basis for postponing execution of the death penalty
issued against the defendant. This occured since the crimes against the environment
committed in Kuwait were not covered by the trial of Saddam Hussein first conducted by
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court. In any event, if Iraq had accepted execution of a
Kuwaiti sentence, a trial in absentia would have reduced human rights protection, making
this a disfavored option.
The second option which the Kuwaiti Government could have followed was to
transfer the whole judicial proceeding to the Iraqi authorities. Although there is no
existing agreement recognizing this option, i.e., transfer of the proceedings, Iraq was
bound to try Saddam Hussein’s crimes against the environment according to the
Extradition Agreement mentioned above as an alternative to Iraq’s rejection of the
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extradition of Saddam Hussein. Probably, Kuwait chose this approach because of the
difficulties of extraditing Saddam Hussein. 823
III.

The Iraqi Trial
In addition to common issues already reviewed, an examination of the Iraqi legal

system raises new issues relating to the basis for Iraqi jurisdiction and flaws in the Statute
of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal established after the collapse of Saddam
Hussein’s regime.
1.

The Basis for Jurisdiction
Although Iraq has adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction for the same

purpose, it could not have asserted that jurisdiction over crimes against the environment
by Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because the Iraqi Penal Code
limits the Universal principle to, “Destroying or causing damage to international means
of communications or trading in women, children, slaves or drugs.” 824 This provision
omits many acts, including crimes against property, deemed criminal by international
conventions to which Iraq is a party.
As an alternative, Iraq could have asserted its jurisdiction based upon the active
personality principle. According to this principle, a state can prosecute all offenses
committed by its nationals abroad. Although this principle is deemed to be extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it is generally accepted in international law. In fact, it has been adopted by
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several international criminal conventions.825 It is argued that this principle should be
applied internationally equally with the territorial principle. 826
The active personality principle has been adopted mainly by civil law states.827
This principle is based upon the allegiance a citizen owes to his country. The root of the
principle is the French view that it is essential to protect the reputation of the state before
the whole world. In other words, the function of this principle is to compromise between
two values, the inability to extradite nationals and the duty to prevent culprits from
escaping punishment. 828
States differ in implementing this principle. Some states do not adhere to the
double criminality doctrine requiring that the act in question be criminalized according to
the laws of both the nationality state and the locus deliciti state. 829 Other states, such as
Iraq and Kuwait, adopt the double criminality doctrine. 830
Even among states requiring double criminality, the extent of the principle differs.
For instance, unlike the Kuwaiti Code, the Iraqi Penal Code does not require application
of the principle that the accused must escape a foreign trial for the same act. Also, unlike
the United Kingdom, 831 Iraq applies the principle broadly. It does not limit its application
to certain offenses. 832
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2.

Comments on the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal
Although establishment of a tribunal to try individuals responsible for

international crimes is a positive step toward achievement of post-conflict justice, this
approach will not satisfy all interested parties. When the Iraqi Special Tribunal or IST
was established, 833 this approach of the trial was unacceptable to some. 834
Some feared that the IST would not achieve justice nor enhance the foundations
of current international criminal law. 835 This fear was attributed to the complexity of the
prosecution of international crimes, the nature of Iraqi society, the Iraqi judicial system’s
lack of experience and impartiality, and the probability of the government’s interference
in the tribunal’s work. 836 This fear arose from the fact that the Statute of the IST was the
product of a decree by an occupying power. On December 9, 2003, this statute was
drafted and approved by both the Governing Council (GC) and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), two authorities established by an occupying power, the United States.
A day later, CPA administrator Paul Bremer signed the Statute order and published it in
the CPA’s official Gazette. 837
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After much criticism, 838 in early August 2005, the IST’s Statute was revoked and
was replaced by a statute establishing the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (SICT),
formerly known as the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 839 The new Statute had been passed by the
Transnational National Assembly, an elected legislature, and ratified by the Presidency
Council. The new statute preserves almost all of the substantive provisions of the IST’s
Statute with increased use of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code.
Before reviewing the provisions of the Statute, it should be clear that there are
several events that played a role in drafting the Statute. These events are: (1) the IranIraq war, (2) the persecution of sections of the Iraqi population by Saddam Hussein, (3)
the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, and (4) the terrorist attack against the United States on
September 11, 2001. Most of the provisions of the Statute were derived from the ICC
Statute with a few exceptions relating to jurisdiction, the death penalty, and violations of
Iraqi law.
Evaluating provisions of the Statute will be limited to the principles of legality,
jurisdiction, immunity, evidence, and the defendant’s right to be tried without undue
delay. The Statute violates the principle of legality in different ways. In terms of offenses,
the principle of legality is infringed by borrowing the definition of war crimes from the
ICC statute. There are many offenses contained in the ICC statute that, when committed,
do not acquire the status of international customary law.
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For instance, Article 13 of the ISCT’s Statute dictates that, “For the purpose of
this law, “War Crimes” means:…Other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflicts, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:…(E) Intentionally launching an
attack in [with] the knowledge that such [an] attack will cause widespread, long-term,
and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 840
Based upon this provision, with respect to his crimes against the environment,
Saddam Hussein could have been held criminally responsible even though Iraq is not
party to Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. He could have been criminally
responsible even though those provisions regarding protection of the environment
contained in the Protocol were not considered international customary law crimes when
they were committed. This would have violated the principle of legality.
Another violation of the principle of legality relates to provisions establishing an
individual’s criminal responsibility based upon orders and superiority. 841 By including
these provisions in the Statute, Iraq violated a fundamental principle of criminal law by
establishing a basis for criminal liability that did not exist in the Iraqi legal system at the
time the criminal acts were committed. Consequently, this will not enhance the rule of
law in Iraq.
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Finally, Article 17 of the Statute confirms the rule that those offenses prescribed
are not subject to the statute of limitations. 842 This provision was viewed as a violation of
the principles of legality. 843 It was unlikely that an argument that the principle of legality
was applicable to the statute of limitations issue would have been accepted in the case of
Saddam Hussein because neither the Iraqi Penal Code nor the Penal Procedure Code
prescribe the statute of limitations.
However, assuming that a conviction based on the above provision had been
secured, the Statute puts the tribunal in a dilemma by stipulating that, “The penalty for
any crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 [war crimes] which do not have a counterpart under
Iraqi law shall be determined by the court taking into account…, guided by judicial
precedents and relevant sentences issued by the international criminal courts”(emphasis
added). 844
This article violates the principle of legality because it does not prescribe in
advance an appropriate punishment and it leaves determination of the punishment to the
court’s discretion. In some cases, this authority might lead to infliction of an arbitrary
punishment, especially considering the fact that the statute allows imposition of the death
penalty, a central issue in choosing the domestic approach. 845 Morover, no international
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precedent exists concerning crimes against the environment upon which the Court may
rely.
This punishment violates the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
or the ICCPR because the Statute does not allow for pardons or for mitigating any
punishment handed down by the tribunal. 846 In the context of enforcement of sentences,
the Statute refers to the Iraqi legal system as the controlling instrument in the execution
of sentences. 847
The Statute emphasizes that, “The punishment must be executed [carried out]
within thirty days of the date when the judgment becomes final and non-appealable.” 848
Without doubt, this provision deprives victims, witnesses, and whole interested societies
of the opportunity to establish conclusively which individuals were legally responsible
for crimes where the defendant is charged in several cases. This is the result of the rule
under the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code that a criminal case concludes upon the death of
the accused. 849
This is a smart strategy to end many of the cases before the tribunal.
Unfortunately, one of those cases was that of Saddam Hussein against the environment.
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This case was concluded when Saddam Hussein was executed based upon the sentence of
his first trial before the tribunal. 850
Enforcing Iraq’s international obligation to prosecute Saddam Hussein for crimes
against both Kuwait and Iran, the ISCT Statute extends its jurisdiction to include “every
natural person, whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi, resident in Iraq and accused of one of the
crimes listed in Article 11 to 14 below, committed during the period from July 17, 1968
until May 1, 2003 in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere, including the following crimes:…
(C) War Crimes”(emphasis added). 851
The ISCT Statute removed all types of immunity, including the immunity of the
head of state conferred by the Interim Iraqi Constitution of 1990. 852 This provision in the
Iraqi Constitution regarding immunity is contrary to international law. 853 However,
removing immunity by the Statute concerning national crimes appears to be
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, credit should be given to the ISCT Statute for protecting
defendant’s rights and for some procedural guarantees. For instance, although giving the
tribunal the authority to adopt a set of evidence rules was viewed as a clear violation of
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the notion of separation of powers set forth in the Iraqi Constitution, 854 this authority
permits the tribunal to establish safeguards protecting the defendants. Based on this
authority, many evidentiary rules relating to expert witnesses were adopted and general
rules ensuring credible evidence in the trial were established. 855
Some of these rules have flaws. For instance, neither the Iraqi Criminal Procedure
Code nor the ISCT’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence permit the investigative judges to
rely on the evidence gathered by foreign authorities, either Kuwaiti or Iranian. To solve
this problem, a judicial cooperation treaty between Iraq and these states was required. 856
In Saddam Hussein’s case, although there might have been reasons supporting a
speedy trial or a slow trial, 857 the Statute provides the right to be tried without undue
delay. 858 Although the Statute does not set a time limit with respect to this right and does
not clearly provide a remedy for its violation, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
furnish the tribunal with the authority to determine an appropriate remedy to be taken
when the provision is violated. 859
Finally, unlike the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 860 the Tribunal’s
Rules do not directly mention the impact of the failure to execute arrest warrants on the
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commencement of the trial.861 However, Article 45 of the Rules stipulates that, “Trial
proceedings should comply with the provisions set forth in the Iraqi Criminal Procedure
Code No. 23 of 1971.” 862 Since the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code permits a trial to be
conducted in absentia, 863 the above provision contradicts Article 19 (4)(D) of the
tribunal’s Statute ensuring the defendant’s right to be present when his trial is
conducted. 864
Conclusion and Observations
National legal systems located in the same region share common characteristics
and differ in others. The differences are due to several factors including the nature of the
society and the legislative history.
There are common legal provisions in both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal
systems. An example is the status of international law within both systems. Adopting the
dualist approach, neither system considers international law as a source of legality and
criminality, except with legislative approval.
As a result of the absence of legislative approval in the context of war crimes,
both systems place their courts in a dilemma when the time comes to fulfill their
international obligations either to extradite or to prosecute. Both states may refrain from
fulfilling their obligations to extradite due to national impediments (asylum or non-
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extradition of nationals) and to prosecute due to national guarantees as well (the principle
of legality).
Alternatively, in order to compromise on the obligation to prosecute and the
obligation to respect human rights, both national courts must resort to available national
provisions which to some extent are similar to these international criminal provisions.
Moreover, even though trials based upon national legislation were conducted, they must
address some difficulties relating to evidence and to defendants’ rights. These difficulties
render conviction and the severe punishment of the death penalty highly likely.
On the Kuwaiti side, although the state has an internationally recognized basis for
jurisdiction in the territorial principle, a trial might not have been at hand because,
according to conventional international law, this jurisdictional basis has no priority.
Alternatively, trial in absentia was another option that could have been pursued, but
again, the execution of a Kuwaiti sentence in Iraqi territory would have subject to the
discretion of Iraqi authorities.
Finally, since the success of the immunity claim depends mainly on the
government-recognition issue, Saddam Hussein’s claim concerning immunity was more
likely to be rejected by Kuwaiti courts if extradition had been granted by the United
States before handing Saddam Hussein over to Iraqi authorities.
On the Iraqi side, it is internationally accepted that a state has the authority to try
its own nationals for their acts committed abroad. However, the Iraqi experience shows
that modification of international law rules (the ICC statute) for the sake of harmony and
to meet the needs of a national legal system and its society results in serious flaws. This
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modification proves that changing legal provisions does not result in changing the
enforcement of these modified provisions.
Moreover, the modification process infringed upon the principle of legality which
in turn undermines the credibility of the whole proceeding. Unfortunately, the
modification process did not include those rules governing the execution of sentences
under the Iraqi legal system which rendered trying Saddam Hussein for his crimes against
the environment practically, although not theoretically, impossible.
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Individual accountability for international environmental crimes is necessary at
the current stage of international law. However, the manner by which this accountability
is enforced must be carefully balanced with human rights values. Balancing those two
values, the need for accountability and the need to protect human rights, requires a
balance between the prosecutor’s interests and the defendant’s interests. In the milieu of
pursuing international environmental crimes, there are often advantages and
disadvantages for each side, the prosecutor’s side and the defendant’s side. Evaluating
those features, whether they are advantages or disadvantages, depends on the interests
represented.
The prosecutor’s advantages are the defendant’s disadvantages and the contrary is
true. A review of Saddam Hussein’s case shows that whether his trial had been held
internationally or nationally there were advantages and disadvantages serving the
prosecutor’s side, the need for accountability, and the defendant’s side, the need to
protect human rights.
If the trial had been held internationally, the prosecutor would have benefited
from some advantages such as the lack of acceptance of the claim of immunity, a statute
of limitations or the flexibility of the principle of legality. In addition, it was more likely
that the prosecutor would have had no problem obtaining custody of the defendant. On
the defendant’s side, the existence of human rights guarantees such as evidence rules,
defendant’s rights, and sentencing guidelines would have made it difficult for the
prosecutor’s side. In addition to those guarantees, political will, the main factor in most
cases, plays a role in enhancing the defendant’s side.
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If the trial had been held nationally, the balance between the prosecutor’s side and
the defendant’s side would have depended on the location of the trial. If the trial had been
held before Kuwaiti courts, although the prosecutor would have had advantages relating
to the lack of evidence rules, the defendant’s rights, and sentencing guidelines, and the
availability of a trial in absentia, disadvantages would have been expected as well. Those
disadvantages would be related to extradition, the principle of legality and execution of
an issued sentence. In other cases, immunity may be considered a disadvantage on the
part of the prosecutor.
The trial held in Iraq and its statutory basis proved that the national trial approach
would heavily favor the prosecutor’s side. The trial caused the loss of a unique
opportunity to establish environmental justice. This opportunity may not be available in
the near future. In short, following the international trial approach would have served the
question of the truth rather than the question of revenge. A review of international, Iraqi
and Kuwaiti legal systems shows the need to follow some modifications which may assist
in achieving uniformity.
•

On the international law side:
o Adopting clear prosecutorial guidelines to ensure uniformity of application
of the law.
o Including environmental offenses committed accidentally and during
peace time in the International Criminal Court Statute.
o Enhancing the role of non-government organizations in the International
Criminal Court Statute.
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•

On the Kuwaiti and Iraqi side:
o Enacting war crimes legislation including environmental crimes.
o Enacting evidence legislation ensuring the establishment of guilt with
international standards.
o Eliminating trial in absentia or at least limiting this style of trial to
exceptional occasions.
o Enacting immunity legislation.
o Reaching an international agreement concerning transfer of judicial
proceedings and execution of criminal sentences.
o Enacting sentencing guidelines ensuring uniformity of punishments.
o Adopting the defendant’s rights stipulated in article 14 of the Covenant
Civil and Political Rights including the right to be tried without undue
delay.

•

On the Kuwaiti side:
o Adopting the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine within its Penal Code.
o Adopting judicial supervision of the extradition process.
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Historical Problem
Generally, borders between states do not have very important values until natural
sources such as ground-water, oil, and coal are discovered. This is the whole story
between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq. The historical rights that Iraq’s
governments claimed did not begin publicly until 1933. 865 Therefore, it would be
reasonable to examine those claims-their basis-their justifications to comprehend whether
those damages that resulted from the Gulf armed conflict of 1990-1991 were justified
under international law.
The Iraqi allegations began in 1933 when King Gaze established his own radio
station which he used as a tool to promote the idea that Kuwait was part of his region,
Iraq. 866 From that time on, the subordination idea was warmly adopted by consecutive
Iraqi administrations. The basis for King Gaze’s claim was that Kuwait was part of the
Basra region, the southern region of Iraq, which was subordinated to the Ottoman Turkey
Empire. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire, as a deafted party, was divided into
several states. One of these was Iraq. It was argued that, since Basra is part of Iraq,
Kuwait should follow its origin (Basra).
As evidence that the international community has reached the correct conclusion
in considering the State of Kuwait an independent state, and Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait
as null and void 867 it is necessary to review briefly some important events that happened
during the last decades. These events prove the authenticity of the conclusion. They
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began in 1899 when Kuwait entered into a protection agreement with England against the
Ottoman Turkey Empire’s control over the Gulf region. 868 The agreement showed that
England regarded Kuwait as an independent part of the Empire. Thirteen years later,
England signed an agreement with the Ottoman Turkey Empire whereby the Empire
acknowledged that Kuwait was an independent area, but the agreement did not become a
reality because of the beginning of the War World I. 869
Until War World I ended, there was no state called Iraq. In 1922, an agreement
was signed whereby Turkey, “a successor of the Ottoman Turkey Empire,” waived all its
claims toward the Arabic territories including Iraq. 870 Iraq, as an independent region, was
held under the British mandate which continued until 1932. Kuwait was not considered
part of Iraq at that time according to the agreement. In 1932, in order for Iraq to become a
member of the League of Nations, it was required to determine its official borders.
Consequently, Iraq sent a request along with its proposed borders between Iraq and
Kuwait to the English delegate 871 in the Gulf. This request was forwarded to the Kuwaiti
Emir, the ruler, who accepted the proposed borders later.
Some argued that this process constituted an international agreement. 872 In 1933,
King Gaze took power in Iraq and for the first time, the allegation that Kuwait was a part
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of Iraq began publicly. This was the seed for continuous allegations toward Kuwait over
57 years.
Some believed that the roots of these allegations lay in the following reasons: 1)
Iraqi intentions to steal properties of the Kuwaiti people in the Iraq region; 2) in 1938, the
Burgan oil well, “the second biggest oil well in the world,” was discovered in Kuwait; 3)
Iraq’s failure to control the Kuwaiti economic system which in turn affected the Iraqi
economic system; 4) Germany’s stimulation of Iraq in order to prevent England from
controlling the region; 5) Iraq’s desire to stretch its marine shore through the Arabian
Gulf; 873 6) political and economic problems Iraq faced at that time, resulting in a strategy
to attract the Iraqi people to what could be gained by annexing Kuwait; 7) Iraq’s desire to
lead the Arab World; 8) a wicked plot which the Iraqi government had at that time. 874
Iraq’s endeavors to annex Kuwait continued in divising ways such as asking
Kuwait to rent some Kuwaiti isles or by providing Kuwait with unsalted water, 875 but the
Kuwait government was wary of these attempts. Consequently, the Kuwaiti government
stymied these attempts smartly. In 1958, the Kingdom lapsed in Iraq and the Republic of
Iraq was established. Three years later, Kuwait sought its freedom from England and it
succeeded. But Kuwaitis independence angered the Iraqi government which threatened to
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use force to join Kuwait. This motivated the Soviet Union

876

to use its veto against

Kuwaiti requests to join the United Nations orgnization. 877 On July 20, 1961 Kuwait
joined the League of Arabic States with the official acknowledgment of all Arabic States
members except Iraq. On May14, 1963, Kuwait became the one hundred eleventh
member of the United Nations Organization.
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The Environmental Impact on the Arabian Gulf Region
Environmental impacts will be reviewed according to the affected element of the
environment: hydrosphere, lithosphere, atmosphere, and public health. The review will
not be limited to oil well fires, but extended to all other sources of pollution so that all
environmental consequences resulting from the Gulf armed conlflict of 1990-1991 may
be comprehended.
1.

Hydrosphere Pollution:
Hydrosphere pollution will be examined through two stages. In the first part of

this section, the focus will be on those sources that caused the pollution while the second
part of this section is concerned with the effects resulting from the pollution.
a.
i.

The Sources of Hydrosphere Pollution:
Oil Spill:
On January 25, 1991, the U.S. administration announced that Iraq had deliberately

discharged crude oil from the Kuwaiti oil facilities into the Gulf. 878 These discharges and
the following incidents occurred from different sources. The first incident occurred on
January 19, 1991, when Iraqi armed forces began discharging oil from five tankers
anchored in the Kuwaiti port of Al-Ahmadi. 879
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The oil discharged in this incident was estimated at 500,000,000 tons. 880 The oil
flow continued until January 30, 1991, and resulted in a massive oil slick, 75 by 35
kilometers in dimension, which stretched out to cover both the southern Kuwaiti and the
northern Saudi coastlines. 881
The second oil spill happened on January 20, 1991, when Iraqi armed forces
opened the pipeline connecting the mainland oil refineries at Al-Ahmadi port with the sea
island terminal, located five miles off the Kuwaiti coast. 882 This incident lasted until
January 26, 1991, and the estimated amount of oil released was 1,100,000 tons. 883
The third incident occurred on January 30, 1991, when an oil spill took place in
Mina Al-Bakr. 884 There were no data regarding the amount of released oil. 885 A series of
oil spills that polluted the waters and Gulf shores occurred later when Iraqi missiles hit
the Al-Khafj 886 oil storage. This incident formed a massive oil slick 6-8 kilometers
long. 887 The total amount of oil released into the Gulf was 4-7 millions barrels. It
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generated an oil slick 130 kilometers in length and 25 kilometers in width. 888 It was
recorded that the amount of oil released into the Gulf was two or three times bigger than
any previous oil spill. 889
ii. Sewage
Another source contributing to pollution of the Gulf as a result of the Iraqi
invasion was sewage and the absence of technical staff. 890 Before the invasion happened,
there were four sewage treatment plants in Kuwait. 891 The Iraqi armed forces destroyed
all the sewage plants; as a result, the Kuwaiti government was forced to discharge
untreated sewage directly into the Gulf. This process lasted about ten months after the
liberation of Kuwait. 892
No doubt, the sewage discharge caused pollution to the marine environment and
the beaches. Released sewage generated an increasingly injurious bacteria level
containing Coli form Faecal Coli form. 893 The resultant viruses made the Gulf a
dangerous body of water to swim in. In addition, these viruses affected the quality of the
fish whose bodies might contain toxic substances. 894
Also, the sewage played a role in decreasing the level of dissolved Oxygen in the
water body. This process was a result of organic substances the sewage may contain.
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Thus, the fishy opulence of the Gulf affected and air pollution resulted of bad smell
release. 895
iii. Fallen Substances
The marine environment was not polluted only through the release of oil and
sewage directly into the Gulf by Iraqi armed forces. It was polluted from another source,
the air pollution caused by the oil-well fires. 896 It is reasonable to assume such a
connection causing pollution from one component of the environment, air, to another,
water.
This pollution occurred through twofold sources, either through acid rain or
through fallen substances such as soot particles. 897 The oil-well fires lasted about seven
months until the last oil well was extinguished on November 11, 1991. 898 The fires used
up approximately 4,600,000 barrels of oil daily and discharged about 1,900,000 metric
tons of carbon dioxide, 20,000 metric tons of sulfur dioxide, and 12,000 metric tons of
soot particles daily into the air. 899
iv.

Military Operations:
Military operations associated with the Gulf armed conflict constituted another

pollution source of the marine environment. These operations caused both instant and
long-term environmental damages. For instance, thousands of marine mines planted by
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Iraqi troops to prevent Coalition forces’ marine assaults severely affected the ecological
system in the Gulf. 900
The estimated number of mines, including marine mines, was 1,250,000. 901 Also,
vessels sunk in the Gulf as a result of military conflict were another source of pollution
to marine life. There were about 82 of these vessels. 902 During the conflict, these vessels
were oil-supply tools for Iraqi troops. The amount of oil that escaped from these vessels
was 1,500,000 barrels. 903 These vessels were recognized as sources of other pollutants
such as lead and heavy metals. 904 Recently, there was a regional conference was held in
Kuwait regarding these vessels and how to deal with them. 905
b.

Hydrosphere Pollution Effects:
Apprehending the environmental impacts that struck the region requires an

understanding of the nature of the marine environment and its features. Thus, the region’s
features will be explored first, then how the environment was affected negatively.
i. The Gulf and its Ecosystem Features:
The Gulf is a partially closed sea of salty water with an average depth of 35
meters. 906 The length of the Gulf is about 1000 kilometers and its width about 300
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kilometers. 907 One of the Gulf’s disadvantages is having a weak exchange of water with
other water bodies. 908 It joins free international waters through the Strait of Hormuz. One
of the factors threatening the Gulf environment is the higher rate of water evaporation in
the Gulf than fresh water can replace. The annual water evaporation rate in the Gulf
ranges from 150-400 cm. 909
Fresh water is supplied mainly by rivers in the northwest, but the amount is
insufficient and does not compensate for the evaporation. One of the most vital factors in
maintaining the ecological balance in this waterway is the circulation of water. This
process is relative and takes place every three to five years. 910 The United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) declared that the Gulf is considered one of the more
sensitive marine ecosystems a special area. UNEP promulgated specific regulations for
its preservation. 911
Another characteristic of the Gulf marine environment is the presence of coral
reef colonies and plant species that thrive in areas which mark tidal movements. The
mangrove forest in the Gulf, which is a continuation of the forest in Southeast Asia and
the Indian Ocean, is also very important from the ecological viewpoint. 912
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Coral reefs are crucial in controlling water flow and they harbor various kinds of
fish, especially smaller species. Mangrove and Avicenna marine plants, which are
particular to the Gulf and to the Gulf of Oman, are among the sea resources that provide
ideal living environments for crustaceans such as shrimp and other marine life. 913
Coral reefs and mangroves, together with an array of other plant colonies, are
among the marine life forms that are threatened by petroleum hydrocarbon pollutants.
The total areas covered by Mangroves in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman exceed more
than 20,000 square meters. 914
Equally significant are colonies of shrimp living in the sea bed near the shore,
which also play a significant role in the areas’ marine life cycles. The vegetation that
results is the major food source that sustains many sea species thriving in the region.
The Gulf, a feeding and spawning ground for fish and other marine life, supports
180 species of mollusks, 106 species of fish, three types of whales, five species of
dolphin, scores of different types of seabirds, and 450 species of animals which live in its
coral reefs. 915
The Gulf is considered an important natural resource for the Gulf States (Kuwait,
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) because it represents the
main source of unsalted water in the region which lacks other water-supply resources
such as rivers and rain. By 1990, there were 37 desalination plants in the Gulf. Kuwait,
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for instance, gets 90% of its water from the Gulf. 916 Finally, the Gulf plays a cardinal role
in furnishing the population with plenty of fishy species such as shrimp. In addition, the
Gulf is deemed the primary resort for recreational purposes.
ii. Hydrosphere pollution effects on the Gulf:
Oil has a dangerous impact on any marine environment. Oil pollution may destroy
marine life in various ways. Some of these impacts are due to the characteristics of oil.
For example, oil is less heavy than water and that allows oil to float and spread over the
water surface. Thus, oil will be dissolved because of sunlight exposure. This dissolution
may generate several toxic petroleum materials which harm the marine environment. 917
By being floated over the water the oil may prevent sunlight from penetrating to the sea
beds and, as a result, the photosynthesis process of plankton, which is deemed the main
source of nutrition for other marine species (fish and shrimp), will be affected. 918
Oil, no doubt, plays a role in reducing the amount of dissolved oxygen in the body
of water. Oxygen reduction is due to the active bacteria that oil usually contains. 919 The
final result of such reduction is that fish perish because of Oxygen decrement. Oil may
produce negative effects on species directly.
Seabirds were the first victims of the environmental damages caused by the Gulf
armed conflict. Before the war, there were various seabirds living in the Gulf region and
the number of these birds was about 260,000,000. After the war, the previous number
was reduced to 100,000,000 birds. Around 100,000,000 to 150,000,000 were found dead
916
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on the Saudi Arabia coastlines. 920 Death caused by oil slicks resulted from the oil which
had been deliberately released into the Gulf by Iraqi troops. Thinking that oil slicks are
water bodies, birds land on them. When landing is completed, the birds lose their
capability to fly again. Thus, birds will perish either because of sinking or hunger. 921
Sea turtles, green turtles living in the Gulf, are wounded by oil slicks. Several
green turtles were found wounded on Garoh Island. 922 Also, turtles nest areas located in
the Kuwaiti islands were contaminated by petroleum. 923 Green turtles are considered an
endangered species. 924 Ninty three dolphins were found dead during the period of
between February-April 1991 in the region. 925 These deaths were attributed to toxic
substances penetrating these mammals’ bodies. 926
Even fish eggs and larva were affected by air pollution. One of the studies
reported that some dangerous petroleum materials were found in high concentration on
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the water surface. 927 It is well established that these materials cause harm to fish eggs and
larva. 928 Oil may cover and block the gills of fish which causes extinction. 929
Water pollution caused harm to shrimp. The shrimp fishing rate was brought
down in the 1992 season due to the Gulf pollution. 930 Coral reefs were partially damaged
because of oil pollution 931 and their color became white, a well known sign that they will
vanish. It was reported that 50% of the coral reefs were destroyed in the Gulf after the
war. 932 Coral reefs have a primary role in the absorption of carbon dioxide. 933
The heavy oil spill in early 1991 might have reduced the survival rate of Pearl
Oyster larva. The great amount of fallout and heavier petroleum that sank into the bottom
of the Gulf might cover the settlement of substrate for Pearl Oyster larva. 934 It is
mentioned that the low temperature due to air pollution would retard the growth of larvae
and increase larval mortality, further affecting recruitment. 935
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Mangrove forests are so important in maintaining balance for marine beaches and
for feeding marine animals. 936 It was reported that 400 kilometers of Saudi coastlines
were heavily contaminated with oil. This contamination caused harm for both mangrove
forests and salted marshes. 937 Sediments, also, were harmed due to Iraqi troop operations
such as land mines and defense walls built to prevent marine assaults. 938
Oil pollution affected the process of water desalination. For instance, when oil
oxidation occurs, toxic substances are the result. These toxic substances may harm human
beings because of their capability to dissolve in salt water (sea). Another result might be
anticipated as a result of the interaction between some petroleum materials, suach as
hydrocarbon, and the chlorine usually added in the water desalination process to sterilize
water. 939 It has been expected that the Gulf’s ecological damages will last for the next
tewenty years. 940
2.

Lithosphere Pollution:
The marine environment was not the only field affected negatively by the Iraqi

invasion of the State of Kuwait. Soil has been victimized through several activities
attributed to Iraqi armed forces. These activities, depending on their environmental
damages, can be classified into three groups: oil lakes, military activities, and ground
mines.
936
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a. The Sources of Lithosphere Pollution:
i.

Oil Lakes:
Oil lakes were formed by gushed oil wells. There were 77 gushed oil wells in the

northern and southern oil fields. 941 These wells were blown up, but they did not catch
fire. Thus, oil was flowing through these wells into the desert in both northern and
southern portions of the country. 942
The flow was estimated at 60 million barrels. 943 Others reckoned it at 24
million. 944 The oil flow formed approximately 570 oil lakes around the country. 945 Some
of these lakes are 5 kilometers in length and 500 meters in width. 946 These lakes cover a
space of 49 Km/square. 947 The depth of these lakes ranged from 60 to 120 Cm. 948 The
estimated depth to which oil might reach beneath the soil is controversial. Some believe
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that the depth was between a few centimeters and a meter, 949 while others think that the
oil might reach a deeper area, 3,7 meters. 950
Polluted soil can be classified in three groups depending on how much pollution
presents in the soil. The first group was severely-polluted soil which caused death to all
its biological capabilities. 951 The second group is mid-polluted soils that affected about
25-100% of the soil’s biota, 952 while the third group is slight-polluted soil covered by
soot which had fallen from oil smoke caused by oil-well fires. 953
ii. Military Operations:
No doubt, Iraqi troops’ military operations affected the soil. These military
operations, such as off-road vehicle traffic, bunkers, and ditches lasted about seven
months, enough to guarantee any soil changes. The movement of heavy military
artilleries would destroy the soil surface. Building defense lines which consist of bunkers
and ditches was another activity that might be counted as an anti-environment activity.
The Iraqi armed forces, following a scorched earth strategy, created a new path to
revenge from the earth in the so called “oil ditches.” These are ditches made above the
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soil surface and filled with oil in order to prevent any ground assaults. 954 Soil ditches
extended about 200 kilometers along the southern border line of Kuwait facing the Saudi
borders. 955 There were 120 ditches, 956 each one of them about 2.5-3 meters in width and
1.5-2 meters in depth. 957
These ditches were filled with crude oil estimated at about 3.5 million barrels. 958
It took about five months from August to January1991 to build these ditches. 959 This
process caused the movement of a tremendous amount of dust and turned over much soil.
iii. Land Mines
Although land mines can be considered a result of military operations, they have
been classified as an independent source of environmental damages inflicted on the soil.
Mines may affect soil in a variety of ways. 960 Without involving details, the number of
land mines discovered in Kuwait by 1997 was about 1,464,514 land mines. 961 1,078,829
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anti-individual mines were planted in the southern and northern portions of Kuwait while
567,685 anti-tank mines were scattered around the country. 962
b.

Lithosphere Pollution Effects:
Soil was affected greatly by the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait. The soil in

areas of war activities was exposed to various impacts which left their mark in the form
of changed soil conditions. The soil surface was pulverized by exposure to off-road
vehicle traffic. Soil was displaced, loosened, and shattered. The digging of bunkers,
ditches, and embankments distributed soil and exposed the hardpan present under the root
zone in most parts of the country. 963
The distributed soil was exposed to water and wind erosion and its productivity
was adversely affected. All plants and animals in the affected areas were killed or very
adversely affected. Acid rain, which fell in large areas, created a dark grey crust on the
soil surface, which modified its physical and chemical features. 964 Environmental
damages inflicted on the soil were varied. These damages will be examined according to
their causes.
Military operations affected soils in different ways. For example, the very low
numbers of both annuals and perennials was due to the use of plants to hide military
equipment; burial of plants during construction of bunkers, trenches, and embankments;
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and destruction of plants due to the movements of heavy military vehicles, 965 In some
cases, the digging of bunkers harmed the soil by exposing the hardpan and parent rocks.
The destruction of sediments was cited as one of the negative effects of the
military operations. 966 Iraqi troop centralization above the soil caused soil compression.
This compression brought about the blockage of soil pores, soil dryness, and an increase
in water flow (rain). 967
Bunkers created by the Iraqi armed forces had direct and indirect impact upon the
soil. Direct impacts are those damages caused by the soil digging process. 968 An example
of direct impacts would be the crumbling of upper parts of the soil, destruction of
vegetable cover, loss of rain and flood water due to water gathering inside bunkers
created by the invader. Gathering water inside bunkers accelerates the water evaporation
process. 969 In addition, bunkers caused indirect impacts on soil. 970
Land mines have their own effects on soil. These damages created both instant
and long-term effects. Instant impacts are those damages which resulted after the
implantation process occurred, changing the chemical conditions of the soil, destroying
965
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the coral reefs around the islands, crumbling upper parts of the soil, and destroying desert
plants. 971
Long-term impacts are those which resulted after a period of time had passed such
as losing surface water, waste of soil humidity, and annihilation of desert fauna and
flora. 972 It was reported that soil suitability for land use was affected by land mines. 973
Oil lakes played a role in affecting soil adversely. Some toxic substances resulting
from the oil lakes may accumulate in plant tissue and constitute carcinogens which cause
death to any animal eating such plants. 974 Areas within the boundaries of the oil lakes
were considered biologically dead. 975 After drying, oil tar or sludge remains, causing
severe disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the soil
environment. 976
The dark coloration of the soil surface leads to greater heat absorbance, increased
soil temperature, and hence increased water loss by evaporation. 977 A study
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acknowledged that damages to the natural vegetation were caused by the increased the
temperature in atmosphere and soil, decreased photosynthetic activities, and the burning
of many oil lakes. 978 Finally, oil lakes affected the ground water aquifer. 979 Sea water
used to extinguish the oil-well fires is another factor contributing to loss of soil
productivity. 980
3.

Atmospheric Pollution:
Understanding atmospheric pollution requires apprehending both the sources of

such pollution and its effects.
a.

The Sources of Atmospheic Pollution:
i. Oil Fire:
The crime against the environment was not limited to life marine and soil, but was

extended to the atmosphere. Burning oil wells were the stone which hit two birds or
targets, wealth and environment. Although it is a small territory, the State of Kuwait
contains an amount of oil estimated at about 12,960 million tons. 981 Kuwaiti oil is
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divided among eight major fields (Burgan, Manakeesh, Um-Qudair, Wafra, Mutreba,
Rawdatain, Sabryia, and Bahra). These oil fields contain 1555 oil wells. 982
The northern oil fields group (Rawdatain, Sabryia, Bahra, and Mutreba) contains
287 oil wells. 983 These oil wells were affected severely by the wicked Iraqi plan; 108 oil
wells were on fire, nine oil wells were gushing, fourteen oil wells were severely
damaged, and sixteen oil wells were intact. 984
The southern oil fields group (Burgan, Manakeesh, Um-Qudair, and Wafra)
contains 1268 oil wells. 985 Their statistics were 510 oil wells on fire, 68 oil wells
gushing, 448 oil wells severely damaged, and 140 wells intact. 986
The amount of oil burned was estimated at from 2.5 to 6 millions barrels daily. 987
Assuming that 2.5 million barrels daily were burned, the resulting substances were: 20-40
thousands tons of black smoke, 250 tons of carbon monoxide, 20 thousands tons of sulfur
dioxide, 1500 tons of toxic substances, and 500 tons of nitric oxide. 988
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Soot and oil mist were noticed on the soil as a result of the burning oil. 989 Types
of oil smoke formed were: black smoke, white smoke, and a clean flame without
smoke. 990 It was reported that the smoke reached places far away from the region
including some areas of the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. 991
ii. Oil Lakes:
Although oil lakes formed above the soil, they have negative impacts on air. Oil
lakes might be a source of toxic substances such as methane, butane, and
hydrocarbons. 992 These oil lakes were formed by oil escaping from oil wells. Either their
damaged oil well-heads were not on fire or their oil well-heads were on fire, but gushing
crude oil simultaneously. 993 Oil lakes were different in shape, location, size,
characteristics of oil, and depth. 994 Some of these oil lakes caught fire from the oil wells
on fire. 995
b.

Atmospheric Pollution Effects:
Oil-well fires greatly affected the environment. Environmental impacts occurred

in different ways. Burned oil caused harm to the atmosphere, and to animals, plants, soil,
and construction. In light of atmospheric impacts, a high concentration of toxic and
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harmful substances was recorded. 996 After the liberation of Kuwait, a couple of
monitoring stations (Al-Rega and Al-Mansoorya) were set up in order to record and
observe any air pollution that might result from oil-well fires. These stations’ records
revealed a high concentration of nitric oxide. 997
The sulfur dioxide concentration level exceeded the safe levels recommended by
the World Health Organization (WHO). 998 Also, hydrocarbons were found in a high
concentration in some areas of Kuwait. 999 One of the effects from the somke of the fires
was decreasing the regional temperature. 1000 This decrease is due to increasing of
pollutants concentration in atmosphere which decreases the amount of sunlight stored by
the soil. 1001
Plants were victimized by the oil-well fires. Oil rain killed plants in the Kuwaiti
territory. 1002 The increased of temperature of the areas surrounding the oil wells was
another source of fatal impact on vegetation. 1003 Soot caused by oil-well fires hindered
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the growth of plants. 1004 The lack of oxygen due to heat is an additional source which
assisted in the destruction of the vegetation. 1005
Fauna were severely affected by the oil-well fires. Soot hindered animals’
movements and flight. 1006 Ulcers in camels were reported as a result of soot fallen from
the smoke. 1007 Soot may smother animals. 1008 It was noticed that animal’s wool became
dark due to soot. 1009 Animal’s lungs were a full of soot.1010 Oil-well fires and their smoke
did not tolerate buildings. 1011 Finally, it has been concluded that the flood that struck
Bangladesh in 1991 was due to the oil-well fires. 1012
4.

Pollution Effects on Public Health
Air pollution was the most dangerous pollution that occurred since both marine

and soil pollution can be controlled authorities by taking some precautionary steps such
as warning signs or fences to prevent public contact with these polluted areas. But air
may invade any place without permission.
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Toxic substances such as sulfur dioxide may cause negative effects on health. By
exposure to some level of sulfur dioxide, a human being may become susceptible to
asthma, dyspnea, emphysema, skin and eyes irritation, or lung diseases. 1013 Sulfur
dioxide is in a high concentration in Kuwaiti crude oil.1014
Carbon monoxide may cause headache, eyesight weakness, general exhaustion,
and death if exposure to such toxicity reaches a high level. 1015 Nitric oxide also may do
harm to the respiratory system. 1016 Children who are ages 2-3 years are the most sensitive
to such diseases. 1017 Smog resulting from burned oil might generate cancerous
diseases. 1018 Lead, nickel, and vanadium are well-known sources of other unhealthy
effects. 1019 They may hinder childrens’ growth, or cause barrenness, liver disease, and
brain damage. 1020
It has been found that nickel may cause lung cancer and skin scorch. 1021
Vanadium may cause poliomyelitis and anemia. 1022 Acid rain contributes to the
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settlement of toxic substances such as lead and mercury. 1023 These substances may
penetrate into plant tissue and cause cancer to whoever eats these plants. 1024
After the liberation of Kuwait, a tremendous task awaited for the Kuwaiti
government to fulfill. One of the top priorities the Kuwaiti government adopted was to
protect public health. Steps were taken either by establishing an emergency plan or by
planning to extinguish oil-well fires as soon as possible. However, impediments were
there to face the government.
One of major impediments was the lack of the capability to deal with such an
environmental catastrophe. The destruction and plundering of equipment used to monitor
pollution before the invasion occurred contributed to the failure to conduct many
scientific studies regarding this incomparable disaster. However, some studies were
conducted regarding pollution’s instant effects. Some of these studies discovered the fact
that asthma and respiratory system problems increased after the pollution occurred. 1025
These studies concluded that children were more vulnerable to this kind of disease than
adults. 1026 Also, an increase in eye, skin, and nose allergies was noticed during 1991. 1027
A decrease in natural childbirth and an increase of short-weight children were
recorded. 1028 One of the studies includes air pollution as one of the causes for increased
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spontaneous abortions, and congenital deformity. 1029 These are some of the diseases
reported after the invasion occurred. Now, there is a long-term study being conducted on
400 families in Kuwait to examine the long-term effects of air pollution. This study is
expected to last from 15 to 25 years. 1030
The fact that most of the studies have agreed upon is that instant and long-term
effects on public health cannot be determined fully. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to
point out that there were some unexpected circumstances, unrelated to the role Iraqi
troops played, that mitigated negative health impacts on public. These circumstances
were the high temperature, 1031 the wind direction, 1032 rain, 1033 thermal inversion, 1034 and
the emergency plan. 1035 In addition, the Kuwaiti territory is flat which allows pollutants
to move fast by winds. 1036 No doubt that the period of time (240 days) consumed in
extinguishing the oil-well fires assisted in reduction of the effects. 1037
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Appendix 3
Document 2
This document indicates the Iraqi regime's desire to safeguard Kuwait's oil wells in the hope of
occupying Kuwait for good.

Top Secret

HQ
First Regiment
47th Mechanized Infantry Brigade Battle Group
No. 686
Date : 28/10/1990
To : All Companies
Subject: Infringements
Top secret memo of Army Chief of Staff HQ no. 245 of 19/10/1990
communicated to us by top secret memo of 47 Mechanized Infantry Brigade Battle Group
no. 408 of 25/10/1990.
1. It has been noticed that the personnel of some of the units deployed near the oil
installations and utilities infringe on these establishments and fire shots at the oil pipes
and tamper with some of their parts. This may cause the flow of oil and gas that may
constitute grave danger to their security and the security of the nearby units . To prevent
this phenomenon, the Army Chief of Staff has ordered the following:
a. Circulate to your units down to the level of unit commanders to stay away from the oil
installations within your area and to refrain from tampering with them in order to
safeguard their security and the security of the sectors near them.
b. The unit commander will be held responsible for any infringements against the
installations within the sector of his jurisdiction.
Please take all required measures.

Captain Thu'ban Khalil Hussain
Commander
First Regiment
47th Infantry Brigade Battle Group
cc: Movements: 47th Infantry Brigade Battle Group/ your memo above.
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Document 3
This document also shows that the Iraqi regime is desperate to preserve
Kuwait's oil wells hoping it will occupy Kuwait permanently.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Martyrs shall remain the best of us.
Secret
Third Regiment Command
Chief of Staff
(Movements)
No. 2/10/5524
Date : 15 September 1990
To:

1st Mechanized Division Command
3rd Armored Division Command
7th Infantry Division Command
8th Infantry Division Command
11th Infantry Division Command
14th Infantry Division Command
15th Infantry Division Command
18th Infantry Division Command
29th Infantry Division Command
Subject: Damage to Gas Pipe and Infringements

Enclosed is a photocopy of the secret and urgent memo of the Ministry of
Petroleum no. 4332 of 4 September 1990, communicated by Army Chief of Staff
HQ's secret memo number 4023 on 14 September 1990, regarding damage to the gas
installa-tions and infringements on materials that belong to the said ministry in the
southern sector.
Please be informed and stop all infringements and conduct continuous
surveillance to safeguard these installations.
Encls.: 1 above
Major General (Staff)
Ali Mohammed al-Shallal
for/ Third Regiment Commander
15 September 1990
1/1 Secret
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Document 4
Devastating oil wells and other vital Kuwaiti installations was the
final goal of the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait

HQ
11 Division Commando Battle
Group
No'2/122
Date: 25/1/1991
To: All Companies
Subject: Directives
Army Chief of Staff HQ's top secret and personal memo no. 490 of 16 January
1991, communicated by Third Regiment Command top secret and personal memo
no. 776 of 17 January 1991, communicated to us by 42nd Division top secret and
personal memo 206 on 22 January 1991.
In the meeting of the Armed Forces General Command on 13 January 1991,
our leader the President (may God keep him) ordered the following:
1. Oil installations prepared for destruction are to be blown up when the situation is too
dangerous in order not to leave them intact to the enemy, they should be
completely devastated. Commanders present in the sectors of their responsibility
should check the decision of the implementation of destruction with the division
headquarters. In case communications are disrupted and contact is impossible,
commanders in charge of destruction should take decisions of implementation in
light of the situation.
2. Kuwait Governorate is handled like any other. We defend it the way we
defend other governorates, and we should not foresake territory except at the right
moment.
3. Use intensive fire while in defensive positions and do not move from them
into combat except under well-calculated circumstances.
4. Americans may transmit on Iraqi TV materials that are contrary to fact. Caution
is required, and anything contrary to our aims should not be believed,
notwithstanding the enemy's attempts.

Captain Amir Sityat Mutlak
pp. Commado Battle Group
42nd Division
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Document 5
The Republican Guard was responsible for implementing the Deferred Destruction Plan.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Top Secret and Personal
Command
Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Republican
Guard
Chief of Staff
(Movements)
No. 2/2
Date: 12 August 1990
12 Muharram 1411
To: 19th Infantry Brigade, Republican Guard
20th Infantry Republican Guard
22nd Infantry Republican Guard
23rd Infantry Republican Guard
Command, Artillery, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ,
Republican Guard
Command, Air Defence, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ,
Republican Guard
Armored Battalion, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ,
Republican Guard
Subject: Directives
Reference to the top secret and personal memo of Republican Guard Forces
Command no. 730 dated 12 August 1990 about the directives of the Minister of
Industry and Military Industrialization of 12 August 1990.
l. All units should actively control all sectors they occupy. Areas in front of
defense positions are prohibited zones; no one is allowed in them or near them
from the direction of the Saudi borders. Full control must be imposed. Mechanized
and reconnaissance patrols should be dispatched to secure complete control.
2. Appoint sabotage squads to mine the oil wells and power and electricity stations that
have been prepared for deferred destruction, and prepare and finalize all the
requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated
place in order to blow up these targets as soon as orders are issued. Groups that
fail to blow up their assigned targets will be severely penalized.
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3. Select accurate positions for stationing artillery, which should be within the range and
protection of our air defence units.
4. In the event of any enemy air strike, all tanks should use smoke; mortar and artillery
should fire smoke bombs. This will interfere with the enemy's use of laser and electronic
weapons and reduce their chance of hitting their targets accurately. In addition to that, all
formations should request and secure enough smoke barrels ASAP to be spread in the
defense positions and the areas of tanks, APCs, artillery, and machinery. They
should be immediately ignited in the event of enemy air raids.
5. All jamming equipment dispensed to you should be used. They should be immediately
installed on tanks; inoperative ones should be repaired. Check their suitability and
practise on them. Also immediately list your needs thereof to secure them for the tanks
that have not received them in order to request them for you so that they are procured and
installed as soon as possible.
6. Move and spread as many as possible of the broken and damaged vehicles now
scattered all over Kuwait to the defence positions of your formations. They should be
copiously dispersed among tanks, APCs, and artillery positions. Trenches should
be dug for them in a way that makes it difficult to identify them. They are to be
placed at a level higher than the armored vehicles and light artillery to warrant their
strike by the missiles and bombs fired by the enemy aircraft. They have to look as real as
possible. This requires the launching of a wide campaign drawing on all the resources
available to you to move those inoperative and damaged vehicles. Utmost attention should be
given to this in order to secure all needs ASAP.
7. Instruct, enlighten, and urge all commanders of all sections, platoons, companies, units,
and detachments to intensely use smoke to counter enemy electronic and laser equipment.
8. Attention should be paid to supply areas with due emphasis to digging, deployment,
camouflage, hiding and continuous and regular relocation to avoid their detection by
enemy air force.
9. Commanders at all levels from section commander to formation commander should be
made to understand how to manage any forthcoming battle without telecommunications or
even telephones. The duties of each one should be made clear. Due emphasis should be
placed on their understanding and practice of duties to secure the implementation of those
assigned to you in case of any enemy ground, air, or sea attack accompanied by
complete jamming of our communication. Emphasis should he placed on the use of
substitute means of communication such as liaison personnel, office boys,
flags, light signals, megaphones and helicopters. From now on, all orders for
countering all possibilities and emergency situations should be clear.
Please take required measures and inform us.
Colonel (Staff)
Ghalib Abdulla Ahmed
pp. Commander
Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard
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12 August 1990
cc: - Nabu-Khaz Nasr Command HQ, Republican Guard, to take measures required
for no. 8 above
- NKNC, Chief of Staff HQ, RG: to take measures required for no. 5 above
- Al-Hussain Tanks Battalion: please take required measures.
- Field Engineering Battalion, NKNC, RG: please take measures required for no.
2 above, send a list of the names in the sabotage squad and inform us.
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Document 6
This document reveals that the head of the Iraqi regime is the mastermind
of the crime of destroying and igniting the oil wells.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Top Secret and Personal
Ninth Tanks Battalion
No. 2/2/28
Date: 18 January 1991
Subject: Directives
Reference to Army Chief of Staffs top secret and personal memo 490 of 16
January 1991, communicated by Third Regiment Command's top secret and
personal memo 726 of 17 January 1991, communicated to us by 7th Division
Command top secret and personal memo 52 on 17 January 1991. In this meeting of
the Armed Forces General Command on 13 January 1991, our leader the President
(may God keep him) gave the following orders:
1. Oil installations prepared for destruction should be blown up when the situation
becomes dangerous, so that they are left to the enemy destroyed, not intact.
Commanders of regiments where there are oil installations within their positions
of responsibility should check the decision of implementing the destruction with the
General Command.
In case communications are disrupted and contact is impossible, regiment
commanders should take decisions of implementation in light of the situation.
2. Care should be observed when using the Counter-Attack Armored Force.
3. We must monitor enemy manoeuvres to shift our concentration. However, we must
keep our sectors as they are.
4. The coast road 'Aradat-Hafr al-Batin-Qaysuma - should be targeted by helicopters
to prevent the enemy from advancing.
5. Coordinate the operations of Squadron BC 9 aircraft in fighting the enemy
helicopters.
6. We handle Kuwait Governorate like any other governorate. We defend it the way
we defended other governorates, and we do not forsake territory except at the
right moment.
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7. Use intensive fire while in defence positions and do not move from them into
combat except under well-calculated circumstances.
8. Americans may transmit on Iraqi TV materials that are contrary to fact. Caution is
required, and anything contrary to our aims should not be believed,
notwithstanding the enemy's attempts.
Please take required measures and act accordingly. The Commander-in-Chief has
ordered the following:
a. Communicate the above directives to all fighters and ensure that all understand them
well.
b. Ensure that the oil wells are prepared for destruction. This should not be carried out
except in the most dangerous situation. They are not to be left intact to the enemy,
whatever the cost may be.
c. Sections should inform us about measures for communicating this.
d. The commander of the regiment should be personally informed.
Please take all required measures. It is imperative to inform all ranks today.
Lt. Colonel (Armor)
Zaydan Khalaf Abdulla
Commanding Officer, Ninth Tank Battalion
18 January 1991
Top Secret and Personal
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Document 9
Document 9 reveals the detonation plan concentrated mainly on the producing wells, not the closed or
abandoned ones, and their ignition to realize the plan's aim of destroying the Kuwaiti economy.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Top Secret, Personal and Urgent

Command
Third Regiment
General Staff (Movements)
No. G2/10/10364
Date 23 December 1990
To : Command, Third Armored Division
Subject: Exercise Report
[Reference to] Army Chief of Staff top secret personal and urgent memo no.
7394 of 21 December 1990. It is possible that the oil gushing out of the wells may not
combust due to the shock that occurs during closure. In view of this, the following
measures should be taken regarding the oil installations and oil wells in your sectors
prepared for the deferred destruction and ignition plan.
1. Cooperating with Kuwait Oil Company (only through its Iraqi personnel) to identify the
abandoned wells, those fitted with underground safety valves, and those producing ones
which will be selected for detonation.
2. As the producing wells may not ignite after the explosion, gunpowder fillings should
be placed with the explosive charges to guarantee the burning of gas and oil after
detonation.
3. Guard and detonation personnel should withdraw to a distance of not less than 300 meters
prior to the explosion.
4. Monitor the oil well after its ignition to ensure that the fire does not extinguish, and take
measures required to rekindle it, by using cannons and munition. This should be
regarded as priority since the non-burning of the oil well will cause dangerous lethal
gases to amass in minutes for a distance between 2.5 - 3 km from the well head.
The degree of effect is lower for longer distances.
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Please take all required measures and inform us.
Brigadier Staff
Salah Mahdi
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Document 10
Its subject is Committee Resolution. It shows that the destructive filling charges were
placed in the
oil wells by representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum and Military
Engineering. It also reveals
the targets prepared for destruction by each of the three regiments and their
responsibilities.
Secret and Personal
Army Staff HQ
Office of Army Chief of Staff
No. /6066
Date: 11 November 1990
To: Command, Third Regiment
Command, Fourth Regiment
Command, Sixth Regiment
Subject: Committee Resolution
1. Enclosed is a copy of the resolution of the committee that visited your sectors in
the period 27 October 1990 to 4 November 1990 and which coordinated with you
regarding the recommendations of deferred destruction and ensuring that it is
practical and implementable.
2. The Army Chief of Staff has approved its content.
Please take all the required measures, each in his own sector. The Committee
will visit your sectors in the future to follow up on implementation.
Encl.: Committee Resolution
Major General Staff
Sa'di Ahmed Saleh
Secretary, Field Forces, Army Chief of Staff
cc: • Operations Dept.: Your top secret and personal memo no. 1243 of Nov. 1990.
For your information and please provide us with a report on the upcoming
visit.
• Training Dept. : Please provide the above regiments with fuses.
Secret and Personal
Committee Resolution
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The Committee formed in accordance with the Operations Department's secret and
personal memo no. 706 O.D. of 17 November 1990, visited the sectors of the Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Regiments in the period 27 Nov. 1990 - 4 Dec. 1990 and coordinated with them
regarding the recommendations of deferred destruction plan and ensuring that it is
practical, sound and implementable, and that their measures will achieve the
[required] objectives.
1. Third Regiment Sector:
a. Targets: The regiment has prepared the targets listed below which are within its
domain of responsibility for deferred destruction.
No.

Target

Area

Brigade Division
Sector
Sector

I
2

Assembly no. 16 (31 oil wells)
Assembly no. 2 (40 oil wells)

al-Manaqeesh
Burgan

39
19

Inf. 7
""

3

Abdaliyya Water Station

Abdaliyya

19

""

4

450 oil wells

al-Wafra

12

Inf. 8

5

Saddam's Grand Water Project

12
12
45
45

""
""
Inf. 11

Inf. 14
Inf. 14
""
""

6
7
8

Water Water Project
Assembly no. 20 (49 oil wells)
Assembly no. 9 (58 oil wells)

Abdulla
Terminal
al-Wafra
al-Magwa'
"

9

Az-Zoor Power and Water
Desalination Station
Oil Storehouse at az-Zoor Oil Terminal
Gas Storehouse at az-Zoor Oil Terminal
Az-Zoor Water Pumping Station

Ras az-Zoor
Ras az-Zoor
""
""

426
426
18
426

Az-Zoor Electricity Station
Doha and Eastern Doha Power and
Water Desalination Station

""

18

Doha

436

15

15

Al-Rasheed Power and Water

Al-Rasheed

16

Desalination Station
Al-Raghwa Water Project

(Shuwaikh)
al-Raghwa

76
95

15
Inf. 18

17

Assembly no. 17-27 oil wells)

Um Qadeer

84

Inf. 29

10
11
12
13
14
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18
19

20
21
22

Assembly no. 18 (14 oil wells)
Assembly points (1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,
11,12,13,14,19,21,22). They form
505 oil wells
Petro-Chemical Compound
Osmosis Station
Northern & Southern Shuaiba Power
and Water Desalination Station

fill

84

""

Burgan
al-Nida'
Port
al-Nida'

451
45

Inf. 42
""

Shuaiba

""
""

b. Procedures and Remarks:
First: The regiment headquarters prepared recommendations for the deferred
destruction of the targets listed above, and informed the divisions of them by its secret and
personal memo no. 3798 of 29 Nov. 1990.
Second: All targets have been prepared for deferred destruction in two ways (electric
deferred destruction circuit and ordinary deferred destruction circuit), except for 30% of
the targeted oil wells which were fitted only in one way, i.e. the ordinary way, due to the
current lack of electric fuses. Work is currently undertaken by the Regiment
Operations Dept. to fit them in both ways.
Third: All targets prepared for deferred destruction are in the secure position.
Fourth: Targets of serial nos. 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 20 mentioned in a) above have been
prepared for destruction by tanks and artillery because it is hazardous to place the
charges in these targets, due to their high temperature when burning.
Fifth: The filling charges have been placed in the suitable places of oil wells and
installations by the representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum according to Army
Chief of Staff secret, personal and urgent memo no. 5798 dated 4 November 1990,
except for some of them which were put in the designated place. The Regiment Operations
Corps have been informed. An actual destruction plan was conducted on a vertical well
group in the sector of the Sixth Division by using 20 pounds of T.N.T.with good results.
Sixth: Form 822 of the orders to the commander of the burning destruction group and
Form 823 of the order to the detonation destruction group were not efficiently used. They
were also not used in some of the division sectors.
Seventh: The guards assigned to the targets are insufficient in number and
unfamiliar with the details of their obligations as shown in the form.
Eighth: There is no coordination whatsoever between the guard groups and the
destruction implementation groups in all sectors.
Ninth: The implementation groups are not clear about the context of delegating
authority for destruction.
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Tenth: There is no efficient system that secures delivering regiment orders to all
targets as required.
Eleventh: Due to the vast number of oil wells, their spacing and their location mostly in
sandy areas, and because of the few number of engineering elements assigned to
destruction and the few wheels [available], the destruction operation is not completely
guaranteed at the fixed time.
Twelfth: There is approximately a 30% shortage of fuses.
Thirteenth: The repeated replacement of the engineering units responsible for
destruction affects their readiness to implement this task in an accurate manner.
Fourteenth: There is a possibility that the equipment prepared for destruction
purposes may be stolen by some elements to be used for different purposes, especially in
targets located inside cities and wells close to general utilities.
Fifteenth: The awareness of the guard and destruction units is not concurrent with the
hazardous duties for which they are commissioned.
Sixteenth: The explosive materials are not secured due to stuffing the filling
charges in a portion of the targets.
Seventeenth: There are five oil wells in the sector of the 7th Infantry Division that
have not been prepared for destruction because they are located in a mine field.
Suggestions:
First: Destruction recommendations should be issued by the headquarters of the divisions to
guarantee that the implementing elements are completely familiar with them.
Second: Fit all targets prepared for in two ways: an electric deferred destruction
circuit and an ordinary one.
Third: Prepare the plan to be used by the tanks and artillery to guarantee the
destruction of the targets listed in Fourth above; assign the detonation units for these tasks
and do not replace them or commission them for any duty other than their
responsibility.
Fourth: Representatives of the Ministry of Oil and Military Engineering should place
the filling charges in the designated places in the oil wells.
Fifth: Forms 822 and 823 should be used by everyone up to the level of the
commander of the destruction plan and the commander of the iginition plan.
Sixth: Assign a destruction group that is sufficient [in number] and armed, besides the
ones shown in the above forms.
Seventh: Establish a central-superintendent body for the deferred destruction in the
headquarters of the divisions to guarantee coordination between the Destruction
Guard Groups and the Destruction and Ignition Groups and the delegation of authority.
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Eighth: Secure an effective and efficient system that guarantees communicating
impromptu orders to the implementing elements, by using wire or wireless means or
persons, as the situation may develop.
Ninth: Allow sufficient time to increase preparedness from security to destruction and
ignition when orders are given, by preparing additional engineering units and enough
vehicles and motor-cycles to secure the quick movement of the implementors.
Tenth: Secure the fuses still needed. (The regiment has already submitted a request
form).
Eleventh: It is preferred that the engineering units responsible for destruction as well as
the guard units are not replaced except under dire conditions to ensure ease of
implementation.
Twelfth: Alert the different ranks of the Destruction Guard and the Destruction Units of
the importance and danger of the duty they are assigned to shoulder through briefings and
meetings.
Thirteenth: Secure the materials for placing the filling charges for the targets which
have not been supplied up to now.
Targets:
First: The regiment has submitted a list of 34 targets for calculating the materials
required for deferred destruction, as per its top secret and personal memo no. 1155 of 13
Nov. 1990.
Second: The above list includes the targets that have been approved for preparation
for destruction except for Martyr Adnan's Air Base as it is considered a substitute for
Kuwait's civil airport.
Third: The Regiment HQ has reconsidered the number of targets and deleted 26 of
them. The number of targets prepared for deferred destruction in the regiment's sector
stands now at eight. They are as follows:
Area
Brigade Division
No. Target
Sector
Sector
1

Pumps and docks

Mitla'

2

Inf. 2

2
3
4

Broadcasting and TV Station
Telecommunications Station
Jahra-Mitla', Road

"

4
58
4

""
""
""

5

Satellite Station

Urn al-'Aysh

2

""

6
7

Oil wells
Water Tanks

Atra

-

11

-

Rec. 1
,. „
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Salmi

Salmi-Jahra Road

8

108

Inf. 16

Procedures and Remarks:
First: Approval was obtained as per the Army Chief of Staff's top secret memo no.
5477 of 25 Nov. 1990 to dispense the materials needed for destruction as requested by the
regiment HQ and as shown in item First 2a above. The official was sent to receive the
dispensed materials.
Second: The regiment has destroyed target no. 8 listed above, i.e. Salmi-Jahra
Road, by using engineering materials only. Other targets will be prepared for deferred
destruction when the materials are received.
Suggestions:
Fist: Expedite the receiving of the destruction materials dispensed to start preparing the
other targets for deferred destruction.
Second: Observe what is stated in Third 1 c above when work starts, and also
during the visit to the regiment sector to ensure that the plan is applicable when the work is
finished and that we are informed by the regiment HQ.
Sixth Regiment Sector
Targets: The regiment has prepared the following targets within its sector of
responsibility for deferred destructi
No.

1

Target

2

Assembly no. 23
(11 oil wells)
Assembly no. 24

3

(31 oil wells )
Assembly no. 15

4

(31 oil wells)
Assembly no. 25

5

(17 oil wells)
Assembly no. 32

6

(17 oil wells)
Assembly no. 12

7

(26 oil wells)
Bubiyan Bridge

Area

al-Sabriyya

Brigade Division
Sector
Sector
78

Inf. 28
""

al-Rawdatain

""
""

al-Ritqa

Khawr alSabbiyya

""

90

Inf. 34

Procedures and Remarks:
First: Forms 822 and 823 have been filled out by the regiment commander only.
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Second: A committee has been formed in the regiment HQ to follow up the
destructions.
Third: Only 39 oil wells have not been finally prepared for deferred destruction
because materials have not been received.
Fourth: Destruction guards have not been assigned to all targets across the Bubiyan
Bridge; instead the regiment personnel have been depended on [for that purpose].
Fifth: The oil wells have been fitted with one destruction method, either ordinary or
electric, because of the current lack of wires.
Sixth: Insufficient engineering personnel have been assigned to the targets.
Suggestions: Same as 1 c of the Third Regiment above except for "third" because of
the absence of electricity and water desalination stations in the regiment's sector.
Recommendations:
1) Inform the Regiments (3,4 and 6) of the suggestions stated in the Committee
resolution.
2) Appoint another time for the committee to visit the sectors of the above regiments to
immediately check all the shortcomings mentioned above.
Resolution issued on 6 November 1990
Signed by
Lt. Col. Staff (Infantry)
Ali Sulaiman Khalaf
Representative of Military
Operations Dept.

Col. (Eng. Oper.)
Muwaffaq Bashir Abdul-Rahman
Representative of Military
Operations Dept.
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Col. Staff (Armor)
Mohammed Abd Aziz
Representative of Military
Operations Dept.
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Document 11
Document 11's subject is a "request for an Iraqi engineer specialized in petroleum affairs" to
identify the important positions in the targets designated for preparation for destruction.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
HQ
29th Infantry Division
Administration and Supplies
No. M15/1104
Date 5 Nov., 1990.
To: Command, Third Regiment (Supplies)
Subject: Request for an Iraqi engineer specialized in petroleum affairs.
Please acquire the approval of the concerned authorities to dispatch an Iraqi
engineer specialized in petroleum affairs to identify the important places and
equipment in the targets prepared for destruction so as to determine point of depth
and priority when requesting the implementation of the upcoming detonation
operations. Please inform us.
Colonel (Armor)
Riad Hassan Kazem
Per/Commander
29th Infantry Division
cc:

29th Inf. Div.: Movements Dept.
29th Inf. Div.: Intelligence Dept.
29th Inf. Div.: Security Dept.
Third Regiment: Field Eng. Battalion: Your
memo no. 6464 of 3/11/1990

Documents Archives (A/B)
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Document 13
Document 13 with the subject "Information" identifies the position of filling
bursting charges at the heads of the wells and the types of explosives used.

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
137/27/12/80
Top Secret
HQ
18 Field Engineering Battalion Movements
No. M/6/366
Date: 26 December 1990
To:
Subject:

2nd Field Engineering Division
18th Field Engineering Battalion
Information

[Reference to] top secret memo no. 3769 of 22 December 1990 of 18th Division
Command (Movements). Please provide us with the following and inform us through
a messenger:
1. Number and type of explosives prepared for blowing up each installation, and
the reserve thereof available
2. A detailed plan of the destruction operation
3. Provide us with a detailed report about the positive and negative aspects of
the detonation process as regards the operation of destroying the installations.
Captain Nabhan Fa'iq Hasan
pp. Commander, 18th Field Engineering Battalion
26/12/1990
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
A list of explosives received by 2nd Field Engineering Company and 18th Field
Engineering Battalion:
No.
I
2

Material Type

Total

Used

Reserve

Explosive boxes
Fuses

573

331

242

13.2 km

13.20 km

-
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3

Ignition cord

15.7 km

15.7 km

-

4

Electric igniters

530

230

300

5

Ordinary igniters

102

--

6

Capsules

330

--

330

7

Safety cords

50 meters

--

50 meters

8

Electric safety cord
Kindler

15

--

Document 13 - continued

282

102

15
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Document 21
This document shows that the officer who received the explosives
conducted a drill to ensure that they were faultless.

Brother Lt. Abdul-Wahed
I carried out an experiment on the ignition cord I received from you but it did not
kindle. My regards for the commanding officer and all the officers.
2nd Lt.
Abdul-Razzaq Rawdan
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International Environmental Law:
First of all, it is important to face the issue of whether a war has any effect on
treaty obligations. It has been said that, in case of war, a distinction should be observed
between the subject matter of the treaty. Therefore, if the treaty to which belligerents are
parties concerns the war issue, the treaty obligations will continue binding on both sides.

However, other treaties dealing with other issues, either bilateral or multilateral,
will be suspended in case of the existence of war. 1038 The suspension is only between the
belligerents. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations rejects the notion
that war may affect the parties’ obligations. 1039

Discussion of the international environmental system requires dividing the
discussion into two sections. The first section concerns the so-called soft environmental
laws or instruments while the second section focuses on hard environmental laws. The
differences between the two types of laws will be clarified through examining both types
in terms of their definitions and examples.

1038

Rashid Al-Enezee, Al-Qanoon Al-Dwalee Al-Aam [International Public Law] 369 (Kuwait University
1997) (Arabic).
1039
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations art. 73, 25 ILM 543 (1986).
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I.

Soft Law

Soft Law is “Guidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set
standards of conduct but are not legally binding.” 1040 Soft Law arises from those rules
that are neither strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance. 1041 The
distinction between soft and hard law is not a precise matter because in some cases it is
possible to find soft obligations in hard law such as a framework treaty. 1042

Soft law might “…come in a richly kaleidoscopic variety of forms. Yet at their
centre stand two primary instruments. The first instrument is the voluntary standards that
serve as equivalent to formally legislated and ratified governmental law and regulation.
The second instrument consists of the informal institutions at the international,
transnational, and national levels that depend on the voluntarily applied participation,
resources, and consensual actions of their members, rather than on the formally mandated
participation and regularly assessed obligatory contributions, organization, resources, and
sanctions of the institutions itself.” 1043

Soft law can be created by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As a result,
soft laws may pave the way to create hard laws in the future. 1044 Soft laws can be
categorized or found within three groups of instruments, “(1) so called ‘non-binding’
agreements, such as the Helsinki records, (2) ‘voluntary’ codes of conduct for
1040

Black’s Law Dictionary Special Abridged Eighth Edition Created in Honor of the 100 the Anniversary
of AALL. 1159.
1041
David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 250 (Foundation 1998).
1042
David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 944 (Foundation 1998).
1043
John J. Kirton & Michael J. Triebilcock eds., Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global
Governance 4 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004).
1044
Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 182 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003);
Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420,
432 (1991).
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transnational corporations, and (3) resolutions of international organizations, of which
General Assembly resolutions are the leading examples.” 1045
The distinction between principles based on their legal status is criticized. 1046
Thus, it has been argued that the debate over the legal status of any environmental norms
is misplaced by claiming that these norms, regardless of their legal status, “can play a
significant role by setting the terms of the debate, providing evaluative standards, serving
as a basis to criticize other states’ actions, and establishing a framework of principles
within which negotiation may take place to develop more specific norms, usually in
treaties.” 1047 There are social reasons that lead to the creation of soft law phenomena. 1048
Soft law form exists at both international and national levels. 1049 Moreover, soft laws
might have their impact on national legislation. 1050 Examples of soft laws on international
environmental issues are the Stockholm Declaration, the World Charter of Nature and the
Rio Declaration.

1045

Quoted in Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 183 (Transnational Publishers, Inc.
2003).
1046
Daniel Bodarsky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 Ind. J.
Global Legal Stud. 105, 119 (1995).
1047
Daniel Bodarsky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 119 (1995); Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of
the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 434 (1991).
1048
Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L.
420, 420-22 (1991).
1049
Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L.
420, 422 (1991).
1050
Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L.
420, 434 (1991).
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a.

The Stockholm Declaration 1051

The Stockholm Declaration was the fruit of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972. This Declaration indirectly approached the protection of
the environment during armed conflict. It is not clear whether the Declaration was meant
to be applicable in the time of armed conflict. However, the principles set by the
Declaration do not come into conflict with the existence of armed conflict. Thus, there is
nothing in the Declaration that prevents its principles from applying in the time of armed
conflict.

The fundamental principle in the Declaration pertinent to the destruction of the
environment is principle 21. This principle mandates states to “ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 1052 There is no doubt that
Kuwait, during the Iraqi invasion, can be considered as an occupied territory, within or
under Iraq’s control.

Also, principle 7 requires states to “take all possible steps to prevent pollution of
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses
of the sea.” 1053 Moreover, principle 26 protects the environment through restricting the

1051

Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
1052
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
1053
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
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use of weapons, such as nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which
negatively affect the environment. 1054

Although both Kuwait and Iraq participated in the Stockholm Conference and
approved its Declaration, the Declaration is not an effective tool for criminal trial on
several grounds. First, it is not a binding instrument. 1055 Second, principle 22
recommends only that the potential remedy for those activities which caused harm is civil
in nature. 1056 Third, the Declaration imposes obligations on states, not individuals. In
sum, the Declaration might be considered an important factor to hold Iraq, as a state,
civilly liable but not its citizens.

b.

The World Charter of Nature 1057

The World Charter of Nature is another soft law instrument which was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1982. This instrument sets general principles
governing activities harmful to the environment either in peace or time of armed conflict.
Principle 5 deals explicitly with warfare activities by stating, “Nature shall be secured
against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities.” 1058 In addition,

1054

Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
1055
See Shilpi Gupta, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
251, 264 (1993).
1056
Article 22 provides “States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within
the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.” Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM
1416 (1972).
1057
World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983).
1058
World Charter for Nature princ. 5, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983).
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principle 20 requires states’ avoidance of those “Military activities damaging to
nature.” 1059

Again, the internationally customary principle which prohibits causing harm to
another state’s territorial environment was included in the Charter. In the debate
concerning the legal status of the Charter, some have argued that the Charter is
considered binding because it was adopted by 111 states. 1060 Regardless of the legal
status of the Charter, the principles provided by the Charter cannot be a basis for
prosecution of the crimes against the environment committed during the Gulf war for the
same reasons mentioned above in regard to the Stockholm declaration.

c.

The Rio Declaration 1061

The Rio Declaration was adopted at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in
1992. This Declaration did not advance the rules regarding protecting the environment.
There is no doubt that the failure to provide more protection was motivated by the desire
to reach universal agreement regarding the protection of the environment. The focus in
this Declaration was to solve the two combating interests, economic development and the
preservation of the environment. Thus, the effort was directed toward creating a
mechanism in order to compromise on the interests in conflict.

1059

World Charter for Nature princ. 20, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983).
1060
Resorting to “general principles recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law, it has
been said that such a number of adopting states (111 states) renders the Charter a binding instrument. See
Stephanie Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International
Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 165 (1992) cited in Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed
Conflict 187 n.268 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).
1061
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874
(1992).
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However, the Declaration continues the affirmation of principles covering
activities harming the environment, whether these activities were military or nonmilitary. For instance, principle 24, acknowledging the destruction of the environment
during the Gulf War, provides, “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable
development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the
environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as
necessary.” 1062

Principle 13 of the Declaration repeats the same remedy which should be
expected in case of harm caused by one state to another. 1063 After reviewing the
principles of the Declaration, no one can reach the conclusion that the Declaration has
any plain rule regarding criminal responsibility, the individual’s obligations, or the legal
status which makes the Declaration binding for Iraq and its nationals, especially since
Iraq did not participate in the Conference.

II.

Hard Law

Hard laws under the international law regime represent basically the primary
sources for international law. Sources mainly are international customs and international
conventions. Since international environmental law has been recently developed, custom
has not played a significant role yet. Consequently, the focus will be on international

1062

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31
ILM 874 (1992).
1063
Principle 13 provides, “States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and
more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas
beyond their jurisdiction.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 13, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992).
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conventional law. The review will focus on major environmental problems facing the
international community.

a.

Land–Based Pollution

It has been reported that 80% of all marine pollution comes from sources that are
located on land. 1064 Pollutants generated on land travel in many ways through the
atmosphere, rivers, canals, underground watercourses, and outfalls. Moreover, urban
expansion into coastal areas has exacerbated the problem of land-based marine pollution.
In sum, the problem of land-based pollution has loomed as more problematic due to
urban and economic growth.

Oil is one of eight groups of pollutants that are deposited into the sea and the
ocean. 1065 The sources of these pollutants are various. For instance, nutrients are
introduced into the marine environment through runoff from agricultural lands, discharge
of domestic sewage, industrial effluents, and atmospheric emissions. 1066 Increased
amounts of nutrients in the sea leads to phytoplankton growth which causes
decomposition of organic materials. This process ends up with depletion of oxygen
causing the death of fish and other marine life.

The control of land-based pollution is one of the hardest tasks on several grounds.
First, it requires controlling domestic pollution which leads to control of the sovereign
1064

Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26, Ch.17.
Other chemicals are chemical nutrients, sewage and bacterial agents, organic chemicals, metals,
sediments
and
litter,
radioactive
substances,
and
heat.”
IMO/FAO/UN.ESCOICO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP: Joint Group of Exports on the Scientific Aspects of Marine
Environmental Protection, Protecting the Ocean from Land-Based Activities, 2.2.1 (June 2001).
1066
IMO/FAO/UN.ESCO-ICO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP: Joint Group of Exports on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, Protecting the Ocean from Land-Based Activities, 2.2.3 (June
2001).
1065
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rights of states to pollute their own territory states rarely accept that. Secondly, the
scientific difficulties of demonstrating pathways and sources are immense. Thirdly,
controlling land-based pollution demands generally expensive measures which sacrifice
states’ economy. The international community’s legal response to such a problem was
through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Montreal
Guidelines.

i.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1067

Article 207 (1) of the Convention requires states to adopt measures “to prevent,
reduce and control…” land-based pollution, “taking into account internationally agreed
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.” 1068 However, no formal
standards even exist at the global level for land-based pollution. Article 122-123 controls
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, like the Gulf.

Looking for standards regarding land-based pollution, states resort to the
Montreal Guidelines. 1069 The Montreal Guidelines are a set of recommendations
compiled by a Working Group of Experts under UNEP auspices. It suggested that states
adopt national legislation, regional agreements or any future global agreements on landbased pollution.

1067

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982) (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994).
1068
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 207 (1), 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982)
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
1069
Montreal Guidelines for the Protection Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based
Pollution, UNEP/GC.13/9/add.3, UNEP/GC/DEC/13/1811., UNEP ELPG No.7 (1985).
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Neither the Convention nor the guidelines set up any provision for criminal
responsibility in case of any violation of these standards. No doubt, states can adopt
legislation or regulations containing criminal remedies for a violation of land-based
pollution standards. However, neither Kuwait nor Iraq has adopted these remedies upon
which criminal responsibility can be based.

ii.

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution and its Protocols 1070
The only regional convention which exists, relating to the environment in the Gulf

and to which both Iraq and Kuwait are parties, is the Kuwait Regional Convention for the
Cooperation on the Protections of the Marine Environment from Pollution and its
protocols.

The Convention is the fruit of the Kuwait Regional Conference of
Plenipotentiaries held on April 23, 1978. The Convention entered into force on June 30,
1979. The parties are: Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates. The Convention is a comprehensive umbrella agreement for the
protection of the marine environment. It identifies the pollution sources and requires
controlling these sources. The sources are ships, dumping, land-based sources,
exploration and exploitation of the sea bed, and other human activities.

It also identifies other environmental management issues for which co-operative
efforts are to be made. The convention contains provisions dealing with technical
assistance and liability. Article III of the convention provides, “The Contracting States

1070

Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author).
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shall, individually and/or jointly, take all appropriate measures…to prevent, abate and
combat pollution of the marine environment in the Sea Area….” 1071 In addition, Article
XIII laid down, “The Contracting States undertake to co-operate in the formulation and
adoption of appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of: (a) Civil Liability
and compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment,
bearing in mind applicable international rules and procedures relating to those matters;
and (b) liability and compensation for damage resulting from violation of obligations
under the Convention and its Protocols.” 1072

With the Convention, the Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in case of Emergency 1073 was
adopted. Article I (2) of the Protocol defines “Marine Emergency” as “[A]ny casualty,
incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in substantial pollution or
imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine environment by oil or other
harmful substances and including, inter alia, collisions, strandings and other incidents
involving ships, includes tankers, blow-outs arising from petroleum drilling and
production activities, and the presence of oil or other harmful substances arising from the
failure of industrial installations.” 1074 The Protocol aims for cooperation in case the
occurence of a marine emergency. Parties to the Convention are parties to the Protocol.

1071

Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution art. III, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author).
1072
Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution art. XIII, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author).
1073
Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful
Substances in Case of Emergency, April 24, 1978 (on file with author).
1074
Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances in Case of Emergency art. I (2), April 24, 1978 (on file with author).
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Neither the Convention nor the Protocol contains any indication of an individual
criminal responsibility in case of a violation. Obligations under the instruments are
imposed on states, but not individuals. In other words, they rely on states to cooperate in
formulating the rules to determine liability. Such a lack of an effective mechanism has
rendered the Convention and the Protocol unsuitable as a substantive basis for criminal
responsibility. Although it might be considered that Iraq violated the Convention, this
violation does not raise the criminal responsibility of the Contracting states’ citizens.

b.

Biodiversity

Biodiversity means “the variability among living organisms from all sources
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species
and of ecosystems.” 1075 The problem of biodiversity exists because species are driven to
extinction by predators that over hunt them; by competitors that co-opt their habitat, or
food sources; by disease; and by natural disasters, and this mass extinction is not natural.
The extinction rate is very high, estimated at a thousand times the natural rate. The value
of biodiversity is very important. 1076 The causes of biodiversity loss are various. 1077

In brief, human activities cause species loss either directly by consumption (food,
clothing, ornament, pets, and raw materials) or indirectly by destroying their habitats
(logging, slash and burn agriculture, damming rivers, draining wetlands, and
contaminating the air and the water).
1075

Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29,
1993).
1076
David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 939 (Foundation 1998).
1077
David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 944 (Foundation 1998).
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In addition, climate change and ozone depletion contribute as well to biodiversity
loss. The consequences of biodiversity loss are based on the fact that all life on the earth
depends for its existence on the ecosystem services such as the cycling of oxygen, carbon
and nitrogen, maintenance of soil fertility, recycling of nutrients, decomposition of waste,
stabilization of climate and water purification. In sum, biodiversity is essential to human
survival and prosperity.

The international effort to solve this problem resulted in the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). 1078 The objectives of this Convention are “the conservation
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.” 1079

Article 3 of the Convention provides that “States have, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.” 1080 Since this rule is part of international customary law, it is applicable in
both peace and armed conflict times.

However, this Convention cannot be a basis for individual criminal responsibility
in case of violation of its terms. First, the Convention does not provide a criminal remedy

1078

Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29,
1993).
1080
The Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29,
1993).
1079
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in case of the violation. Second, the Convention entered into force on December 29,
1993. Therefore, assuming it has criminal provisions, adopting this Convention as a basis
for criminal prosecution will clearly violate the basic criminal rule prohibiting retroactive
application of the criminal law. Third, Iraq is not party to the Convention and Kuwait
became a party on August 2, 2002. The same thing can be said regarding the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety 1081 which is considered the supplementary agreement for CBD.

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES)

1082

attempts to protect endangered species through restrictions on

international trade. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild
animals and plants does not threaten their survival. It imposes on state parties an
obligation to penalize the trade or possess the endangered species. 1083 The subject matter
of the convention does not relate to environmental destruction during armed conflict.
However, this does not mean that the convention does not apply in the time of armed
conflict. Such a trade can be anticipated in both peace and armed conflict times.

Moreover, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and
Natural Heritage is also an international endeavor to protect another aspect of the
environment. 1084 It protects the sites which are considered both “cultural heritage” and
“natural heritage.” 1085 The Convention prohibits each state party from taking any

1081

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, January 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 27 UST 1087;
TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (1973) (entered into force July 1, 1975).
1083
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora art. VIII (1), 27
UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (1973) (entered into force July 1, 1975).
1084
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073
U.N.T.S. 151.
1085
Article 1 of the Convention defines “cultural heritage” as “monuments: architectural works, works of
monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave
1082
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measure which directly or indirectly causes the destruction of the protected sites which
are located in another state party’s territory.1086 The Convention recognizes and protects
examples of natural and cultural sites. Most of the listed sites are national parks. In
addition, Article 11(4) of the Convention contains a “list of World Heritage in
danger.” 1087

The Convention does not provide a criminal remedy for its violation. As a matter
of fact, the nature of the adopted remedy to fulfill the Convention obligations is a national
policy issue. Iraq accepted the Convention in March 3, 1974 and Kuwait ratified it on
June 6, 2002. In addition, after reviewing the “World Heritage List,” Kuwait had no
properties which were included in that list. 1088

To protect the wetlands, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention) was adopted. 1089 Article 4 (1)
provides that, “Each Contracting Party shall promote the conservation of wetlands and
dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of
history, art or science; groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of
their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from
the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man,
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical,
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” While article 2 defines the “natural heritage” as
“natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are
of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical
formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites or
precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science,
conservation or natural beauty.” Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151.
1086
Article 6 (3) of the convention provides “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage referred to
in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Convention.” Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151.
1087
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage art. 11 (4), Nov. 16,
1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151.
1088
For the list of these sites, visit http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
1089
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 996 UNTS 245;
TIAS 11084; 11 ILM 963 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975).
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waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands, whether they are included in the
List or not, and provide adequately for their wardening.” 1090 The violation of this
Convention might raise without doubt the international responsibility of the state which
violated the Convention’s provisions. However, individual criminal responsibility
requires a clear and precise expression concerning the parties’ intention.

Finally, the Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
or the Bonn Convention 1091 was adopted to protect the entire spectrum of animal species
including birds, mammals, reptiles, and fish. Article III (4) (a) laid down:

Parties that are Range States of a migratory species listed in Appendix I
shall endeavour: a) to conserve and, where feasible and appropriate,
restore those habitats of the species which are of importance in removing
the species from danger of extinction; b) to prevent, remove, compensate
for or minimize, as appropriate, the adverse effects of activities or
obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration of the species;
and c) to the extent feasible and appropriate, to prevent, reduce or control
factors that are endangering or are likely to further endanger the species,
including strictly controlling the introduction of, or controlling or
eliminating, already introduced exotic species. 1092
Although some of the animals affected during the Gulf armed conflict of 1990
are listed as endangered species, such as the Green Turtle, neither Kuwait nor Iraq are
parties to this Convention. In sum, the Convention, as previously cited international legal
instruments in this field, cannot be used to try its violators criminally.

1090

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat art. 4 (1), 996
UNTS 245; TIAS 11084; 11 ILM 963 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975).
1091
Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 19 ILM 15 (1980); ATS 1991/32;
BTS 87 (1990), Cm. 1332. (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983).
1092
Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals art. III (4)(a), 19 ILM 15 (1980);
ATS 1991/32; BTS 87 (1990), Cm. 1332 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983).
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c.

Global Climate Change

Human activities are changing the global climate which causes unpredictable
consequences for global weather patterns, ecosystems and human health. Human
activities have resulted in increased concentration of gases in the atmosphere, causing
increased global temperature. Increased temperature leads to an increase in the number of
extreme weather events such as floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes. In addition, the
increase of temperature might cause biodiversity loss through affected forests and
habitats. Moreover, increasing the temperature may spread those species carrying fatal
diseases such as malaria and typhus. 1093

An international effort to deal with this problem has been made through the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 1094 All parties
have a duty to “promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases.” 1095 In sum, all governments
under the Convention are obligated to gather and share information on greenhouse gas
emissions, national policies and best practices and to launch national strategies for
addressing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to expected impacts, including the
provision of financial and technological support to developing countries, and to cooperate
in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.
1093

David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 2-3 (Foundation 1998).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty Doc No.
102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).
1095
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4 (1)(d), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21,
1994).
1094
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Each party must take climate change considerations into account in domestic
policies and actions. 1096 Article 3 (3) adopts the Precautionary Approach. It states “the
parties shall take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.” 1097 Such an article applies equally to
both military and non-military actions. However, this Convention does not include a
direct rule which criminalizes the action of creating emissions. In addition, Kuwait
became a party to the treaty in 1994 while Iraq is not a party. Moreover, the Convention
entered into force on March 21, 1994. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 1098 does not provide any provision in
criminal matters as well.

d.

Ozone Depletion

The ozone layer shields the Earth from high-energy ultra-violet radiation (UV-B)
from the sun. UV-B is extremely harmful to human health and the environment.
Synthetic chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) destroy the ozone layer more
quickly than it can be replenished. The increased amount of UV-B radiation striking the
earth’s surface may increase the rates of skin cancer, suppress the body’s immune
response system, inhibit the growth of many plants such as cotton, soybeans, and certain
trees, alter the biodiversity terrestrial ecosystems, and cause developmental abnormalities
in fish and other species.
1096

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4 (1)(f), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21,
1994).
1097
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3 (3), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21,
1994).
1098
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) ( entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
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Through the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna
Convention) 1099 the international community effort began to reduce the global production
and consumption of ozone layer depleting substances. Article 2 (1) of the Convention
asserts that nations agree to take “appropriate measures to protect human health and the
environment against adverse effects resulting from human activities which modify or are
more likely to modify the ozone layer.” 1100 Neither specified measures nor substances
harmful to the ozone layer are mentioned by the Convention. Thus, the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted. 1101

Its goal is to eliminate the ozone-depleting substances. (Preamble) It has been
amended five times: London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna (1995), Montreal
(1997) and Beijing (1999). The military use of chlorofluorocarbons is deemed a breach of
both the Vienna Convention 1102 and the Montreal Protocol and London Adjustments. 1103
Neither the Convention nor its Protocols provide a basis for individual criminal
responsibility.

1099

Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, TIAS No. 11,097; 1513 U.N.T.S. 323; 26 ILM 1529
(1987) (entered into force Sep. 22, 1988).
1100
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2 (1), TIAS No. 11,097; 1513 U.N.T.S. 323; 26
ILM 1529 (1987) (entered into force Sep. 22, 1988).
1101
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1; 26 ILM 1550 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
1102
John S. Hannah, Chlorofluorocarbon: A Scientific Environmental, and Regulatory Assessment, 31
A.F.L. REV. 85, 92 (1989) cited in Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 157 n. 74
(Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).
1103
David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International
Environmental Law Lawmaking, 14 HOUS. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 755, 760 (1991) cited in Nada AlDuaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 157 n. 75 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).
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e.

Toxic and Hazardous Substances
Despite the fact that toxic and hazardous substances are responsible for air and

water pollution, unlike in some national legal systems, 1104 there is no universally adopted
or accepted definition of hazardous substances. However, a toxic substance can be
identified by a number of factors including the length of time it will persist in the
environment , how it tends to build up in the tissue of lower species, the extent to which it
reacts with other substances to form a more harmful contaminant, and whether it
produces effects in humans. 1105

The international legal response to this problem was the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 1106 The
Convention aims to control the movement, by either importing or exporting, of hazardous
waste between the state parties. The Convention considers the movement criminal. 1107

The Convention defines hazardous waste as those substances which are explosive,
flammable, oxidizing, poisonous, infectious, corrosive, toxic, or any substances capable
of forming other materials which possess any of the previous characteristics after

1104

In national legal systems, like that of the United States, toxic and chemical substances have been
identified differently for each class of pollutant and for differing regulatory schemes. Hazardous waste,
defined under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, is any solid waste which because of its
concentration, quantity, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality or to irreversible illness. See Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §6903; Hazardous air pollutants, under the Clean Air Act, are those substances which
may be carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogentic, neurotoxin, or those that cause adverse environmental effects
through bioaccumulation. See the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4712 (b)(2)(B). For the hazardous waste
definition in the hazardous waste statute, see Jeffrey G. Miller ET Al, The Law of Hazardous Waste
Disposal and Remediation, Cases-Legislation-Regulations-Policies 131-191 (West Publishing Co. 1996).
1105
G. Tyler Miller, Living In the Environment 397-402 (12th ed. 2002).
1106
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992).
1107
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal art. 4 (3), 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992).
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disposal. 1108 Although oil can be considered waste under the Convention,1109 Kuwait has
been a party to the Basel convention since 1993 while Iraq is not a party. There is another
convention which has lists of wastes. 1110 However, the jurisdiction of this Convention
covers only those activities which end in Africa.

f.

Transboundary Air Pollution

Three specific problems can be singled out: (1) Particulate matter (airborne dust
and smoke), (2) Lead which is produced primarily from vehicle emissions, and (3) Indoor
air pollution. The migration of air pollutants has created major global problems such as
climate change, ozone layer depletion, and nuclear fallout. Examples of air pollutants are
sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides. Pollutants emitted into the atmosphere from industrial
and commercial sources and automobile exhausts can form gases or become dissolved in
cloud vapor and raindrops. Those pollutants may produce new toxic chemicals that can
be transported many hundreds miles by winds, deposited on the soil or in the water or
returned to the earth by rainfall. Acid rain represents a classic example of the global
transportation of pollutants.

The prevailing rule in this issue is that one country may not cause significant
transboundary environmental harm to another. 1111 Although there is no global
international treaty dealing with air pollution, the international community’s legal

1108

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992) Annex III.
1109
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992) Annex I.
1110
Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement
and Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa art. 2, ann. I, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 775.
1111
Thomas W. Merril, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. J. 931, 951 n. 106-07
(1997).
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response to this problem is the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution. 1112 The Convention was created under the auspices of the U.N. Economic
Commission for Europe in 1979 and counts most countries in the Northern Hemisphere
as parties, including the United States, Canada, and Russia. The Convention embraces a
duty not to cause transboundary harm. 1113 It focuses generally on combating acid rain.

Long-Range air pollution is air pollution “which has adverse effects in the area
under the jurisdiction of another state at such a distance that it is not generally possible to
distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources.” 1114
Article 2 of the Convention mandates that states endeavor to limit, reduce, and prevent air
pollution. 1115

Eight protocols have been added to the Convention. These protocols require
specific emission limitations for sulphur dioxide (1985, 1994), nitrogen oxide (1988), and
volatile organic pollutants (1998), and include a protocol which set 2010 emissions
ceilings for four pollutants: sulphur, NOx, VOCs and ammonia. Neither Kuwait nor Iraq
are parties to this convention. This Convention and its protocols do not adopt individual
criminal responsibility in case of their violation.

1112

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; 18 ILM
1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
1113
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution preamble ¶ 5, TIAS 10541; 1302 UNTS 217;
18 ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
1114
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 1 (b), TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217;
18 ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
1115
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 2, TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; 18
ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
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Documentary Evidence
Nationally and internationally, criminal conviction can be secured by proving
beyond reasonable doubt that an accused committed the criminal action with which he is
charged. This conviction can be obtained by different types of evidence, either oral or
written evidence. The evidence has to be admitted by a court after being the subject of
arguments by parties. 1116 In international criminal law, evidence rules are set by those
international instruments constituting criminal proceedings. For instance, article (89) of
ICTY’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure sets the general principles concerning
evidentiary issues. 1117
By and large, international judges, unlike national judges, are not bound by these
national technical and strict rules governing evidence. 1118 Therefore, in case of the
absence of evidence rules in an international instrument creating an international criminal
tribunal, a chamber “[S]hall apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair
determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute
[ICTY statute] and the general principles of law.” 1119

1116

Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 421 (Oxford University Press 2003).
Article 89 of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides “(A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of
evidence set forth in this section, and shall not be bound by national rules of evidence. (B) In cases not
otherwise provided for in this section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair
determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general
principles of law. (C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to
ensure a fair trial. (E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of
court. (F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow,
in written form. ” Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
1118
See generally Gideon Boas, Admissibility of Evidence under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the ICTY: Development of the ‘Flexibility Principle’ in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 263
(Richard May et. al. eds., 2001).
1119
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (A)(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
1117
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As a result of this flexibility, international criminal tribunals or courts may create
some evidence rules to preserve other provisions of their legislation. For example, a court
may take a judicial notice concerning facts of common knowledge. 1120 In Saddam
Hussein’s case, an ad hoc international criminal tribunal might have taken a judicial
notice, from U.N. records, regarding issues relating to the nature of the armed conflict
and the damage that resulted. No doubt this tool, judicial notice, contributes to expediting
the judicial proceedings, preserving the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay.
In terms of evidence, there are several types of evidence, oral and written or
documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is mainly reviewed in the following part
as this type of evidence is at hand at the current time in the case of Saddam Hussein. 1121
Documentary evidence includes both written statements offered in lieu of oral evidence
and “anything on which information is recorded.” 1122 Thus, documentary evidence
encompasses photographs, video-tapes, audio-tapes, digital records, sketches, maps, other
written documents containing military orders and reports, letters, diaries, books, journals,
newspapers and dossiers.
In one aspect, documentary evidence might be better than oral evidence
(witnesses’ testimony). This is true when a trial is held years after the alleged events and
witnesses have difficulties remembering details of the events. Moreover, it is said that,
“A challenge for the prosecution therefore is to connect the accused with the crimes
charged. There may be many witnesses to testify as to the occurrence of a particular
atrocity, but very few to link that atrocity to a particular accused at a higher level of
1120

See generally Eugene O’Sullivan, Judicial Notice in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 263
(Richard May et. Al. eds., 2001).
1121
See infra Ch.III.
1122
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 53 (January 27,
2000).
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authority.” 1123 On the contrary, documentary evidence, like military orders, speaks for
itself. In addition, it is no surprise that international criminal practice has proved that
documentary evidence is deemed to be a necessary path to expedite the trial. 1124
In international criminal law, documentary evidence has been used to prove
several issues such as ‘crime-base’ evidence, whether there were widespread and
systemic attacks on the civilian population or property, issues of command structure, and
crimes that occurred in the context of an international armed conflict. Plus, it is used to
corroborate, support, prove or disprove case circumstances.
Within international criminal practice, distinguishing between two stages,
admissibility and evidence weighing stages, should be noted. In light of the admissibility
stage, documentary evidence can be admitted either before or during the trial 1125 and its
sources can be individuals, states, and non-governmental organizations. 1126
Concerning the standard of admissibility of documentary evidence, it is ruled that,
“[T]he standard of proof required for admissibility [of documentary evidence] should be
lower than the standard of proof required in the final determination of the matter at hand
through the weighing up of the probative value of the evidence by the Chamber: that
comes later. Admission requires simply the proof that evidence has some probative

1123

Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 11 (Transnational Publishers
2002).
1124
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 256 (Transnational Publishers
2002).
1125
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 657 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
1126
For instance, article 18 (1) of ICTY statute states “The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio
or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations
organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.” Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 (1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR
48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).
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values.” 1127 Therefore, as a general rule, evidence to be admitted needs to be relevant and
have probative value. 1128
As a result, there are three challenges or objections the defense can raise
regarding documentary evidence. These challenges relate to relevance, reliability, and
repetition. 1129 The practice concerning these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper.
On the other side, weighing documentary evidence requires considering the
source and the authenticity of a document. The source of the document might affect its
credibility. However, it does not follow that if the source is the party which itself adduces
the document, the document is considered unreliable. 1130
By and large, the authenticity of a document is an issue a defense might raise
during a trial. Moreover, if the defense did not raise this issue, the trial court “may
request verification of the authenticity of the evidence obtained out of court.”1131 In order
to determine the authenticity of a document, several considerations, such as the form,
content and purported use of the document, plus the position of the parties on the matter,
should be taken into account. 1132 Moreover, it is not sufficient to rely on one of the
previous considerations to prove or disprove the authenticity of the document. 1133
In terms of the form of a document, several elements should be considered such
as whether a document is an original copy; whether it is enrolled with institutional
1127

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶56 (January 27,
2000).
1128
Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
1129
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 239-40 (Transnational
Publishers 2002).
1130
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 61-63 (January 27,
2000).
1131
Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).
1132
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 66 (January 27,
2000).
1133
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 72 (January 27,
2000).
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authorities; whether it contains a signature; whether it is sealed, certified, or stamped;
whether it is officially authorized by an authority; and whether it is duly executed. 1134
The content of the document is another factor to be considered, especially with
“its relation to oral testimony given before the Chamber pertaining to the content of the
document.” 1135 In the same context, it is ruled that the absence of a signature or a stamp
from the document does not necessarily mean it lacks authenticity. 1136
Internationally, documentary evidence does not need to be produced through a
witness. However, it should be noted that, “[T]he defense’s rights include: how the
evidence was obtained, the chain of custody, potential tampering, and confronting and
cross-examining those who obtained the evidence and those who handled it.” 1137
Moreover, international criminal conviction does not require a corroboration rule.
Therefore, conviction can be obtained based upon, “[A] single testimony provided such
testimony is, in its opinion [Chamber’s opinion], relevant and credible.” 1138 This rule
extends to all types of evidence, including documentary evidence. In short, evidence
needs to be reasonable and reliable. 1139

1134

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 67 (January 27,
2000).
1135
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 70 (January 27,
2000).
1136
Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-1, Admission of Evidence Order, ¶ 20 (February
15, 2002).
1137
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 657 (Transnational Publishers 2003);
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 245 (Transnational Publishers
2002).
1138
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 2, 1998) ¶ 135;
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence (January 27, 2000) ¶ 43;
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence (December 6, 1999) ¶ 18.
1139
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (June 1,
2001) ¶ 320-22.
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Documents containing military orders, reports, maps and photographs are
admitted before international criminal tribunals. 1140 In addition to paper documents,
video-tapes, audio-tapes, and digital records are included within this accepted evidence.
Real evidence is another source for obtaining criminal conviction. This evidence
“consists of any object presented to the court as evidence” 1141 and can be gathered by
visiting the locus of the crime. Even though, in the case of those trials held years after the
events, it might be thought that real evidence will not play a critical role, this is not true.
Depending on the ability of the prosecution, the real evidence might be admitted if the
prosecution can demonstrate that this evidence has probative value, a strong chain of
custody, and there is no possibility of evidence tampering.
Finally, in the near future, pursuing crimes against the environment before the
International Criminal Court will depend extensively upon expert witnesses. This type of
evidence is necessary to determine environmental impacts and their causes.

1140

Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 246-52 (Transnational
Publishers 2002).
1141
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 256 (Transnational Publishers
2002).
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International Armed Conflict Instruments that are inapplicable to Saddam
Hussein’s Case
As a matter of fact, the laws of armed conflict have a long history 1142 and, during
that history, they have expanded from the protection of objects to the protection of people
and the environment. In the context of environmental protection, the protection was
indirect at the beginning. Later on, explicit protection became clear. 1143 In the light of
indirect protection of the environment, this protection can be accomplished by other
conventions controlling the means of warfare. For example, the protection of the
environment can be achieved through other conventions which limit the right of
belligerents to use certain weapons.

However, this study is meant to explore the gaps in the international law regime
concerning the explicit protection of the environment as an object. Such explicit
protection is required and essential for closing any future debate that might be raised
regarding whether laws of armed conflict adequately protect the environment.
Moreover, in terms of the general principles applicable to any military action regardless
of its target, people or properties including the environment, one of the main goals the
laws of armed conflict have tried to accomplish is to limit the belligerent’s right to apply
any means of injuring the enemy’s property, including the environment. In achievement
of such a goal, there are four main principles that control war. Those principles are: [1]

1142

Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,89
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).
1143
David Hunter ET AL., International Environmental Law and Policy 1368 (Foundation Press 1998).
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Military necessity, [2] proportionality, [3] prevention of unnecessary suffering, and [4]
discrimination between civilian and military targets. 1144

With regard to international environmental offenses committed during warfare,
some of these principles, such as the military necessity and proportionality principles, lost
their independence and distinction by inclusion within those articles or codes which
protect the environment directly.1145

Therefore, the subject of this review is trying to accomplish is to address
international instruments protecting the environment as objects in respect to their
applicability to the deliberate destruction of the environment committed in the Gulf War
of 1991. The main international conventions which will be reviewed in this part of the
paper are the Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 and
relating to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed Conflict, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict.

1144

David Hunter ET AL., International Environmental Law and Policy 1368 (Foundation Press 1998).
For instance, compare among article 8(2)(b)(iv) of ICC statute provides “. 2. For the purpose of this
Statute, "war crimes" means:… (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts: ….(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause…..
injury to …. damage to…. widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”
See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998); and article 20 (g) of Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides “ Any of the following war crimes
constitute a crime against the peace and the security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or
on a large scale: (g) in the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by
military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage
occurs.” Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
1145
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In addition, recommendations and directions concerning protection of the
environment are not exclusive to binding instruments such as conventions and judicial
decisions. They might be located in non-binding instruments or so called soft laws as
well. Although soft laws are not binding instruments, they play an essential role in
assisting international courts in interpreting the provisions related to these instruments.
Therefore, the beginning of this review will deal with those instruments which are not
deemed to be binding instruments. The non-binding instruments are the draft Code of
Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind and the International Committee of the
Red Cross Manual regarding Protection of the Environment during the time of Armed
Conflict.

Soft laws can be those drafts issued by the International Law Commission (ILC)
concerning the laws of armed conflicts or war crimes such as the Draft Code of Crimes
against Peace and Security of Mankind. 1146 The Draft considers an intentional attack
against the environment in international armed conflict without military necessity as a
war crime. 1147 The positive feature that can be attributed to the Draft is that it does not
make a distinction, in light of the protection of the environment, between internal and
international armed conflict. In addition, commentary paragraphs included and attached

1146

Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
1147
Article 20 (g) provides the fruit of 24-year development regarding environmental protection during
armed conflict. Article 20 (g) provides “Any of the following war crimes constitute a crime against the
peace and the security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale: (g) in the
case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely
prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs.” Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532,
corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
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with the Draft are useful tools for international judges to use to comprehend the elements
and extent of the offense.
Other examples of soft laws in the field of armed conflict will be those
recommendations, manuals, and guidelines issued by non-governmental organizations
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC.) For instance, in 1993,
ICRC issued the "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict." 1148 The guidelines are meant "to
contribute in a practical and effective way to raising awareness of a precious asset which
merits respect and protection …in time of armed conflict: the natural environment." 1149
The guidelines reaffirmed those principles protecting the environment in international
agreements such as distinction and proportionality.
In addition, the guidelines provide examples of international protection of the
environment such as prohibition of transplanting indiscriminate landmines, attacks on
historic monuments, using plants to cover military objectives, and destruction of cultural
properties. Finally, the guidelines recommend that "the parties thereto are encouraged to
facilitate and protect the work of impartial organizations contributing to preventing or
repairing damage to the environment" 1150 and disseminate the guideline rules by making
them known as widely as possible.

1148

The guidleines are available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument
(last visited Nov.11, 2006).
1149
Paragraph 19 of the Guidelines,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument ( last visited Nov.11, 2006).
1150
Paragraph 17 of the Guidelines,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument (last visited Nov.11, 2006).
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I.

The Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949,
relating to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed
Conflict 1151
The Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relating

to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed Conflict is the first
international instrument that deals with or protects the environment explicitly during
armed conflict time. 1152 It came into force in 1978.

The Protocol applies to international armed conflicts. Its general aim is to make
warfare less brutal and inhuman. In addition, the Protocol was drafted by the
International Committee of the Red Cross 1153 in response to the large-scale use of “Agent
Orange” by U.S. armed forces in the Vietnam War. The pertinent articles of the Protocol
are 35 and 55. Article 35 (1) and (3) provides:

In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited…..3. It is prohibited to
employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment. 1154
From the above text, it is plain that it did not address the incidental damages that
occurred during armed conflict. In addition, it requires, in order for the Protocol to be
violated, that three elements (widespread, long-term, and severe) be present. Long-term

1151

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977).
1152
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 .U.N.T.S. 3 (1977).
1153
Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the Nato Military Action against
Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 126 (2000).
1154
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35 (1),(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977).
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damage is understood as damage which lasts a period of years, if not decades. 1155 The
missing element in this text is military necessity which is a traditional justification for
most military actions. The Protocol, at least in respect to the above article and the relative
time of the commission of the Iraq offenses, is not considered a part of customary
international law. 1156

The second article is 55 which lays down:

Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population….. Attacks
against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 1157
Generally, protection of the environment can be accomplished through a couple of
approaches. The first protects those elements of nature which are necessary to human
survival. Therefore, this link between human suffering and the environment injures the
protection since it requires a higher standard of proof and injuries. The second is to
extend protection to all elements of nature, regardless of their link to human life. 1158

It seems that the Protocol adopts both approaches since the difference between
article 55 and 35 is “Article 35… broaches the problem from the point of view of
methods of warfare, Article 55 concentrates on the survival of the population, so that
even though the two provisions overlap to some extent, and their tenor is similar, they do
1155

See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary. ¶ 1452 available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750044?OpenDocument (Last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
1156
See Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for
International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 113 (1992).
1157
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 55, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977).
1158
Stephen C. MaCaffrey, Crimes against the Environment in International Criminal Law, Vol. I, 983 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).

318

Appendix 6
not duplicate each other. (9) It will be noted that the text begins with the words "care
shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment.” 1159

In other words, article 35 concerns this environmental destruction regardless of its
humanitarian effects while article 55 considers the environment as a protected object and
recognizes the link between the environment and human survival. The Protocol does not
consider environmental destruction as a grave breach. 1160 Moreover, other protection can
be derived from the Protocol. This protection is indirect through protecting other
objects. 1161 The Protocol imposes both civil and criminal responsibility. 1162

There is no need to examine whether the two articles, 35 and 55, are applicable to
Iraqi action during the Gulf war, since Iraq is not party to the Protocol and the provisions
protecting the environment were not considered part of international customary law at

1159

See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary, ¶ 2133 available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750070?OpenDocument ((Last visited Aug. 31, 2006)
1160
See article 85 (3) of the Protocol. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). Article
85 (5) provides that “Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave
breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.” This provision is confusing regarding these
provisions of the Protocol which are considered grave breaches; are they constituted crimes? are they only
military crimes and thus left to local authorities to decide the fate of their actors? They only fact that can be
inferred from the paragraph is that these are war crimes and the universal jurisdiction doctrine will not be
applicable to them.
1161
For instance article 54 (2) of the Protocol provides “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to
the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to
move away, or for any other motive…” In addition, article 56(1) provides “Works or installations
containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be
made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack
if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977).
1162
Article 86 of the Protocol deals with criminal responsibility and article 91 provides the basis for the
civil responsibility Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977).
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least when those actions were committed. Therefore, there was no way to implement the
provisions of the Protocol in the facts of the case without violating the principle of
legality.

II.

ENMOD Convention 1163

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, or ENMOD Convention, was adopted by a
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1164 ratified by thirty six countries. Like
Protocol I, the Convention is deemed to be a response to the actions of United States
armed forces during the Vietnam War. 1165 The Convention has not gained the status of an
international customary norm yet. 1166 It entered into force October 5, 1978.

Article I (1) of the Convention lays down the basic obligation on state parties.
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” 1167

The

Convention

defines

the

damage

requirements

as:

"widespread":

encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; "long-lasting":
lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; and "severe": involving serious

1163

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.
1164
G.A. Res. 31/72, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.39, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
1165
Peter J. Richard & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protection the Environment during
Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1047, 1063 (1999).
1166
See Anthony Leibler, Delibrate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International
Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 81 (1992).
1167
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques art. I (1), May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.
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or significant disruption or harm to human life, and natural and economic resources or
other assets.” 1168

The Convention is broader than Protocol I in two aspects at least. First, it does not
require for its violation all the three conditions or adjectives (widespread, long-lasting, or
severe). Any of these conditions may cause the violation of the Convention if it resulted
from the use of environmental modification techniques. Secondly, the Convention does
not apply only in armed conflict time. It covers any military activities whether in armed
conflict, international or internal, or in peace time.

The Convention defines environmental modification techniques as “any technique
for changing -- through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes -- the dynamics,
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and
atmosphere, or of outer space.” 1169 The Convention does not consider military necessity,
self-defense, or distress as justifications to violate its terms. However, it protects only a
party state’s territory and does not provide explicitly civil or criminal responsibility as
remedies for its violation.

The remedy that can be taken by the complaining state concerning a violation of
the Convention against its territory is bilateral consultation and cooperation, an inquiry
commission, or filing a complaint with the U.N. Security Council. 1170 It seems that the
Convention imposes its obligations on states, not individuals. Thus, the expected remedy
1168

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152, Understandings Regarding the Convention,
Understanding relating Article I.
1169
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques art. II, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.
1170
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques art. V (2), May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.
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is a remedy which can be taken against the states. Finally, Iraq just signed, but has not
ratified. 1171 As a result, Iraq is not bound by the Convention’s provisions.

III. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict 1172

The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, adopted at The Hague (Netherlands) in 1954 in the wake of massive destruction
of the cultural heritage in the Second World War, is the first international treaty of a
world-wide nature focusing exclusively on the protection of cultural heritage in the event
of armed conflict. The Convention has two protocols.
It covers immovable and movable objects, including monuments of architecture,
art or history; archaeological sites; works of art; manuscripts; books and other objects of
artistic; historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections of all kinds
regardless of their origin or ownership. 1173
States which are party to the Convention benefit from a network of more than a
hundred States that have undertaken to lessen the consequences of armed conflict for the
cultural heritage and to take preventive measures for such protection not only in time of
hostility, when it is usually too late, but also in time of peace, by a variety of measures.
These measures safeguard and respect cultural property during both international
and non-international armed conflicts; consider registering a limited number of refuges,
monumental centers and other immovable cultural property of very great importance
1171

Countries
which
are
parties
to
the
Convention
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Prohibition_of_Military_or_Any_Other_Hostile_Use_of_
Environmental_Modification_Techniques (last visited July 10, 2007).
1172
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of armed conflict, 249 U.N.T.S.
240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).
1173
See article (1) of the Convention. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of armed conflict, 249 UNTS 240(1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).
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listed in the International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection and
obtaining special protection for such property; consider marking certain important
buildings and monuments with the special protective emblem of the Convention; and set
up special units within the military forces to be responsible for the protection of the
cultural heritage.
Article 18 (2), determining the scope of the application of the Convention, lays
down, “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance.” 1174 According to article 5 of the Convention, in the case of occupation, the
occupying power:
1. shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the
occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property. 2.
Should it prove necessary to take measures to preserve cultural property
situated in occupied territory and damaged by military operations, and
should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures,
the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in close co-operation
with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation.
3. Any High Contracting Party whose government is considered their
legitimate government by members of a resistance movement, shall, if
possible, draw their attention to the obligation to comply with those
provisions of the Conventions dealing with respect for cultural
property. 1175

The Convention penalizes violations of the Convention and promotes its
provisions widely to the general public and to target groups such as cultural heritage
professionals, the military or law-enforcement. 1176
1174

The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 18 (2), 249
U.N.T.S. 240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).
1175
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 5, 249
U.N.T.S. 240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).
1176
Article 28 of the Convention provides, “The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or
disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a
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Both Kuwait and Iraq are parties to the Convention and Saddam Hussein could
have been held responsible based upon the Convention for those actions taken against
museums and centers containing a large amount of cultural property such as scientific
collections and collections of books or archives. However, it is obvious that using oil is
not included within the definition of cultural property proscribed by the Convention.
Therefore, unless a connection or causation is established between the action of using oil
and the destruction of cultural property (using oil or land mines in destroying
archaeological sites), this Convention could not have been a basis for criminal conviction
in the case of Saddam Hussein.

breach of the present Convention.” The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
armed conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240(1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).
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